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I. INTRODUCTION
The shifting values of currency exchange rates now taking place
in favor of the yen and Deutsche mark in terms of dollars are creating
new opportunities for increased sales of United States products
abroad. At the same time, the current high trade deficit in the United
States has created a crucial need to increase U.S. exports. It is thus
timely to examine the impact of U.S. export regulations as a major
factor for encouraging or impeding the export of U.S. goods. The
comprehensive study that follows will discuss the amendments
adopted by the 99th Congress, in June 1985, to the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979 as those changes impact on the ability of U.S.
companies to sell technology products abroad. These amendments of-
fer some opportunity for increasing technology exports without risk-
ing national security.
In December 1982 Dr. Paul Freedenbergt predicted that the "ex-
piration of the Export Administration Act on September 30, 1983,
[would be] likely to precipitate one of the major legislative battles of
the 98th Congress."' 2 His prediction proved accurate, for the struggle
both within and between the two houses of Congress over how to re-
vise the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the 1979 Act) was not
only a great contest, but one that in fact outlived the 98th Congress.
Not until June 27, 1985, was the expired Export Administration Act
finally reauthorized in amended form by the 99th Congress, 3 to be
signed into law on July 12, 1985, 4 as the Export Administration
Amendments Act of 19855 (EAAA 1985).
On one side of this conflict were those who were outraged over
the leakage of scientific data and sophisticated technology into the
hands of the Soviets. Simply by copying our technology and ideas,
available not only illegally through espionage, theft, and bribery, but
legally through licensed purchases, freely available scientific and tech-
1. Dr. Freedenberg is International Finance Economist for the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Finance and Monetary Policy, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs [hereinafter cited as Senate Banking Committee], the Senate Committee having juris-
diction over revision of the Export Administration Act of 1979. Freedenberg, US. Export
Controls: Issues for High Technology Industries, 1982 NAT'L J. 2190.
2. Id.
3. 43 CONG. Q. 1302 (1985).
4. Trade Policy: Reagan Signs Compromise Bill Reauthorizing Exporting Administration
Act, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 135, at L-3 (July 15, 1985).
5. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 1985, reprinted
in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (99 Stat.) 120 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420
(1986)) [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 99-64].
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nical journals, and attendance at open scientific meetings, the Soviets
had been able to seriously narrow the technological advantage of the
West over the East. Worried legislators urged that increased regula-
tion of sales of technology and exchange of scientific information was
needed in revising the 1979 Act, as well as stricter enforcement of
export laws and harsher penalties for illegal activity.
On the other side of the conflict stood both the scientific commu-
nity and U.S. industrialists, who feared that greater restrictions on
their activities would threaten their survival. The scientific commu-
nity asserted that this country's technological superiority depends on
the open exchange of ideas among scientists at meetings and in their
professional journals. United States industry, while not disputing the
need to safeguard technological advancements from our enemies, ar-
gued that legitimate trade is stifled by unreasonable delays in ob-
taining licenses. Not only that, but directly because of the President's
broad authority under the 1979 Act to block performance on existing
contracts through trade sanctions, U.S. companies have gained a
wide-spread reputation abroad for being unreliable suppliers. Fur-
thermore, they argued, when the United States is not the sole supplier
of certain advanced technology, a unilateral restriction on exports
from this country only serves to boost the sales of foreign competitors
as U.S. companies are forced to vacate markets they worked to
develop.
The basic conflict of whether exports should be more highly pro-
moted or restricted was also manifested by the controversy, not only
within Congress but also within the Administration itself, as to which
agency-the Commerce Department or the Treasury Department's
Customs Service-should have primary responsibility for enforcing
commercial export laws.
Under the 1979 Act, Commerce has principal authority over
commercial exports, with the State Department (pursuant to other
laws) having jurisdiction over the export of defense articles. As the
only cabinet-level agency dedicated to seeking U.S. competitiveness in
international trade, Commerce's preeminence in export administra-
tion has been seen by many as the surest means of ensuring the pro-
motion of exports as the primary objective of commercial export
regulation.
Many in the Senate, however, were impressed with the Customs
Service's extensive experience as a traditional law enforcement agency
and its recent administration of President Reagan's "Operation Exo-
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dus," a campaign begun in 1981 of tougher enforcement against ille-
gal exports. 6 These senators sought to shift export enforcement duties
under the 1979 Act to Customs.
7
Meanwhile, a similar controversy raged over the appropriate
level of involvement of the Defense Department in the area of pre-
export license approvals. The well-funded8 Defense Department
(DOD) sought to persuade Congress to expand DOD's role in the
license review process and thereby assure attention to Defense's pri-
mary objective in export control: to deny advanced products and
technical know-how to the Soviets.9
The contrasting goals of the Defense and Commerce Depart-
ments in export administration capsulize the two contrasting goals of
the 1979 Act itself: while the DOD raises concerns about the risks of
having U.S. technology freely available on the world market, the
Commerce Department points out the adverse economic conse-
quences of denying to U.S. technology free access to the world mar-
ket. Nevertheless, the ongoing theme of congressional debate over
reauthorization of the Export Administration Act was that a way had
to be found to simultaneously further promote U.S. exports and put a
stop to Soviet military exploitation of this country's technological in-
novations. The end result of that legislative struggle is the subject of
this article, which will approach the subject by discussing each of the
issues affecting technology exports, presenting first the divergent
viewpoints advanced in congressional debate and then describing the
6. Operation Exodus is discussed in detail infra notes 393-407 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Weinrod & Pilon, Staunching the Technology Flow to Moscow, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 23, 1983, reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. S1293-94 (daily
ed. Feb. 9, 1984) (placed in the Congressional Record by Sen. Gan (R-Utah)); 130 CONG.
REC. S2141 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nunn (D-Ga.)); 130 CONG. REC. S 1694
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Proxmire (D-Wis.)).
8. Congressman Bonker (D-Wash.), a member of the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, recently commented on the contrast between the resources of the Commerce Department
and those of the Defense Department:
Mr. Perle [Assistant Secretary of the Defense Department] boasted that he has in-
creased his staff in one year from four to 77 people to handle licensing and technol-
ogy transfer policy. The Commerce Department has to come before our committee
to beg to put on another four or five people. With all those resources comes control.
I am not talking about technology control, I am talking about institutional control-
policy control, if you will.
Address by Congressman Bonker before a July 18, 1985, conference on the EAAA 1985, re-
printed in INT'L Bus. REV., July 1985, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Address by Rep. Bonker].
9. Chase, It's a Bruising, Three-cornered Turf Battle, ELECTRONIC Bus., Sept. 15, 1984,
at 134.
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consensus reached on each such point.'0
Before commencing a point-by-point discussion of the changes
enacted by the EAAA 1985, however, this article will provide a back-
ground on the history of U.S. export regulation, including: (a) the
events that led to the 1979 Act; (b) the legislative history of the
EAAA 1985; (c) the perspectives influencing options for controlling
exports; (d) a brief description of the operation of the 1979 Act; and
finally, (e) a chart outlining the options considered by Congress in
revising the 1979 Act.
II. HISTORY OF EXPORT REGULATION
A. Events Leading to the 1979 Act
Until 1949 the U.S. government had used export controls only in
wartime or other national emergency, but in the late forties the Cold
War led to the first comprehensive, peacetime control scheme over
exports, the Export Control Act of 1949.11 It dealt with the Commu-
nist world by simply cutting it off from trade with the West. The
1949 Act was simple to administer and worked well during the fifties
and early sixties when our allies shared our policy of economic con-
tainment and the United States dominated the world market in goods
and technology.'
2
Also, in 1949 the United States, Japan, and most of NATO
formed an informal organization known as the Coordinating Commit-
tee, or CoCom, to multilaterally control exports for security pur-
poses. 13 Members agree to jointly control the export of embargoed
items to specified countries, which for many years have included the
U.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, North Korea, Viet-
10. This article will not discuss those aspects of the EAAA 1985 dealing with exports of
agricultural products, nuclear technology or Alaskan crude oil, and it will deal sparingly with
issues related to sanctions against South Africa.
11. Comment, The EAA of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of the "Right to Export"
versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 258
(1981).
12. Murphy & Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The
Quandary of U.S. Export Controls, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791, 792 (1981).
13. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
PROGRAM 10 (1984) (available from ITA/DEA, Wash., D.C. 20230) [hereinafter cited as
COMMERCE]. The fifteen members of CoCom are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany (including West Berlin), Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(NATO-members Iceland and Spain do not belong to CoCom). Members retain the right to
act independently, and any agreements reached, such as which items are to be embargoed,
must be unanimous. Id.
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nam, and the People's Republic of China.14
During the 1960's, as the economies of our trading partners
strengthened, and their need to increase their exporting markets grew,
our allies sought greater trade with Eastern Europe and the rest of the
Communist world.' 5 The Export Administration Act of 1969 was a
response to pressure from our allies to liberalize our East-West trade
policy. 16 The 1969 Act took a marked departure from the superseded
1949 Act in regarding trade with all countries, Communist included,
as beneficial to the U.S.17
In the 1970's another change began, involving technological in-
novations. With the development and astonishing drop in the cost of
computer chips, manufacturers could afford to use microprocessors in
limitless inventions. Thus, technological advancements that could,
with Soviet ingenuity, be militarily significant to our enemies began
pouring out of the private sector. Previously, most militarily relevant
technology was developed under the direct supervision of the Penta-
gon, which was thus also in a position to control the transfer of that
technology to other countries. More and more, those concerned with
curbing our enemies' military advancement had to consider potential
applications of privately developed, U.S. high technology in the
wrong hands. 8
An additional factor that should be mentioned, one that has had
a significant impact on world trade in general, is the OPEC cartel's
control over world oil prices throughout the 1970's. As a result of the
1973-74 and 1979-80 OPEC price hikes, the increasingly high cost of
importing petroleum seriously escalated the pressure on the Europe-
ans and Asians to find ways to make up currency exchange and bal-
ance their trade deficits.19 No doubt this contributed to those
countries' unwillingness to employ the same tight controls over ex-
14. Id. CoCom is discussed further infra notes 370-77 and accompanying text.
15. Murphy & Downey, supra note 12, at 792.
16. COMMERCE, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Murphy & Downey, supra note 12, at 792.
18. Johnson, Apple Ils for Soviets? High Tech: Easing Curbs on Exports, L.A. Times,
May 21, 1984, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1.
19. Solomon, What the Oil Shock is Doing to the World Economy, FORTUNE, Dec. 29,
1980, at 9. See also Oil Prices Roil Eurocurrencies, Bus. WK., Mar. 29, 1982, at 146 (discuss-
ing large balance-of-payments deficits caused by high oil prices and effect of oil prices on for-
eign exchange rates); Dowling, An Oil-shock Strategy that Paid Off, Bus. WK., Dec. 1, 1980, at
66 (discussing success of Japan's aggressive export promotion to finance its oil deficit); Com-
mon Market May Turn to Oil States to Finance Deficits, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1980, at 38, col. 3
(discussing plan to help community members with international payments deficits caused by
high oil prices).
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ports of high-technology goods that the United States government
favored.
Predictably, U.S. companies soon protested our government's
unilateral restrictions on exports of high technology when similar
products were available abroad.20 In 1977, in response to pressure
from the private sector, legislators modified the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969 to restrict executive authority to impose export con-
trols on goods and commodities that were available abroad in
"significant quantities and comparable in quality" to U.S. products.2'
With the 1977 amendments, however, a new type of export con-
trol was authorized under the Act-the power to restrict exports for
foreign policy reasons. Under the 1977 amendments, the declared
policy of the United States was to encourage trade with all countries,
except those "with which such trade has been determined by the Pres-
ident to be against national interest. ' 22 Trade was permitted to be
interrupted "to the extent necessary to further significantly the for-
eign policy of the United States and to fulfill its international obliga-
tions."' 23 Under the 1977 amendments, Congress gave the President
the authority to "implement this policy by prohibiting or curtailing
exports 'under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe."' 24 In
practice, this meant direct loss of sales for U.S. exporters.
During the 1978 and 1979 congressional hearings on the
reauthorization of the Export Administration Act of 1969, due to ex-
pire in September 1979, much attention was given to the extensive use
the Carter Administration had made of its authority to impose foreign
policy controls.25 Witnesses testified to the confusion it created for
20. Comment, supra note 11, at 264.
21. COMMERCE, supra note 13, at 3, citing the 1979 Act, section 4(c), which reads as
follows:
(c) FOREIGN AVAILABILITY. -In accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
President shall not impose export controls for foreign policy or national security pur-
poses on the export from the United States,. . . unless the President determines that
adequate evidence has been presented to him demonstrating that the absence of such
controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the
United States.
Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 4(c), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (93 Stat.) 503, 506 [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 96-72].
22. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(A) (1977).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(7) (1977).
24. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(b)(1) (1977).
25. The Carter Administration seized upon this new authority to attempt to deny the
export of, for example: (1) about $400 million in trucks, aircraft, and spare parts to Libya to
discourage it from aggression against other African countries, particularly Egypt; (2) a Sperry-
Univac computer to Tass, the official Soviet press agency, as an expression of displeasure with
1986] 409
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exporters and its "dampening effect on the generally declining U.S.
export position.
' '26
Therefore, while the 1979 Act did include most of the 1977
amendments, provisions were added to guard against the misuse of
foreign policy controls. The new Act required the President to show
Congress that he had considered a specified set of criteria before call-
ing for economic sanctions against a targeted nation.
27
The 1979 Act also sought to improve on the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969 in: (a) its elevation of the needs of exporters;28 (b)
the provisions for greater input from the exporting community;
29 (c)
heightened congressional involvement in the export process mecha-
nisms; 30 and (d) requirements that the lists established to control ex-
the trials of Russian dissidents and U.S. newspaper reporters; (3) technical data and equipment
for a rock drill bit manufacturing facility by Dresser Industries to the Soviet Union; and (4)
certain crime control and detection equipment to any country engaged in egregious violations
of human rights. Murphy & Downey, supra note 12, at 810-11 nn.98-100. Perhaps best
remembered of the foreign policy controls imposed during the Carter years were the sweeping
economic sanctions declared in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: "an embargo
on exports of grain, phosphates, high technology products, equipment for the Kama River
truck plant; and goods to be used at the Olympics in Moscow. Also, the U.S. Olympic team
did not participate in the games." H. MOYER, JR. & L. MABRY, EXPORT CONTROLS AS IN-
STRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, LEGAL ISSUES, & POLICY LESSONS OF
THREE RECENT CASES (1983), reprinted in 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus., (June 1983), also
reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. E2347 (daily ed. May 18, 1983) (placed in the Congressional
Record by Rep. Hamilton (D-Ind.)) [hereinafter cited as MOYER-MABRY STUDY]. This study,
by Homer E. Moyer, Jr., and Linda A. Mabry, goes on to assess the relative lack of success of
the Afghanistan-related sanctions:
Because not all grain producing countries cooperated, the economic impact of the
grain embargo was ultimately quite limited, the Olympics boycott had substantial,
symbolic effect, although fewer countries joined the boycott than we had hoped; high
technology controls halted numerous U.S.-Soviet transactions but did not change the
policies of other COCOM countries. The greatest short-term economic inconven-
ience and cost to the Soviets may have been caused by the embargo on phosphates
and Kama River truck plant equipment. In total, the political statement of the sanc-
tions was strong, but the economic impact on the Soviets quite limited. The costs to
the U.S., in part hidden, were very high.
Id. at E2347.
26. Murphy & Downey, supra note 12, at 812.
27. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(b), at 513. These criteria and the problems
resulting from the fact that the 1979 Act requested, but did not enforce, executive self-re-
straint, are discussed infra notes 269-83 and accompanying text.
28. Id. § 3(10), at 505 ("Declaration of Policy" section).
29. Id. § 5(h), at 510 (national security controls section); § 6(c), at 514 (foreign policy
controls section); and § 7(b), at 516 (short supply controls section).
30. Id. § 6(e), (i), at 514-15 (foreign policy); § 7(d)(2), at 518 (short supply); § 10(g)(4),
(h), at 527-28 (licensing); § 12, at 530-31 (enforcement); and § 14, at 532-33 (annual report to
Congress).
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ports3' be meticulously compiled and periodically reviewed to ensure
against overcontrol.
32
Yet despite its improvements over the 1969 Act, the 1979 Act
was roundly criticized for the way it seemed almost to thwart exports
and facilitate the flow of technology to the Soviets, instead of the re-
verse. Long before its September 30, 1983 expiration date, various
interest groups began lobbying for specific changes in the replacement
Act.
B. Legislative History of EAAA 1985
By the end of the first session of the 98th Congress-and by that
time the 1979 Act had expired 33-only one legislative body had even
approved a bill, H.R. 3231, which passed the House on October 27,
1983. 34 The House bill placed heavy emphasis on opening trade chan-
nels for high technology. 35 Not all members of the House accorded
with H.R. 3231's liberalized approach on behalf of exporters, how-
ever. Congressman Roth,36 for example, felt that the proposed lan-
guage sacrificed important safeguards to national security by
eliminating the requirement that U.S. companies obtain export
licenses for shipments to CoCom countries. 37
By March 1, 1984, a Senate counterpart bill, S. 979, was ap-
proved. 38 While this version was aimed at striking a clear balance
31. The Commodity Control List established under § 5(c), id. at 507, and the Militarily
Critical Technologies List established under § 5(d), id. at 508 (national security controls
section).
32. Id. § 5(d), at 508.
33. Under section 20 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the authority delegated
to the President to control exports terminated on September 30, 1983. The law was extended
on October 1, 1983, by Pub. L. No. 98-108; on December 5, 1983, by Pub. L. No. 98-207, and
on February 29, 1984, by Pub. L. No. 98-222. As these extensions lapsed, the Export Admin-
istration Regulations were continued in effect by Exec. Order No. 12,444, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,215
(1983) and Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984), under authority granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1985).
See also A Review of Key Provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1985, MACHINERY &
ALLIED PRODUCTS INST. MEMORANDUM No. FT- 113, Aug. 2, 1985, at I n.l (available from
Machinery & Allied Products Institute, 1200 Eighteenth St., N.W., Wash., D.C. 20036) [here-
inafter cited as MAPI].
34. 129 CONG. REC. H8766 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1983).
35. 131 CONG. REC. H2011 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Frenzel (R-
Minn.)).
36. R-Wis.
37. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. H1814 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1983), 129 CONG. REC. E3918
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1983), 129 CONG. REC. H6696 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1983), and 129 CONG.
REC. E4289 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (statements of Rep. Roth).
38. 130 CONG. REC. S2143 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
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between eliminating unnecessary restrictions and providing for more
effective control, 39 its emphasis leaned on the side of national
defense °
The joint conference, which met on fifteen separate occasions be-
tween March and October 1984,41 managed to settle nearly all the
differences between the two bills. Nevertheless, on the floor, two
points remained on which the legislative bodies could not agree. The
House adamantly rejected the Senate's insistance on a provision that
would have given the Pentagon authority to veto licenses for certain
high technology items to Free World destinations.42 Meanwhile, the
Senate disliked language inserted by the House relating to trade with
and investment in South Africa.43 Unable to reach a compromise on
these two points in its closing days, the 98th Congress bequeathed the
job of passing a new export act to the next Congress."
On the first day of the 99th Congress, Congressman Roth intro-
duced H.R. 28. 4 5 The new bill simply deleted the two deadlocking
issues from the bill that almost passed a few months earlier. The
House's Title III measure, relating to economic sanctions on South
Africa, was removed and introduced as a separate bill.46 The contro-
versy over the Senate's amendment to section 10(g), which would
have given Defense a veto over certain Free World exports, was
mooted 47 by action taken in January 1985 by President Reagan.
48
39. S. 979, the bill reported by the Banking Committee, is a consensus bill. The bill
achieves a balance between our national security needs, that is, to restrict the flow of
critical U.S. technology to the Soviet military, and our economic security needs
which call on us to promote exports and export-related jobs.
130 CONG. REC. S1692 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
40. 131 CONG. REC. H2011 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
41. Id. at H2004 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
42. Electronic News, Oct. 15, 1984, at 2, col. 1. The measure would have amended Sec-
tion 10(g) of the 1979 Act.
43. Id. The measure was contained in Title III of the House bill.
The original House bill (H.R. 3231) provided, among other things, for a total ban on
all U.S. investment in South Africa. While conferees would have tempered the sanc-
tions, as originally proposed, a ban on U.S. commercial bank loans to the govern-
ment would have been maintained. Some Senate backers of reauthorization
legislation, led by Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah), objected to a ban on bank loans,
which they saw as an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee chaired by Senator Garn. Some members of the House viewed any sanctions
other than those originally proposed in the House bill as too weak.
MAPI, supra note 33, at 3.
44. Electronic News, supra note 42.
45. 131 CONG. REC. H2010 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Roth). When
introduced to the House floor for a vote, H.R. 28 had been revised to become H.R. 1786.
46. Id. at H2004 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
47. 131 CONG. REC. S8922 (daily ed. June 27, 1985). Senator Garn explained to the 99th
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The President issued a directive granting the Pentagon authority to
review licenses for "West-West" trade of certain commodities to se-
lected countries. 49 The resulting bill contained only those amend-
ments both houses had previously agreed to, which included a new
division of enforcement authority between Commerce and Customs.
By the time the bill came to the House floor for a vote, new lan-
guage had been inserted that was not part of the package both houses
had agreed on in the previous Congress. 50  Language insisted on by
the House Judiciary Committee5 1 added a new paragraph to section
12(a) of the 1979 Act, conferring authority on the Justice Department
to promulgate the regulations to be followed by Commerce and Cus-
toms in exercising their police powers.52 Although the House ap-
proved the bill on April 16, 53 the Senate balked at the new provision,
and on May 3 called for a conference on the legislation.
5 4
On June 25 the conferees reached a compromise on the remain-
ing points of controversy, thereby virtually guaranteeing House and
Congress that revision to section 10(g) was unnecessary because of the action taken by Presi-
dent Reagan:
The legislation makes no change to this provision in current law, as none was consid-
ered necessary in light of the President's recent directive. The President is to be
commended for his directive, bringing to an end a dispute that had hampered effec-
tive implementation of our national security controls. As legislators, our primary
task is to legislate, but I am just as happy when action by the President makes legisla-
tion unnecessary.
Id.
48. Yore, Free Trade and National Security, CALIF. LAW., July 1985, at 47, 49.
President Reagan finally tried to resolve the dispute through a classified memo signed
in January 1985 by Robert C. McFarlane, assistant to the president for national se-
curity affairs, and sent to the secretaries of State, Defense and Commerce. This
memorandum of 'understanding' gave the Pentagon veto power over high tech ex-
ports to 15 noncommunist countries of the Pentagon's choosing. While neither De-
fense nor Commerce Department spokesmen will confirm the countries on the list,
reliable sources say the targeted nations are Hong Kong, Malaysia, India, Sweden,
Austria, Liechtenstein, Spain, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Finland, Singapore, South Africa,
Switzerland and Syria.
Id.
49. MAPI, supra note 33, at 3.
50. Senate May Balk at Approving Export Control Bill Cleared by House Panel, DAILY
REP. EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 69, at L-3 (Apr. 10, 1985).
51. Id.
52. H.R. 1786 § 113(a)(4) as found at 131 CONG. REC. H2001 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985).
53. Green, House Votes to Renew Law on Export Controls, 43 CONG. Q. 739 (1985). The
House then substituted its text for the language in the Senate's bill, S. 883-a bill to extend the
act through mid-June-and returned the legislation to the Senate in hopes of swift approval by
the other legislative body. Id.
54. Senate Calls for Conference on Export Control Bill, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (BNA)
No. 87, at L-6 (May 6, 1985).
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Senate approval. 55 On June 27 the bill was adopted by both houses,56
and on July 12, as expected, President Reagan signed it into law.5 7
C. Perspectives Influencing Options for Controlling Exports
The story of the competing interests represented in each of the
bills developed by Congress and the compromises that were achieved
is an interesting one. It reflects the way the world has changed in the
past thirty years, the many-faceted role of U.S. technology in this
country's economy and the world marketplace, and recent growth in
technological strength among the developed Asian nations. As might
be expected, the issues and the interest groups that vied for attention
during the long struggle to amend the 1979 Act do not divide neatly
into two homogenous camps. True, there was a side that favored stif-
fer controls and a side that was against stiffer controls. Yet even
within the Defense Department-generally a "hardliner" group-
there were military technology leaders striving to protect the scientific
community from restrictions on the open exchange of ideas. 58
Nevertheless, some synthesis of viewpoints is useful, not only to
clarify the interests at stake, but also to show the give and take in the
gains each interest group was able to make. A report prepared for the
Senate Banking Committee provides just such a summation of the rel-
evant perspectives. In anticipation of the congressional debates on the
reauthorization of the 1979 Act in 1983, Senators Gan and Riege 59
requested that the Office of Technology Assessment update its 1979
55. Green, Congress Clears Bill to Renew Main Law Regulating Exports, 43 CONG. Q.
1302 (1985). Senate negotiators had protested that review by the Justice Department would
only complicate enforcement. The compromise reached allows the Attorney General to issue
guidelines for Commerce, but not for Customs. Id.
56. Congress Clears for President Legislation to Reauthorize Export Controls Law, DAILY
REP. EXECUTIVES (BNA) No. 126, at L-2 (July 1, 1985).
57. Trade Policy, supra note 4, at L-3. Nevertheless, the President seemed to have mixed
emotions.
[H]e expressed regret that Congress had 'prescribed several new administrative ar-
rangements and reporting requirements that make the export control program more
difficult to manage,' but stated that the 'new law-which reflects compromise by all
concerned parties--strikes an acceptable balance between enhancing our commercial
interests and protecting our national security interests.'
Id.
58. Boffey, Stemming the Flow ofHigh Technology, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1984, § C, at 2,
col. 3.
59. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, the Senate Committee having jurisdiction over the Export Admin-
istration Act.
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study, Technology and East-West Trade.60
The resulting report highlighted those provisions of the 1979 Act
that had led to problems of interpretation or execution. The report
then outlined the policy alternatives open to Congress in amending
the Act and categorized these alternatives under four primary goals:
(1) Trade Promotion,
(2) Efficiency,
(3) Foreign Policy, and
(4) National Security.6'
Regarding these goals the report points out:
The debate over U.S. export administration policy centers on how
to simultaneously pursue and balance four different objectives. All
members of the export licensing community believe to some extent
in each of these goals. They differ in their priorities, and in the
past, the relative emphasis accorded these elements has shifted. A
new or revised Export Administration Act will reflect congres-
sional decisions on how best to accommodate all four [objectives]
62
From the trade promotion perspective, the most important task
of export administrators is to avoid hindering U.S. companies from
being able to compete effectively in the world market and conduct
trade in the widest possible variety of civilian goods and technolo-
gies. 63 Allied with the trade promoters are those who emphasize effi-
ciency in the exporting process, with its attendant goals of (1)
allowing exporters to plan ahead, make long-term commitments and
gain a reputation for reliability as suppliers, (2) encouraging compli-
ance and (3) minimizing complexity and delays in export licensing.64
Some provisions of the 1979 Act are designed to be utilized as
instruments of foreign policy. Those favoring this goal desire preser-
vation of a system whereby presidential use of trade sanctions for
achieving political objectives is as easy and effective as possible.65
Lastly, the goal of policy options focusing on national security is to
make it as difficult as possible for the Soviets to acquire and apply
60. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONG. OF THE U.S., TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST
TRADE: AN UPDATE iii, (1983) (available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office) [hereinafter cited as OTA].
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id.
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Western technology for military purposes. 66
This article will discuss the amendments adopted in EAAA 1985
by grouping them according to the four policy goals just discussed.
As one final point of background before describing the changes, how-
ever, it may be helpful to explain briefly the structure of the old law.
D. Brief Description of the Operation of the Export Administration
Act of 1979
1. Export jurisdictions of the Commerce and State Departments
The administration of exports is divided between the Commerce
Department and the State Department. The export of commodities
and technical data that are uniquely designed for military application
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Department's Of-
fice of Munitions Control (OMC). It should be noted however, that
decisions by State's Office of Munitions Control are frequently based
on case-by-case recommendations from the Defense Department.
Under the leadership of its Office of Export Administration
(OEA), Commerce has authority over the export of nearly everything
else.67 This encompasses both those items that have a purely com-
mercial use and the so-called "dual-purpose" items, that is, those hav-
ing both a commercial and a military use.
It is important to understand that the jurisdictions of the Office
of Munitions Control and Office of Export Administration are mutu-
ally exclusive. Unfortunately, in practice, these lines of mutual exclu-
sivity do not create clearly predictable administrative processes for
firms seeking export licenses. The OEA will return an application
without action if it believes the OMC has authority over the proposed
export, and vice versa.68 Worse still, when the goods arrive at the U.S.
66. Id. at 13.
67. The Code of Federal Regulations lists the exports controlled by other departments
and agencies. Briefly, (1) the Munitions List defines the items controlled by the OMC; (2)
narcotics and dangerous drugs are controlled by the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
Justice Department; (3) commodities subject to the Atomic Energy Act are controlled by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the U.S. Department of Energy; (4) certain water-
craft require export authority from the U.S. Marine Administration; (5) natural gas and elec-
tric energy are controlled by the Department of Energy; (6) tobacco is controlled by the
Department of Agriculture; (7) endangered species, by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the
Department of the Interior; and (8) regulations issued by the Patent and Trademark Office
govern the export of unclassified technical data regarding foreign patent applications. 15
C.F.R. § 370.10 (1985).
68. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, EXPORT CONTROL RULES, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE-
LINES 2 (The Government Contractor, Briefing Papers No. 84-5, 1984).
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port of exit, the Customs Service is authorized to detain or even seize
goods if Customs officers doubt the correctness of a license, which
includes the issue of whether the OMC or OEA should have
jurisdiction.
69
Thus, in dealing with the actual administration of exports, four
government entities, crossing four cabinet departments, need to be
satisfied: the State Department, the Defense Department, the Com-
merce Department, and the Customs Service of the Treasury Depart-
ment. Of the four, only Commerce has a clear interest in promoting
exports.
The jurisdiction of the State Department's Office of Munitions
Control over military exports derives from the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. 70 The OMC's regulations are called the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),71 which include a generalized
list of the goods and technologies subject to its regulation, known as
the Munitions List. In determining whether to issue an export li-
cense, the OMC normally requests the recommendation of the De-
partment of Defense.72 The DOD's inquiry typically centers on
whether the proposed export might provide a foreign government
with an opportunity to derive new technology capabilities not avail-
able from other sources.
73
The essential difference in the policy toward exports under the
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the 1979 Act is that, unlike
Determining whether your product is military, dual-use or commercial depends on
the nature of your product and not on the identity of your foreign government cus-
tomer. In other words, the mere fact that you contract with a foreign government's
ministry of defense does not necessarily mean your product is a military commodity
subject to OMC jurisdiction. For example, trucks sold to a foreign ministry of de-
fense for transporting military personnel probably would be similar-if not identi-
cal-to trucks used in purely commercial applications. This is an example of a dual-
use commodity which is subject to OEA jurisdiction. If your truck is specifically
designed to carry ammunition, however, then the truck has a uniquely military appli-
cation and, consequently, would be subject to OMC jurisdiction.
Id.
69. Id. at 12.
In such an event, you will need to convince the Customs Service, OEA, OEE [Opera-
tion Exodus is jointly administered by Customs and the Commerce Department's
Office of Export Enforcement], and OMC that your shipment has been properly li-
censed. In effect, you will need to process a commodity jurisdiction case-which can
involve DOD as well. In the meanwhile, you will not be permitted to export the item
in question.
Id.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1985).
71. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-30 (1985).
72. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 5.
73. Id. at 6.
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commercial items, military goods and technology are regulated per se
because they are defense articles. 74 Two objectives in passing the
Arms Export Control Act were (1) the encouragement of regional
arms control and disarmament agreements so as to discourage arms
races and (2) the reduction of international trade in arms in the world
community. 75 In contrast, one of the stated aims of the 1979 Act was
to "encourage trade with all countries with which the United States
has diplomatic or trading relations." '76 Under the 1979 Act, the
United States government may control exports "only after full consid-
eration of the impact on the economy of the United States" and then
"only to the extent necessary" to (1) avoid jeopardizing national se-
curity, (2) further a foreign policy objective or (3) protect scarce do-
mestic resources.
77
The discussion now returns to its focus on the Office of Export
Administration's (Commerce Department) authority over commer-
cial and dual-use exports.
2. What constitutes an export
The 1979 Act mandates the compilation of two lists. One, to be
completed by the Defense Department, is the Militarily Critical Tech-
nologies List (MCTL).78 It is intended to be a precisely defined list of
all technologies whose acquisition by countries hostile to the United
States would enhance their military capabilities and thus be a threat
to our national security. 79 The other, to be compiled by the Com-
merce Department, is the Commodity Control List,80 a catalogue of
all the goods, technology and related technical data controlled for rea-
74. As stated in the Committee Comment to the House Report accompanying the Act
when it was passed:
[A]rms transfers cannot become an automatic, unregulated process. Each case must
be carefully judged on its own merits, approval should come only after the applica-
tion of a set of criteria designed to insure that a grant or sale of defense articles be in
the national interests of the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1388.
75. Comment, The Regulation of Technical Data Under the Arms Export Control Act of
1976 and the Export Administration Act of 1979: A Matter of Executive Discretion 6 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 169, 174 (1983).
76. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 3(1), at 504 ("except those countries with which
such trade has been determined by the President to be against the national interest.")
77. Id. § 3(2).
78. Id. § 5(d)(2), at 508.
79. Recent Developments-Export Controls: Restrictions on the Export of Critical Tech-
nologies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
80. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 5(c)(l), at 507.
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sons of national security, foreign policy, or short supply. 8' With the
concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce, items selected by the De-
fense Department for inclusion on the Militarily Critical Technologies
List are incorporated into the Commodity Control List.8 2
Under OEA regulations, the term "technical data" means
information of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the
design, production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of
articles or materials. The data may take a tangible form, such as a
model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating manual; or they may
take an intangible form such as technical service.8 3
Since the 1979 Act authorizes controls on technical data related
to items on the Commodity Control List, an "export" is possible even
in transactions taking place entirely within U.S. borders. Under Of-
fice of Export Administration regulations, an "export of technical
data" means not only actual shipment (or transmission-which in-
cludes data sent over telephone lines), but also release of the data in
the United States with knowledge or intent that such data be shipped
or transmitted out of the country, as well as any release of such U.S.-
origin data in a foreign country.8 4 Furthermore, the concept of "re-
leasing" technical data is also broader than one might expect. It
includes:
(i) Visual inspection by foreign nationals of U.S.-origin equipment
and facilities;
(ii) Oral exchanges of information in the United States or abroad;
and
(iii) The application to situations abroad of personal knowledge or
81. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(a), (i), (n) (1985). Subsection (n) provides: "All software not ex-
pressly subject to the licensing requirements imposed under the Commodity Control List is
subject to the provisions of Part 379, 'Technical Data.' However, the definitions contained in
§ 371.1(b) and (c) apply to all software .... "
82. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § (c)(2). With regard to foreign policy controls,
under Section 6(k), the State Department is instructed to identify those items to be controlled
for foreign policy reasons. With the concurrence of Commerce, these items are also incorpo-
rated into the CCL. In the case of interagency conflict-whether Commerce/Defense or Com-
merce/State, the President is to resolve the issue. Id. §§ 5(c)(2) at 507, 6(k) at 515.
83. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1985).
84. Id. § 379.1(b)(1). Under such a definition of "export," it would be easy for U.S.
travelers to unwittingly make an illegal export by simply carrying technical data (even though
only for personal reading purposes) in their briefcases or baggage while bound for or traveling
in foreign countries. If discovered by U.S. Customs officials, the traveler's materials would be
confiscated and held until he or she produced evidence that the export was proper. (Interoffice
correspondence from Thomas A. Wagner, Senior Counsel, TRW Inc., Electronics & Defense
Sector in Redondo Beach, California, June 15, 1983).
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technical experience acquired in the United States.85
3. The licensing process
a. general and validated licenses
The Office of Export Administration has established, by its Ex-
port Administration Regulations, 86 a complex system for regulating
exports of commercial and dual-purpose goods and technology.
87
Under this system, some type of license is required for all exports,
whether or not listed on the Commodity Control List. Most items
can be exported under a general license, however, which requires no
formal application to or prior approval from the OEA, so long as
applicable shipping requirements are met.
88
Those items subject to OEA jurisdiction that do not qualify for a
general license require a validated license for export. To obtain a vali-
dated license, an exporter must submit an official Office of Export Ad-
ministration application form describing the goods to be exported, the
identity of the consignee, the value of the transaction, and other de-
tailed information, including a document known as an "end-user
statement," certifying that the products shipped will not be re-ex-
ported without proper authorization.
89
The Commodity Control List (CCL) is the touchstone of the
OEA's regulations for determining whether or not a validated license
is required for export. It is a highly technical list with over 100,000
entries, catalogued into over 200 classifications, including, for exam-
ple, a broad range of computers, computer-related equipment, lasers,
aircraft and their components, electronic devices, synthetic rubber
85. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1 (b)(2) (1985).
86. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399.2 (1985). These include the CCL, found at Section 399.1.
87. The word "technology" as used hereafter is intended to encompass the concept of
technical data, as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(n) (1985).
88. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 7; 15 C.F.R. § 371.2 (1985).
89. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 8. See chart at 15 C.F.R. § 375.1 (1985).
There are two types of end-user statements. For exports to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, West
Germany, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey or the United Kingdom, the exporter's customer must obtain an "Interna-
tional Import Certificate and Delivery Verification," (IC/DV) from its government warranting
that the customer's government will exercise jurisdiction over the goods. In most other cases,
the foreign purchaser must sign OEA's standard form ITA-629, "Statement By Ultimate Con-
signee and Purchaser," agreeing that the product will not be re-exported without OEA's prior
approval. The exception to the requirement for either an IC/DV or a form ITA-629 is when
selling directly to foreign government agencies. Id. at 8-9. See 15 C.F.R. § 375.2-.3 (1985).
Note also that a "re-export" of technical data is just as broadly conceived as an export. Id.
§ 379.1(c).
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products, certain organic and inorganic chemicals, a broad range of
communications-related equipment, certain camera equipment, hor-
ses and other items controlled for short-supply reasons, diesel engines,
and truck assembly lines. Moreover, if a good or technology is subject
to the CCL, its spare parts and prototype models are often separately
made subject to the CCL. The Commodity Control List is not an
easy document to decipher. Many entries are highly technical. Others
are not clearly defined, thus tending to be broad in their coverage. 90
The exporter uses the CCL by matching its product against indi-
vidual entries on the list and finding the closest description, with its
accompanying Export Commodity Control Number (ECCN), consist-
ing of four digits and a letter. The type of license required for export-
ing a commodity is a function of both the letter in its ECCN and the
country of ultimate destination. Export Commodity Control Num-
bers with the letter "A," the strictest designation, generally require a
validated license to all country destinations, while those with the let-
ter "G" usually allow shipment under a general license (meaning that
no prior notification to or approval from the Office of Export Admin-
istration is required). 9'
b. licensing technical data
Often, an exporter must supply technical data along with its sale
of equipment to the foreign buyer. Other times, a foreign purchaser
may wish to see specifications on a product prior to ordering it from a
U.S. company. As stated earlier, the "export" of technical data is
defined very broadly. The transactions just described could likely re-
quire a validated license, depending on the classification of the com-
modity to which the technical data relates. On other occasions, the
related commodity will not have any bearing on one's licensing obli-
gations, for there could be a technical data general license applicable
to the data being exported.92
The Office of Export Administration has authorized two types of
general licenses specifically for technical data. One, the "General Li-
cense-Technical Data Publically Available" (GTDA) covers publi-
90. Interoffice correspondence from William E. Gallas, Senior Counsel, TRW Inc., So-
lon, Ohio (June 11, 1984) (discussing export licensing). Even those who frequently work with
the list have complained that it lacks such a simple amenity as a workable index. (Interoffice
correspondence from James J. Branagan, Senior Counsel, TRW Inc., Automotive Worldwide
Sector in Solon, Ohio, May 7, 1984).
91. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 7.
92. Id. at 10. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.2 (1985).
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cally available technical data and is available to all destinations.
9 3
The other, the "General License-Technical Data-Restricted"
(GTDR) is available for exports of certain types of data that do not
qualify for a GTDA but do conform to certain specific require-
ments.94 A validated license is required if neither of these general
licenses apply.
95
c. inter-agency review process and CoCom referral
The Office of Export Administration develops its regulations in
consultation with other government agencies. 96 Furthermore, during
its license review process, the OEA may decide that certain applica-
tions present policy problems requiring review by another agency
before a license can issue.97 Consultation may take place through the
Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP).98 The ACEP con-
ducts its reviews at five operational levels: the senior staff level, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary level, the Assistant Secretary and Secre-
tary levels, and the President, who has final authority to resolve all
interagency disputes. 99 Interagency review can also take place
through less formal consultation with particular agencies, as
93. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1985). This section sets out the sort of information that can be
exported under a GTDA license, including: "data released orally or visually at open confer-
ences, lectures, trade shows . . . publications that may be purchased without restrictions at a
nominal cost . . . or are readily available at libraries open to the public," and scientific or
educational information disseminated "by correspondence, attendance at, or participation in,
meetings," or through "instruction in academic institutions and academic laboratories" so
long as the information is not "directly and significantly related to design, production or utili-
zation in industrial processes." Id.
94. Id. § 379.4. The GTDR regulations are complicated and continue for many pages.
There are restrictions applying to certain countries, particularly South Africa and Namibia,
special restrictions applicable to software, and written assurance requirements warranting that
the technical data will not be re-exported, nor any products made from that technical data. Id.
See also A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 11.
95. 15 C.F.R. § 379.2 (1985).
96. COMMERCE, supra note 13, at 8.
97. Id.
98. Id.
Members of the ACEP include representatives from the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, State, Energy, Transportation, Treasury, the National Security Council, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as appropriate
(although not all of those listed are voting members on each issue). Other agencies
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appropriate. 100
The Defense Department has a statutory right to review any li-
cense for export "to any country to which exports are controlled for
national security purposes .... ."101 Under the 1979 Act, this au-
thority does not extend to applications for exports to Free World
Countries, and it will be recalled that this was one of the deadlocking
issues in the 98th Congress. The Senate wanted to give Defense the
right to review applications where there is a "clear risk of diversion of
militarily critical goods or technology to proscribed destinations."' 10 2
The issue was resolved when President Reagan, in effect, gave this
authority to Defense. 1
0 3
In practice, the Defense Department does not review all licenses
for exports to controlled countries because it has, in consultation with
the OEA, exempted itself from about two-thirds of the applications in
this category. 104
Another agency having a statutory right to review license appli-
cations is the State Department. The Secretary of State may review
any license for the export of goods controlled for foreign policy
reasons. 0 5
If an agency recommends disapproval of the export, OEA's rejec-
tion of that assessment is highly unlikely. 10 6
Under the 1979 Act, the Office of Export Administration is al-
lowed 90 days in which to act upon a license if interagency review is
not required. 0 7 If interagency review is required, then, within 30
days of initially receiving the application, Commerce must refer it to
the other agency or agencies, who will then have up to 60 days to
consider the application. 108 By the time Commerce gets the applica-
tion back, up to three months will have elapsed since the application
was initially submitted, and Commerce is allowed yet another 90 days
from this point within which to take final action. 10 9 This may involve
100. Id.
101. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 10(g)(1), at 527.
102. S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
170].
103. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
104. COMMERCE, supra note 13, at 9.
105. Id.
106. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 9.
107. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 10(c), at 525.
108. Id. § 10(e)(1).
109. Id. § 10(0(1).
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resolving interagency differences and then either granting or denying
the license.
This whole process, including interagency review, can thus take
up to six months, from the time the application is filed until the li-
cense is approved or rejected. Exporters should also take into account
the time required to get the consignee's (customer's) signature (or that
of the consignee's government) on the end-user statement,"0 which
must be submitted when first applying for the validated license."'
Even after an exporter has obtained final U.S. approval for a li-
cense, it may not be permitted to ship the goods yet. The proposed
export may be subject to CoCom review, requiring that the export be
held back for as much as 60 days or more, while awaiting CoCom
approval. In the event that CoCom review is not concluded within 60
days, however, the 1979 Act requires that the U.S. export license be
granted, unless the OEA determines that the "issuance of the license
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States." Then the exporter could be required to wait until whenever
CoCom concluded its review."
2
E. Options for U.S. Policy
As discussed earlier in Section C,'13 the policy alternatives that
were available to Congress in amending the Export Administration
Act of 1979 can be categorized according to four primary goals: (1)
Trade Promotion, (2) Efficiency, (3) Foreign Policy, and (4) National
Security.
In updating its Technology and East-West Trade report for the
Senate Banking Committee, the Office of Technology Assessment also
prepared a chart listing many of the options for revising the Act and
designating which of the four goals each option promoted." 4 The fol-
lowing chart is an adaptation of the same idea. A few options have
been added in order to give a more complete listing of the issues dis-
cussed in this article. The chart has also been altered from its original
form by the addition of two columns, one telling whether the item was
enacted in EAAA 1985 and the other telling the section in this article
where the matter will be discussed.
110. See supra note 89.
111. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 8-9.
112. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 10(h), at 528.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
114. OTA, supra note 60, at 12.
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III. TRADE PROMOTION
A primary tactic in revising the 1979 Act was to eliminate con-
trols that are ineffective because of foreign availability of the con-
trolled item. The reasoning of those who sought some relaxation of
national security controls, in order to permit more exports, could be
stated as follows. First, the United States does not have a monopoly
on worldwide technology, and it is clear that our allies are unlikely to
change their policy of protecting only clearly military items. For this
reason, U.S. efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring many
products and technologies are destined to fail. 1 5
A second line of reasoning of export promoters was based on the
fact that even controls that are truly necessary to protect national
security are costly to the United States. There comes a point of di-
minishing returns, where the measure of military security gained by
restricting certain exports is outweighed by the economic damage that
results from the loss of sales. 1 6 Logically, then-goes the argument-
the aim should be to control the minimum range of items consistent
with national security. It follows that efforts should be focused on
determining which dual-use technologies are truly militarily critical,
and concentrating only on them."17
A third proposition by export promoters was that the move in
115. Id. at 14; see also Hyde, The search for a solution: Foresight rather than hindsight,
ELECTRONIC BUS., Sept. 15, 1984, at 148:
A sane and practical approach is needed. For starters, the Reagan administration
should abandon the pompous idea that advanced technology originates in the United
States, and the United States alone. To force allied nations to swallow tough export
controls on items widely available throughout the Western world only discredits a
sound export policy. To assume that every computer crossing the border will be put
to immediate military use is crying wolf. And it is creating an unfair disadvantage to
U.S. companies competing in Western European markets.
116. As Senator Tsongas (D-Mass.) stated in urging reform to the Export Administration
Act to reduce obstacles to export:
[T]echnology exports are a growing sector of our economy of increasing economic
significance. High technology industries now contribute about 7 percent of our entire
GNP. Over the next decade, it has been estimated they may grow to a 10-percent
share, or more than $206 billion worth of goods.
. . . With a trade deficit for goods and services of $2.5 billion in the third quar-
ter of last year [1982], we simply cannot afford to tolerate unnecessary barriers to
technology products sold by our many small and large technology exporting firms.
Only technology products made a positive contribution to our manufacturing trade
account, and we do not have the luxury of losing the assets they bring to our current
accounts balance.
129 CONG. REC. S6852 (daily ed. May 17, 1983) (emphasis added).
117. "Given Soviet persistence, the time and money wasted to police everything on the
books would be better spent tightening controls on the items of utmost importance from a
stragetic point of view." Hyde, supra note 115, at 148.
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the Commerce Department to allow multiple shipments under a sin-
gle license should be codified and even expanded. The benefits to both
government administrators and business managers from an efficiency
standpoint are obvious, but another benefit also accrues to businesses
that can qualify for a multiple export license. That benefit is de-
creased government involvement with internal business operations as
the Office of Export Administration shifts part of its burden onto the
private sector to self-regulate.
These issues-foreign availability, a narrowed focus of controls,
and use of multiple export licenses-are discussed next as they relate
to the changes proposed and adopted in amending the 1979 Act.
A. Changes in the Concept of Foreign Availability
from the 1979 Act
The 1979 Act, as discussed earlier, did address the issue of for-
eign availability. In general, the Commerce Department was not to
require a validated license for goods and technologies found to be
available abroad,1 18 and the Act authorized negotiations with foreign
countries to control and reduce foreign availability.'1 9 Moreover, the
Department of Commerce was directed to develop procedures and
criteria for the continual review of the foreign availability of con-
trolled goods. ' 20 But, as noted in a Comment written shortly after the
enactment of the 1979 Act, "[T]he strict legislative standards and pro-
cedures for assessing foreign availability may realistically translate
into only limited benefits to United States international trade."'121 De-
spite the measures provided for in the 1979 Act, in 1983 the matter
was still a problem for U.S. exporters.
1. Burden of proof shifted to government in EAAA 1985
Both sections 5 and 6 of the 1979 Act are revised by the 1985
amendments to provide new rules on the evidence and criteria to be
considered in making foreign availability determinations. 22 That is,
118. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 5(0(1), at 509: "[T]he Secretary [of Commerce]
may not. . . require a validated license. . . unless the President determines that the absence
of export controls would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."
119. Id. § 5(0(4), at 510.
120. Id. § 5(f)(1), at 509.
121. Comment, An Examination of Foreign Availability of Controlled Goods and Technolo-
gies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179, 180 (1980).
122. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 107(b), at 129, and § 108(g), at 134. Section 5
governs national security controls, while section 6 governs foreign policy controls.
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the changes apply both with regard to national security and foreign
policy controls. While the exporter still has to provide as much detail
as possible, the Commerce Department is directed to "accept the rep-
resentations of applicants unless such representations are contradicted
by reliable evidence .... -123 This tends to shift the burden of proof
regarding foreign availability away from the private sector to the
government.
2. "Foreign availability" as defined by EAAA 1985 and creation
of Office of Foreign Availability
Under the 1979 Act, foreign availability was considered to exist
when "any such goods or technology are available in fact to such des-
tinations from such sources in sufficient quantity and of sufficient
quality" as to make a validated license requirement ineffective. 124 The
Senate bill, S. 979, proposed to change this language so as to find
foreign availability if the item were available in "comparable quantity
and of comparable quality." 125 The desire was to allow for decontrol if
the same capabilities were available from some other source, even if
the technologies were not identical.
A contrary stance was taken by a 1983 study126 published in the
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, placed in the Congressional Rec-
ord by Senator Garn. 12 7 The study argued that
even if an item were available elsewhere, it would not necessarily
make sense for the U.S. to export that item. The United States is
the political and moral leader of the free world, and, choosing the
circumstances wisely, occasionally must set an example in order to
have effective leverage. 128
In the view of this study, the conclusion that restrictions are un-
necessary should only be reached after careful consideration of such
matters as comparability, quantity, quality, price and maintenance.
For (1) if the non-U.S. item is only similar but not the same, (2) if the
foreign supplier cannot quickly match the quantities available from
the U.S., (3) if the foreign item will not last as long or perform as
efficiently, (4) if the Soviets would have to expend more hard currency
123. Id.
124. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 5(0)(1), at 509.
125. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 44 (citing S. 979). The House bill had no compa-
rable provision.
126. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1293.
127. R-Utah.
128. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1295.
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for the item from non-U.S. sources or (5) if the foreign supplier could
not provide the maintenance that a U.S. company would, then per-
haps it is not accurate to say there is foreign availability. 129 The re-
port also expressed the opinion that the Department of Defense
should be involved in evaluating the foreign availability question.
The revised law partially adopts the Senate position, by changing
the language "sufficient" quality to "comparable" quality. But, un-
like S. 979, "sufficient" quantity is still required.130 The new law also
responds to concerns such as those raised in the Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder report by incorporating the following new language
into section 5(f)(3):
In making determinations of foreign availability, the Secretary may
consider such factors as cost, reliability, the availability and relia-
bility of spare parts and the cost and quality thereof, maintenance
programs, durability, quality of end products produced by the item
proposed for export, and scale of production.13'
In addition, the Department of Defense is now expressly men-
tioned as an agency to be involved in evaluation of the foreign availa-
bility question. 32 The amendments appear to avoid shifting the
"balance of power" on this issue from Commerce to Defense, how-
ever, for the 1985 Act also establishes a new office within the Com-
merce Department, the Office of Foreign Availability. The new
Commerce office is responsible for gathering and analyzing all infor-
mation necessary for making determinations of foreign availability
under the Act. 133
3. President must negotiate to attempt elimination
of foreign availability
As a result of EAAA 1985, whenever the President has deter-
mined that, despite foreign availability, the absence of such controls
would be detrimental to our national security, a new provision that
originated in the House bill now requires the President to enter into
negotiations with other countries to eliminate foreign availability.
The provision only applies to exports going to countries with whom
we have export control agreements. If foreign availability has not
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 107(i), at 131, and § 108(g), at 134.
131. Id. § 107(b), at 129.
132. Id. § 107(a).
133. Id. § 107(d), at 130.
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been eliminated after six months (extendable by the President to
eighteen months), Commerce can no longer require a validated license
for the item involved. 1
34
In the case of foreign policy controls, an even stronger amend-
ment of section 6(g) now requires the President to report to Congress
after six months (not extendable to eighteen months) regarding the
effort to negotiate elimination of foreign availability. If a similar item
is determined to still be available abroad, licenses shall be issued to
permit the export of the U.S.-source item, except in cases involving
terrorism, crime control instruments, and fulfillment of international
treaty obligations. 13
5
B. Narrowing the Focus of Controls
In 1976 the Defense Science Board, a task force chaired by J.
Fred Bucy, 136 published what has come to be known as the Bucy Re-
port, promoting the view that the administration should give up try-
ing to control everything and concentrate instead on protecting
"recent major advances in technology critical to improved military
capability.' 1 37 In his September 1984 article in Electronic Business, J.
Fred Bucy noted that the Bucy Report had led to the 1979 Act's re-
quirement that the Secretary of Defense develop the Militarily Criti-
cal Technologies List. 38  However, beyond that, said Bucy, the
recommendations of the Report had not been carried out. 13 9 Reiterat-
ing a point made there, Mr. Bucy stated that
[tiechnology is know-how. It is not science and it is not product.
Technology is comprised of the myriad design and manufacturing
steps that begin with science and end with product. . . . [T]he
key element in controlling the transfer of technology is delaying
the acquisition of know-how.14°
The EAAA 1985 amended section 5(e) of the 1979 Act to elimi-
nate the requirement of a license for replacement parts that are being
134. Id. § 107(c), at 129; H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. REP. No. 257, pt. 1, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1].
135. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(g), at 134.
136. President and Chief Executive of Texas Instruments, Inc.
137. Schmitt, Export Controls: Balancing Technological Innovation and National Security,
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall 1984, at 117, 121.
138. Bucy, Some Thoughts on a Realistic Approach to Export Control, ELECTRONIC Bus.,
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exported to replace, on a one-to-one basis, parts that were in a good
legally exported from the United States. There were four other im-
portant changes specifically designed to narrow the range of goods
and technologies subject to control: (1) the elimination of controls
imposed solely because a good contains an embedded microprocessor;
(2) a shift away from controlling the end-products of critical technol-
ogies; (3) a mandated, annual review of the Commodity Control List
to remove obsolete technologies; and (4) the requirement that foreign
availability be researched in developing the CCL. These changes will
now be discussed in full.
1. Embedded microprocessors no longer trigger requirement
of an export license
Under new paragraph (m) to section 5 of the Act,
[e]xport controls may not be imposed under this section on a good
solely on the basis that the good contains an embedded
microprocessor, if such microprocessor cannot be used or altered
to perform functions other than those it performs in the good in
which it is embedded. An export control may be imposed. . . on
a good containing an embedded microprocessor .. .only on the
basis that the functions of the good itself are such that the good, if
exported, would make a significant contribution to the military po-
tential of any other country or combination of countries which
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States. 141
For some U.S. companies, this is perhaps the single-most signifi-
cant change made by the EAAA 1985142 because, overnight, it elimi-
nated all export licensing requirements-to all destinations-for the
bulk of their products. 143 Products coming within this exclusion can
141. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(j), at 127 (emphasis added).
142. A very close second place would have to go to decontrol of low-tech goods and tech-
nology to CoCom destinations, discussed infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text, which
similarly makes for wholesale elimination of many companies' entire export licensing
obligation.
143. The Commerce Department had already, in April 1984, decontrolled ninety-four cat-
egories of unilaterally controlled instruments incorporating microprocessors. H. REP. No.
180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985) [hereinafter cited as H. REP. No. 180]. By adopting new
paragraph 5(m), however, Congress codified this administrative action and thus clarified legis-
lative intent. It is worth noting that OEA's April, 1984 act of decontrolling some instruments
containing microprocessors followed introduction of the measure in the House's bill, H.R.
3231. See H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 48. The Report of the Senate Banking
Committee, dated June 29, 1983, also expressed approval of the measure: "In this regard the
Committee believes that national security export controls need not, as a general rule, be im-
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now be shipped under a general license.'"
2. Controls reduced for technology end products
In keeping with the Bucy Report's recommendation that export
controls focus on keystone technology rather than on end products,
section 5 of the Act has been amended with a view to both of these
objectives. Added to the criteria for the Defense Department's devel-
opment of the Militarily Critical Technologies List is a provision that
it would be appropriate to include "keystone equipment which would
reveal or give insight into the design and manufacture of the United
States military system."' 45 At the same time, however, it is intended
that the process of adding militarily critical technologies and keystone
equipment should include "suitable reductions in the controls on the
products of that technology and equipment."' 46 Also in keeping with
the increased emphasis on controlling technologies, the word "com-
modity" has been dropped, so that now the list of controlled technolo-
gies is known simply as the Control List. 47
3. Annual review of Control List required
The Act now mandates annual review of the Control List 48 to
ensure that national security controls are imposed only if the items
restricted would "make a significant contribution to the military po-
tential" of another country in a way that would prove detrimental to
U.S. national security. 49 The requirement of the 1979 Act was basi-
cally the same, but review was only triannual. o50 This amendment
was intended to reemphasize the need for prompt and frequent review
of national security controls, both to remove items from the list for
which control would no longer serve the purposes of the Act and to
incorporate new items whose transfer to foreign countries would pose
a threat.' 5 1
posed on a scientific or analytical instrument solely because it contains an embedded
microprocessor." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 7. The Commerce Department evidently
read the handwriting on the wall.
144. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
145. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 106(a)(1), at 128 (emphasis added).
146. Id. § 106(a)(2) (adding new paragraph 6), at 129.
147. Id. § 105(c)(1)(A), at 124.
148. Id. § 105(c)(1)(B), at 124.
149. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 3(2)(A), at 504. This language was unchanged by
EAAA 1985.
150. Id. § 5(c)(3), at 507.
151. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 7.
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In order to invite greater input from the private sector, para-
graph 5(c)(3) provides for prior notice of the annual review in the
Federal Register.5 2
The Commerce Department is also now instructed to consider,
as a criterion for the removal of items from licensing requirements,
"the anticipated needs of the military of controlled countries."'
153
As explained earlier, 15 4 one main source for generating the Con-
trol List is the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) devel-
oped by Defense. The MCTL is a classified document, and the
Defense Department consults it when making licensing decisions re-
ferred to that agency by the Office of Export Administration. The
Control List, which is codified at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (updates to which
are published in the Federal Register), is the public document that
defines which goods require a validated license and which goods are
prohibited for export to particular destinations. Implicit in an item's
being listed on the Control List, however, is the understanding that a
good or technology can be exported, albeit, not to all countries of the
world.
The amended Act requires that the "integration of items on the
list of militarily critical technologies into the control list shall proceed
with all deliberate speed."' 55 Presumably, then, Congress desires
more goods and technologies to become available for sale abroad, and,
moreover, that the exporting community be kept better informed of
what items are considered to be militarily critical and why.
4. Control List should not include items available abroad
In developing its Control List, the Commerce Department must
now find out whether the good or technology sought to be controlled,
or one that is functionally equivalent, is "available in fact to a con-
trolled country from sources outside the United States in sufficient
quantity and of comparable quality so that the requirement of a vali-
dated license for the export of such good or technology is or would be
ineffective in achieving the purpose" under the Act.156 This change is
designed to ensure that the Office of Export Administration will not
only consider foreign availability in making licensing decisions, but
152. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(c)(l)(B), at 124.
153. Id. § 105(e), at 125 (amending section 5(g)).
154. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
155. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 106(a), at 128 (adding new paragraph 4).
156. Id.
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that the Control List itself will reflect this consideration. There is no
point in even putting an item on the list, and making exporters go
through the exercise of applying for a license, if foreign availability
would defeat the purpose of the control.
C. Broadening Available License Types to Serve Marketing Needs
The 1979 Act provided for two types of licenses covering individ-
ual transactions, the general license and the validated license de-
scribed earlier.1 5 7 It also authorized the "Qualified General License,"
covering multiple transactions. 158 The Qualified General License was
a new type of license under the 1979 Act, which permited multiple
shipments to a particular consignee and for a specified end use.159
The report of the Senate Banking Committee accompanying that leg-
islation stated that
[t]he Committee believes the number of separate licenses required
and the attendant paperwork and expense for both applicants and
the Government can be greatly reduced without reducing the effec-
tiveness of export controls, by the adoption of qualified general li-
cense requirements in place of validated license requirements
whenever feasible and appropriate.' 60
The Qualified General License was repealed by EAAA 1985,161
in part because it had not been used as widely as anticipated by the
drafters in 1979.162 Nevertheless, the same desire to reduce the bur-
den of licensing was the basis for several bulk licenses authorized
under the 1985 amendments. 63
1. Codification of recently developed license types
Congress has codified three types of multiple-export licenses de-
157. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
158. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 4(a), at 505.
159. 15 C.F.R. § 373.4 (1985). Under regulations developed by Commerce, the QGL was
made available especially for exports to these countries, which are controlled for national se-
curity purposes: Romania, Hungary, Poland, U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Berlin, German Democratic Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia and
Laos. 15 C.F.R. §§ 370.13, 373.4(a) (Supp. No. 1) (1985).
160. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 3.
161. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 54. The repeal of the QGL and new emphasis on
multiple export licenses to non-controlled countries is apparently part of Congress' overall
intention to tighten controls on East-West trade while easing licensing requirements on West-
West trade.
162. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 3.
163. Id.
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veloped by Commerce in its regulation of exports, which are de-
scribed in the Code of Federal Regulations:164
(a) the project license, designed for use with a substantial capital
expansion project, for supplying maintenance and repair
services, or for use in the production of other commodities
for sale;
65
(b) the distribution license, designed to cover exports by a U.S.
individual or company to its affiliated foreign distributor; 66
and
(c) the service supply procedure, to enable U.S. individuals or
companies to provide service for U.S. equipment exports or
to foreign manufacturers who use parts imported from the
U.S. 167
In endorsing the project, distribution, and service supply licenses,
the House committee stated that
[a]pplications for the same type products, to the same destinations
and to the same end-users are needlessly expensive and time-con-
suming for both government and industry, place U.S. exporters at
a competitive disadvantage by creating uncertainty with respect to
164. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 104, at 122-23. There is an additional multiple-
export license issued by the Commerce Department, the "validated bulk license," that is not
described in the Code of Federal Regulations. According to James J. Branagan, Senior Coun-
sel, TRW Inc., Automotive Worldwide Sector, who has obtained several, the "validated bulk
license" is an expedient developed for obtaining simultaneous authorization for (1) the export
of products to a single foreign distributor and (2) the distributor's subsequent re-export to
designated countries. Once the bulk license issues, no further U.S. government approval is
required for the license-holder to export the products to its foreign distributor (or for re-export
to the countries listed on the application) during the one year term of the license. A bulk
license authorizes only the volume of exports applied for (requiring a realistic estimate of 12
month projected volume of sales) and does not cover the products described if the license-
holder subsequently improves or modifies them. Interoffice correspondence from J.J. Brana-
gan, Corporate Counsel, TRW Inc., Automotive Worldwide Sector, in Solon, Ohio (May I1,
1984).
165. 15 C.F.R. § 373.2 (1985). Goods and technologies being exported must be "covered
by entries in the Commodity Control List under at least four Commodity Processing Numbers
in which the first two digits of each differ from the first two digits of the other three Commod-
ity Processing Numbers." Also, it is a prerequisite that at least 25 individual validated licenses
would be needed to transfer the goods and technologies abroad. Id.
166. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1985). For this license to be obtained, the foreign consignee must
be approved in advance as a distributor or user, and the approved foreign distributor must be a
subsidiary, affiliate, or branch of the U.S. exporter, or a distributor of the U.S. exporter under a
written agreement, or an end-user importing for its own use or to include in another product.
As with the project license, the distribution license must replace at least 25 individual validated
licenses. Id.
167. 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1985).
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likely shipment dates, and most importantly, divert attention from
applications for exports to countries to which exports are con-
trolled for national security purposes. [The three licenses are only
available to Free-World destinations; i.e., country groups T and V,
except for the Peoples Republic of China.] The distribution, pro-
ject, and service supply licenses have served well to reduce the bur-
dens on government and business of individual licenses for each
transaction, with no adverse impact on national security, and the
committee insures the continued availability of these licenses by
specific statutory language.'
68
2. New types of multiple export license authorized in EAAA 1985
The House and Senate committees wished to encourage as wide a
use as possible of multiple validated licenses, particularly "by United
States exporters that have demonstrated a sensitivity to United States
national security concerns through their own effective security proce-
dures and practices." 169 Thus, in addition to affirming the three
licenses just described, the EAAA 1985 authorizes a new type of mul-
tiple export license, the comprehensive operations license (COL)J 70
The COL, like the other three, is made available to all countries other
than controlled countries.1 71 It is intended to facilitate cooperative
innovation and transfer of know-how among affiliated companies,
such as subcontractors and suppliers of international operations of
U.S. exporters. 72
Whereas the distribution license covers the multiple export of
goods to approved distributors and end users, the comprehensive op-
erations license authorizes multiple export of technology and related
goods from a domestic concern to and among its foreign subsidiaries,
affiliates, joint venturers, and licensees that have long-term, contrac-
tually defined relations with the exporter. 73 Both the distribution li-
cense and the COL are specifically authorized for exports of items
from the Militarily Critical Technologies List. 174
The Committee recognizes the international scope of the U.S. high-
168. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 16-17.
169. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 4. The House report similarly refers to "U.S.
companies with a history of compliance with export control regulations and strong internal
management controls. ... H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 16-17.
170. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 104(a), at 122.
171. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 54.
172. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 4.
173. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 104(a), at 122-23.
174. Id.
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technology industry and the desirability of utilizing existing propri-
etary controls on U.S. technology where such controls are ade-
quate. Transfers of technology take place in a variety of ways,
many of them quite different from the flow of goods across borders.
The comprehensive operations license is intended to accommodate
the special characteristics of critical technology by facilitating co-
operative innovation and transfers of know-how within the interna-
tional operations of U.S. firms. It will minimize administrative
burdens for U.S. industry while at the same time enabling U.S.
officials to focus on the most crucial aspect of the licensing pro-
cess-the system of control-rather than on an overwhelming
number of individual transactions.1
75
3. Comprehensive Operations License (COL) remains
to be implemented
It should be noted that the EAAA 1985 merely authorizes the
COL. The Commerce Department has not yet developed regulations
for a comprehensive operations license, so it is still unavailable to U.S.
exporters. In fact, it is doubtful that the COL will become available
until after the Militarily Critical Technologies List has been incorpo-
rated into the Control List.
176
In the meantime, multiple exports of technology can take place
through use of the distribution license. Alternatively, a company
would have to obtain an individual validated license or, if applicable,
a technical data license. At present, in some cases, companies are
violating the law and simply making data transfers without a license,
perhaps not even aware that one is required. The future COL, since it
will be designed to accomodate the special requirements of exports of
technical data, will encourage compliance with the government's
175. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 4.
176. Telephone interview with Michael T. Schilling, Manager, International Affairs, TRW
Inc., in Arlington, Va. (Nov. 22, 1985). IBM provided the impetus in getting Congress to
authorize the comprehensive operations license. IBM has a highly organized export control
office that handles all of the corporation's exports. Its staff processes all IBM export licenses.
It was IBM that developed the concept of the COL, and the regulations for its use will proba-
bly also be developed by IBM (along with other interested companies) and submitted to the
Commerce Department for possible adoption. Controls, restrictions and criteria will likely be
patterned after the requirements for obtaining a distribution license, which are strict, highly
detailed and require yearly audit by the OEA. The difficulty in developing appropriate COL
regulations arises from the fact that the "paper trail" generated by exchanges of technical
data-often exported on a daily basis via telecommunication and even computer to com-
puter-is qualitatively different from the letters of credit, shipping documents, etc., associated
with the export of goods. Id.
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scheme of monitoring such data flows. In a sense, then, the compre-
hensive operations license is an envisioned means of implementing
greater controls on what may presently be an unmonitored, high vol-
ume of exchange of data and technology between parent and subsidi-
ary companies or between joint venture partners.1 77
The Senate drafters of the COL provision expressed the hope
that the approach taken by the comprehensive operations license
would provide "a strong incentive for U.S. firms to maintain their
own controls on technology,. . . [allow] the Government to concen-
trate its enforcement efforts more efficiently, and . . . [provide] an
attractive model that allied and friendly countries could adopt."'17 8
The COL is thus evidence of a legislative desire to find a realistic way
of preventing leakage of militarily critical technology through data-
flow means that can be as sophisticated and efficient as the very tech-
nology described in the exchange.
D. Funding for Export Promotion
Title II of the EAAA 1985 authorizes Commerce to spend $133
million for each of the fiscal years 1985 and 1986 to carry out export
promotion programs.17 9 These programs are designed to stimulate or
assist U.S. businesses in marketing their goods and services abroad
competitively with businesses from other countries.18 0
IV. EFFICIENCY
The goal of efficiency, although espoused most strongly by those
seeking to promote exports, is based on the proposition that regard-
less of whether the objective is to limit or encourage exports, controls
should be administered in a timely and predictable manner and en-
forced so as to (1) encourage compliance and (2) achieve the maxi-
mum cost/benefit ratio for the administration's policing efforts.
Proponents of this goal urged that greater efficiency in the exporting
process would allow U.S. companies to invest more sensibly and com-
pete more efficiently in international markets.' 81
177. Id.
178. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 4.
179. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, §§ 201, 202, at 157-58.
180. Id.
181. OTA, supra note 60, at 13. "In many cases, the long timelag between the application
for a license and approval was tantamount to a loss of sales as potential customers grew impa-
tient and placed their orders with alternative suppliers." 130 CONG. REC. S 1860 (daily ed. Feb.
28, 1984) (statement of Sen. Tsongas).
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In addressing the House on these issues, Congressman Zschau 8 2
noted that the two objectives of greater exports of technology prod-
ucts and national security were not necessarily in conflict. "I know of
no executives in high technology companies who wish to help the So-
viet Union improve its military might. In fact, very little of our trade
actually goes to the Soviet Union or Warsaw pact countries."' 8 3 Con-
gressman Zschau reiterated the sense of frustration expressed by U.S.
exporters who lose business to foreign competitors that are able to
respond quickly with similar products, because U.S. shipments to
Free World countries are delayed by time-consuming licensing
procedures.
Most export license applications are approved. It just takes
time. Out of the more than 80,000 validated license applications
made in 1982, less than 900-slightly more than I percent-were
denied. This high approval ratio suggests that the licensing proce-
dures can be streamlined and focused without increasing the risk of
losing critical technology. In fact, streamlining the control proce-
dures could enable the controls that are applied to be tighter and
more effective. 1
84
Increased efficiency was a principal goal in enacting the EAAA
1985. The 1985 Act introduces several reforms designed to speed and
simplify the licensing process by the following tactics:
(1) taking advantage of multilateral control mechanisms to re-
duce or hasten licensing to CoCom destinations;
(2) one-third reduction in licensing time mandated for non-
CoCom destinations;
(3) greater sensitivity to business needs through other revisions
to promote efficiency; and
(4) congressional oversight to ensure implementation.
A. Taking Advantage of Multilateral Control Mechanisms
Congressman Zschau noted that during House debates on
reauthorization, two basic points were made, with which he con-
182. R-Cal. "My congressional district in northern California includes the area often re-
ferred to as 'Silicon Valley.' I have in my district about 700 electronics companies manufac-
turing high technology products. Most of these companies are subject to the Export
Administration Act in the regular conduct of their business." 129 CONG. REC. E2025 (daily
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curred.8 5 First, our greatest national security concerns are not with
West-West trade, and yet a majority of our enforcement efforts go to
monitoring those transactions.1 86 Second, relaxation of those controls
would diminish the administrative burden for our greatest percentage
of trade and simultaneously free up resources for strengthening en-
forcement of controls on trade with controlled countries.
1 87
In order to reduce the burden of licensing requirements for ex-
ports to other CoCom countries, the House bill would have amended
section 5(b) of the 1979 Act to provide that no export license could be
required in the case of exports to a country that maintains export
controls cooperatively with the U.S. The House bill excepted certain
end users who may be specified by regulation because, for example,
they are suspected of diverting items to controlled countries. In lieu
of requiring a license, exporters could have been required simply to
notify the Office of Export Administration of such exports.
188
Congressman Toby Roth objected to such a sweeping elimination
of licensing requirements, stating that what the General Accounting
Office had actually recommended was to "[r]eexamine the need for
licensing of high technology products to COCOM countries and other
allies by exploring various alternatives that would satisfy control
objectives and reduce or eliminate the burden of licensing. ' ' 189 Con-
gressman Roth then asserted that "[t]he provision in H.R. 3231
before the House does not satisfy control objectives-it just eliminates
U.S. export licensing and does not put anything in its place. The pro-
vision transfers the entire burden of export controls to the Europeans
and the Japanese."1 90 Congressman Roth asserted that the license
mechanism-even to CoCom destinations-was needed to track ex-
ports and ensure against illegal diversion to controlled countries. 191 If
the United States were to weaken its controls on exports, Roth in-
sisted, "the Europeans and the Japanese will surely respond by weak-
ening their own controls."
'
192
185. 129 CONG. REC. E4506 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1983).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 39.
189. 129 CONG. REC. E4470 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1983).
190. Id.
191. 129 CONG. REC. E3918 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1983).
192. 129 CONG. REC. E3283 (daily ed. June 30, 1983). Congressman Roth's concern that
items shipped to CoCom could, for lack of adequate supervision via the licensing mechanisms,
be diverted to controlled countries was one of the two issues at the heart of the House and
Senate deadlock at the end of the 98th Congress. As discussed earlier, the Senate sought to
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The Senate bill, S. 979, took a more cautious approach than the
House bill in that it eliminated licensing requirements to countries
controlling exports cooperatively with the U.S. under multilateral or
bilateral agreements, but only for items not on the Militarily Critical
Technologies List. The Senate's version was the one more closely fol-
lowed in amending the Act.
Two key elements, to be examined next, were enacted in the
compromise bill. First, there was a complete elimination of any re-
quirement for a validated license for exports of low technology items
to CoCom countries. Second, a "fast-track" licensing procedure was
implemented for exports of high technology items to CoCom nations.
1. Elimination of validated license requirement for low-tech
exports to CoCom destinations
The Joint Conference Committee agreed to eliminate the vali-
dated licensing requirement for exports to CoCom countries with re-
spect to relatively low-technology items, such as personal
computers, 93 that require only notification for export under CoCom
multilateral controls. 194 These items are specified in the Administra-
tive Exception Notes of the Control List. 95 Section 5(k) of the Act
was amended to require negotiations with countries that are not mem-
bers of CoCom to provide that any country which enters into an
agreement with the U.S. to maintain multilateral export controls com-
parable in practice to those of CoCom shall be treated like a CoCom
country for the purposes of export controls. 96
alleviate this concern by giving the DOD authority to review licenses for shipments "where the
Secretary of Defense. . . determines that there is a clear risk of diversion of militarily critical
goods or technology to proscribed destinations," and, in such cases, to recommend disapproval
of the export. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 69. See supra notes 42, 47-49, 102 and
accompanying text, showing that the Senate view (which was also that of Rep. Roth) was
implemented by Presidential directive, not by legislative consensus.
193. 131 CONG. REC. H5062 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Rep. Mica (D-Fla.)).
194. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(b)(2), at 124. New section 5(b)(2) provides:
No authority or permission to export may be required under this section before
goods or technology are exported in the case of exports to a country which maintains
export controls on such goods or technology cooperatively with the United States
pursuant to the agreement known as the Coordinating Committee, if the goods or
technology is at such a level that the export of the goods or technology to controlled
countries requires only notification of the participating governments of the Coordi-
nating Committee.
The new general license for such exports is called "G-COM," and is discussed at 50 Fed. Reg.
38,512 (1985), codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 371, 374, 386, 399 (1986).
195. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 55.
196. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(h), at 126-27. Hereafter, all references to
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2. Fast-track licensing for high-tech exports
to CoCom destinations
Under new paragraph (o) of section 10 of the Act, for goods and
technologies contained in the Control List (and not excluded by the
Administrative Exception Notes) certain expedited procedures apply
when exporting to CoCom (and comparable) countries. 97 If the Of-
fice of Export Administration does not inform the applicant within 15
working days (i.e., three weeks) of the application's receipt that (1)
the license is denied or (2) more time is necessary to consider it, a
license automatically becomes valid and effective, and shipment can
be made pursuant to that license.198 If additional time is required for
its review process, the OEA must complete that task and take action
within 15 additional working days. 199 At the end of this time, if there
has been no action to deny the license, it automatically becomes valid
and effective. 20
0
Thus, in shipping goods and technology to cooperating countries,
Congress has mandated that exporters gain certainty after no more
than 15 working days, or, if necesary, 30 working days. 20 ' The fast-
track procedures for high-tech exports apply only to individual
licenses, not to applications for multiple-export licenses.20 2
B. One-Third Reduction in Licensing Time Mandated for Exports
to Non-CoCom Destinations
In a move to reduce processing time for all export licenses, Con-
gress has mandated a one-third reduction in allotted time for exports
not destined for CoCom or CoCom-like countries. 20 3 Thus, to rewrite
the paragraph that earlier described licensing deadlines under the
"CoCom"-in connection with either (1) the just-described exemption from the validated li-
censing requirement for low-tech exports or (2) the "fast-track" licensing procedure for high-
tech exports-will include those other countries that have entered into agreements with the
U.S. similar to that of CoCom.
197. Id. § 111(o), at 145-46.
198. 131 CONG. REC. H2006 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bonker). Hence,
no news is good news.
199. Id.
200. Id. The export license application number, of which the OEA must inform the appli-
cant immediately upon receipt, is the same number that will be used for the subsequent license
to export. The exporter can then refer to that number in exporting its goods and technology
and need not await return receipt of a formal license to export. Id. at H2007.
201. Id.
202. Id. Significantly, any inter-agency review that may be required must take place
within the 30 working day time frame. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § I l(b)(3), at 142.
203. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § IIl(a), at 142.
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1979 Act,2°4 the new procedure is as follows:
Under the EAAA 1985, the Office of Export Administration is
allowed 60 days in which to act upon a license if interagency review is
not required. If interagency review is required, then, within 20 days
of initially receiving the application, Commerce must refer it to the
other agency or agencies, who will then have up to 40 days to con-
sider the application. By the time Commerce gets the application
back, up to two months will have elapsed since the application was
initially submitted, and Commerce is allowed 60 days from this point
within which to take final action. The whole process, including inter-
agency review, can now take not longer than four months, from the
time the application is filed, until the license is approved or
rejected. 20
5
C. Sensitivity to Business Needs in Additional Revisions
to Promote Efficiency
1. Faster processing of classification inquiries
As mentioned earlier, 20 6 the Control List is not an easy docu-
ment to decipher, and it can sometimes be difficult to determine
which is the applicable Export Commodity Control Number for one's
product. It is possible to obtain an Office of Export Administration
advisory opinion relating to the classification of a commodity on the
Control List by submitting a written description and allowing the
OEA to examine and classify it.2° 7 In the past, however, this process
could sometimes take months. 208 Under new paragraph (1) to section
10, the OEA must "within 10 working days [i.e., within two weeks]
after receipt of the request, inform the person making the request of
the proper classification. '20
9
When the OEA receives a written inquiry about the applicability
of export license requirements to a proposed transaction or series of
transactions, it must now reply with that information within 30
days.
2 10
204. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
205. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 11 (a), at 142.
206. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
207. A. GREEN & M. JANIK, supra note 68, at 7.
208. Id.
209. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § I I I(), at 144.
210. Id. § 111(I)(2).
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2. What happens if application requirements change
while license is pending
Under the 1985 amendments, if it happens that the Office of Ex-
port Administration changes certain license requirements after an
application has already been submitted, the OEA may not return
the application without action for failure to meet the new
requirements. 2
1'
3. Right of applicant to respond to negative recommendations
In cases where questions or negative considerations are received
from departments or agencies to which Commerce has referred the
application, applicants are now entitled, under the amended section
10(f)(2), to respond in writing or in person. 212 Where a determina-
tion has been reached to deny the application, the applicant, under
changes made to section 10(f)(3), shall have 30 days to respond to the
determination before the application is finally denied. Furthermore,
the applicant must now be informed of those modifications which
would allow the license to issue.
213
4. Small business assistance
Within four months of the July 12, 1985 date of enactment, the
Commerce Department was required to develop a plan to assist small
businesses in export licensing procedures. Congress desires that the
211. Id. (adding new paragraph 10(k)). The Secretary may request appropriate additional
information of the applicant, however. Id.
212. Id. § 111(c), at 143.
213. Id. In the following excerpt from the amended section 10(0(3), although the format
is different, only items D and E are new requirements.
In cases where the Secretary [of Commerce] has determined that an application
should be denied, the applicant shall be informed in writing, within 5 days after such
determination is made, of:
(A) the determination,
(B) the statutory basis for the proposed denial,
(C) the policies set forth in section 3 of this Act which would be furthered by
the proposed denial,
(D) what if any modifications in or restrictions on the goods or technology for
which the license was sought would allow such export to be compatible
with export controls imposed under this Act,
(E) which officers and employees of the Department of Commerce who are fa-
miliar with the application will be made reasonably available to the appli-
cant for considerations with regard to such modifications or restrictions, if
appropriate,
(F) to the extent consistent with the national security and foreign policy of the
United States, the specific considerations which led to the determination to
deny the application, and
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plan include, for example, "arrangements for counseling small busi-
nesses on filing applications and identifying goods or technology on
the control list, proposals for seminars and conferences to educate
small businesses on export controls and licensing procedures, and the
preparation of informational brochures. ' 214
D. Congressional Oversight to Ensure Implementation
Within six months of the July 12, 1985 date of enactment, and
quarterly thereafter, the Commerce Department was required to com-
mence periodic submission of a report to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and the Senate Banking Committee describing all licens-
ing activity for that reporting period. Commerce must give certain
specified, comprehensive data regarding the number of licenses
processed, the length of time required for review, including inter-
agency review, how many went over the mandated deadline, and so
forth, so that these committees can monitor the OEA's compliance
with the new legislative requirements. 215
Addressing the floor of Congress on April 16, 1985, Congress-
man Bonker noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee was aware of
"instances in which the competitiveness of U.S. exporters has been
hampered by the inefficiency of the agencies with regulatory and en-
forcement authority," and that on occasion the export regulations had
been applied inconsistently and irrationally. 216 He stated that the
committee had not sought to directly address this situation in its legis-
lation since it already is "the express policy of the United States that
these controls be administered fairly. ' 21 7 Mr. Bonker stated that it
was the Committee's intent to closely monitor administrative prac-
tices in the future and, "if necessary, to consider remedial
legislation." 21 8
V. FOREIGN POLICY
Those who favor giving the President broad discretion in the use
of foreign policy controls make certain basic assumptions. First, that
the targeted nation (whether Libya, Nicaragua or the Soviet Union)
has such a need for Western imports, and that restraint of exports to
(G) the availability of appeal procedures.
214. Id. § 111(e), at 144 (adding new paragraph 10(m)).
215. Id. § 11, at 144-45 (adding new paragraph 10(n)).
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that country provides an effective lever for affecting its policies and
behavior. Second, that Presidential intervention in the conduct of in-
ternational trade is appropriate as a diplomatic mechanism. Finally,
that U.S. foreign policy requires a means by which the President can
reward or punish the actions of other nations where there is no suita-
ble alternative to manipulation of trade controls.
2 19
Advocates of the use of foreign policy controls maintain that
they are an important tool for the President. Export controls can,
they argue, (1) deter future actions, (2) mobilize international support
against certain behavior, (3) impose economic costs on the targeted
nation, (4) express disapproval of another nation's policies, and (5) set
a moral example. In addition, their authorization ensures that the
President has a variety of diplomatic tools at his disposal.
220
A. The Soviet Pipeline Embargo Fiasco
Opinions on the value of foreign policy controls vary dramati-
cally. In response to the imposition of martial law in Poland, Presi-
dent Reagan imposed numerous political and economic sanctions on
both Poland and the Soviet Union.22 ' The sanctions were dominated
by the pipeline controls, for which the United States imposed extra-
territorial, retroactive export controls on oil and gas technology in its
attempt to embargo all oil and gas equipment trade between the
U.S.S.R. and foreign subsidiaries or licensees of U.S. firms.222
Depending on who is speaking, the pipeline sanctions against the
Soviet Union were either a great success or a complete disaster. In
the view of the study cited earlier that was published in the Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder,2
23
[t]he Soviet pipeline sanctions, for example (1) delayed the
219. OTA, supra note 60, at 13.
220. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1295.
221. The U.S. cancelled Aeroflot landing rights, deferred grain negotiations, ended ex-
change agreements, restricted the movement of Polish diplomats, expanded controls on the
Kama River truck plant and extended them to the Zil truck plant, froze all export licenses for
sales to the Soviets, withdrew Poland's most-favored nation status, and-best remembered and
most controversial-imposed new controls on pipeline equipment and later extended those
controls to various foreign countries. MOYER-MABRY STUDY, supra note 25, at E2347.
222. OTA, supra note 60, at 4. Originally the President imposed controls on exports and
re-exports of U.S.-origin oil and gas goods and technical data, but, by regulation published in
the Federal Register on June 24, 1982, these controls were expanded to restrict exports to the
U.S.S.R. of non-U.S.-origin goods or technical data by U.S. owned or controlled firms wher-
ever organized or doing business. International Operations, MACHINERY & ALLIED PROD-
UCTS INST. BULL. No. 6274, June 24, 1982, at 1.
223. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1293-96.
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construction of the Siberian pipeline; (2) compelled the USSR to
allocate scarce resources between priority domestic projects and
the export pipeline; (3) gave the Europeans an opportunity to as-
sess alternative energy supply options in view of the soft petroleum
and gas market and possibly prevent further reliance on Soviet gas;
(4) gained European cooperation for a more coordinated approach
toward East-West trade. Europeans are now more cooperative on
a coordinated economic policy toward the Soviet bloc because, not
in spite of, the sanctions.
224
In contrast, according to the Moyer-Mabry Study,225 the pipeline
controls were "the most controversial, and perhaps least successful,
controls in U.S. history. Not only did our allies not cooperate, they
vehemently opposed the pipeline controls and directed companies in
their countries to disregard them. ' 226 Another study reported that
[s]everal European firms defied U.S. orders, and were subjected to
U.S. import control sanctions as a result. The West Europeans
viewed the Siberian pipeline as a desirable way to increase and di-
versify energy supplies. American critics of the pipeline viewed
such policies as politically shortsighted. Therein lay one of the
problems with the use of this particular sanction as a tool of U.S.
foreign policy, namely, that the diplomatic reason for imposing
this embargo was not at all clear. 227
The OTA study prepared for the Senate Banking Committee
pointed out how a failure to have a clear purpose for imposing foreign
policy controls can dilute their effectiveness.228
It has been argued that equivocal economic impacts aside, the
political utility of trade sanctions lies as much in the message of
U.S. resolve that they convey to the U.S.S.R. as in precipitating
measurable changes in Soviet behavior. Yet messages sent to the
U.S.S.R. through imposition of pipeline sanctions have been un-
clear, being variously justified as designed to:
-protest Soviet responsibility for the declaration of martial
law in Poland;
224. Id. at S1295-96.
225. MOYER-MABRY STUDY, supra note 25, at E2347-48.
226. Id. at E2347. "The efforts by each side to press its claims to the fullest in the pipeline
dispute obviously left the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms in an impossible situation-caught
between competing national laws and regulations." Reauthorization of the Export Administra-
tion Act, NAT'L A. MANUFACTURERS 1 (Apr. 1983) (available from NAM, 1776 F Street,
N.W., Wash., D.C. 20006) [hereinafter cited as NAM].
227. OTA, supra note 60, at 7.
228. Id. at 8.
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-prevent West European dependence on Soviet gas;
-damage--or at least not aid-general Soviet economic de-
velopment by inhibiting a project of great economic importance;
-protest the use of "slave labor" in pipeline construction; or
-- deny the U.S.S.R. hard currency earnings from gas sales in
Europe.
These are very different goals. Yet, if the success of a policy
rests on its symbolic message, its impact may be weakened when
the message itself is unclear.
229
B. U.S. Economy Pays Price for Ill-Conceived
Foreign Policy Controls
The U.S. exporting community strongly protested the pipeline
sanctions, complaining bitterly that this symbolic gesture was made
with little regard for its adverse impact on them. The loss encom-
passed far more than mere lost profits suffered by U.S. firms. More
critical were (1) the loss of our market share to foreign competitors
and (2) the blow to the reputation of U.S. firms as reliable suppliers.
Senator Lautenberg 30 further described the damage that retroactive
foreign policy controls can inflict on U.S. exporters:
More generally, the uncertainty that has surrounded U.S. ex-
port policy has itself been a major problem for American compa-
nies seeking to do business abroad. As a former businessman
myself, I know how critical customer goodwill and confidence are,
especially in international business. It takes years to build up the
kind of relationships on which effective marketing depends. A
firm's most valuable asset, in many cases, is its reputation for relia-
bility and a capacity to back up its initial sales with dependable
service and replacement parts. That kind of credibility is the first




231. 130 CONG. REC. S2142 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (speaking in support of S. 979). In an
article written while he was president of Bechtel Corporation, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz summarized many of the concerns of business with regard to the use of foreign policy
controls:
It takes a long time to go abroad, get positioned and learn about how to do things. A
considerable investment is made on both sides of the transaction. . . . In this pro-
cess the company develops what the government may regard as a bargaining chip.
But if our government then takes the bargaining chip and spends it, where does that
leave the company? The company has lost out and its commercial relationship
deteriorates.
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The embargo on oil and gas equipment was lifted in November
1982,232 but the exporting community continued in its united efforts
in this area by launching a major campaign in early 1983 to have
Congress restrict presidential authority under the 1979 Act to use for-
eign policy controls.233 Many even supported the complete elimina-
tion of section 6 (the section authorizing presidential use of foreign
policy controls) from the 1979 Act. 234 Neither the House nor the
Senate bill actually went this far, but the legislation passed by Con-
gress in June 1985 does attempt to significantly restrain the Presi-
dent's power under the Export Administration Act to interfere with
existing trade contracts. In urging passage of S. 979 in late February,
1984, Senator Heinz235 was expressing many of the sentiments of a
majority of both houses:
The [thrust] of the committee bill with respect to foreign policy
controls is, frankly, to discourage them, without at the same time
repealing the President's authority to impose them. Our experi-
ence with most foreign policy controls has been largely an unhappy
one. They have usually been unilateral. They have had little im-
pact on their intended targets, and they have caused real harm to
American exporters. They have not only caused us lost sales but
have led to permanent lost market share abroad. They have also
struck a crippling blow to the credibility of Americans as
suppliers.2
36
In amending section 6 of the 1979 Act, Congress addressed four
main issues: (1) contract sanctity; (2) exterritorial reach of U.S. au-
thority; (3) restraints on the use of foreign policy controls; and (4)
required consultation with Congress. Each of these issues will now be
discussed in turn.
C Resolution of the Contract Sanctity Issue in EAAA 1985
1. Curtailing foreign policy controls-Houses divide over whether
to allow exceptions
The House bill sought to accommodate contrasting feelings
about authority to impose controls for foreign policy purposes. The
NAM, supra note 226, at 1.
232. OTA, supra note 60, at 7.
233. The Green Memo, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, P.L. 99-64,
NAT'L A. MANUFACTURERS, Oct. 17, 1985, at 7 [hereinafter cited as NAM Green Memo].
234. Id.
235. R-Pa.
236. 130 CONG. REC. S1696 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
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bill supported the conclusion that "actions taken under the act, par-
ticularly for purposes of furthering U.S. foreign policy goals, may be
the single greatest hindrance to U.S. exports, costing significant loss
of U.S. jobs." 237 H.R. 3231 therefore specified that "[a]ny export con-
trols imposed under this section shall not affect any contract to export
entered into before the date on which such controls are imposed or
any export license issued under this Act before such date. ' 238 But
"for circumstances involving imminent or actual foreign acts of mili-
tary aggression, nuclear test, gross violation of human rights, or acts
of terrorism," H.R. 3231 allowed an exception to the proscription
against abrogation of existing contracts.
239
The Senate bill was more absolute. It provided simply that no
controls could be imposed that curtail the ability to perform under an
existing contract. 240 The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder re-
port,241 however, had warned against eliminating the mechanism of
foreign policy controls: "Not maintaining this authority would mean
that the President would be powerless to act promptly and effectively
should it be discovered that a particular item's export would be dam-
aging to Western security or would be shipped to a country which has
openly aided a heinous terrorist act."' 242 This line of reasoning was
persuasive to some senators, apparently, for the Senate tempered its
bill by including an amendment to the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act 243 to make explicit the President's authority to ab-
rogate contracts in foreign policy emergencies. 244
2. Compromise reached
The differences between the House and Senate on the issue of
contract sanctity were one of the major sticking points in the long
joint conference during the spring and summer of 1984. In October,
237. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 6.
238. Id. at 60 (adding new paragraph 6(m)).
239. Id. at 7. Unfortunately, both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (prompting the grain
embargo of the Carter years) and the imposition of martial law in Poland would seem to fit this
language as permitting an exception to the rule.
240. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 13.
241. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1293-96. It should be recalled that this report
was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Garn, the Chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee.
242. Id. at S1296.
243. 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1985), the authority through which President Reagan extended the
1979 Act until it was reauthorized by Congress. See supra note 33.
244. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 13. See statements by Sen. Proxmire at 130
CONG. REC. S1693 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
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House Conferees finally acceded to the Senate on this issue, but the
victory for business interests was short lived. Pressed by the deadlock
and the short time remaining before Congress adjourned, in exchange
for concessions on other issues, Senate conferees agreed to a less re-
strictive foreign policy provision. Although Congress failed to jointly
approve a bill before adjournment, the compromise language became
part of the final EAAA 1985.245
The language adopted in the EAAA 1985 allows the abrogation
of existing contracts in instances involving a "breach of the peace
pos[ing] a serious and direct threat to the strategic interest of the
United States. ' 246 Such abrogations of contract must be "instrumen-
tal in remedying the situation posing the direct threat" and may con-
tinue only so long as the direct threat persists.
247
3. Consultation with industry required
The main complaint of industry (aside from the fact that foreign
policy controls are allowed at all) has been that trade sanctions are
invoked by the President with seemingly little thought for the cost
that will be borne by U.S. companies. 248 A Senate measure, adopted
by the EAAA 1985, amended section 6(c) to require the Secretary of
Commerce "in every possible instance" to "consult with and seek ad-
vice from affected United States industries and appropriate advisory
committees" with respect to five criteria before imposing foreign
policy controls. 249  The effectiveness of this measure may depend
245. NAM Green Memo, supra note 233, at 8.
246. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(l)(1), at 136 (adding new paragraph 6(m)).
247. The statement of managers of the House Conference Report on S. 883 (the bill that
became Pub. L. No 99-64) explained, regarding the contract sanctity provision:
The most important thing to note in this new language is the operation of the cause
and effect relationship between the two actions that are prerequisites to the imposi-
tion of controls on exports subject to a contract or agreement. Simply put, the provi-
sion requires a clear and direct relationship between the proposed control that
requires the breaking of a contract and the remedying of the event causing the direct
threat to our strategic interests. The certification required of the President by this
provision must make clear that such breaking or curtailment of a contract or con-
tracts will be instrumental in remedying the situation that has occurred.
H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 58-59.
248. Under section 6(b)(4) of the 1979 Act the President is supposed to consider "the
likely effects of the proposed controls . ..on individual United States companies and their
employees and communities," but this suggestion by the Act is nonbinding. Pub. L. No. 96-
72, supra note 21, § 6(b)(4), at 514.
249. 130 CONG. REC. H12153-54 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (heading entitled "Subsection
(c)--Consultation With Industry"). The October 1984 draft statement of managers [hereinaf-
ter cited as Draft Stmt], found at 130 CONG. REC. H12150-62, is a section-by-section delinea-
tion, on behalf of the House Conferees to the joint conference committee, of the compromises
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on the aggressiveness of U.S. industry groups in verifying its
implementation.
D. Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Authority
1. Allied irritation with U.S. conduct
There are two types of extraterritorial controls that may be im-
posed by the President: (1) restrictions on exports of non-U.S. items
made by U.S. subsidiaries located abroad250 and (2) restrictions on the
reexport by non-U.S. companies located overseas of items originally
exported from the U.S.251 It has been argued that the jurisdiction of
national security and foreign policy controls must have an extraterri-
torial reach, or U.S. firms will flee the country to escape their
power.252
The problem is that the United States and its European and
Asian allies do not share the same view regarding the "role, impor-
tance and acceptable scope of trade with the Soviet Union" 253 and
other nations targeted by U.S. foreign policy controls. Europeans
"also resent American attempts to dictate matters which they con-
sider to be internal economic policy, and to take major foreign policy
steps without consultation. ' 254 In the case of the pipeline embargo,
U.S. notions of what was best for the Europeans actually differed
from those of the Europeans themselves. 255
The broad scope of extraterritorial controls, as they were ap-
plied in this case [pipeline embargo], may lead to long-term ad-
verse impacts on West-West trade, far more important to the U.S.
economy than trade with the Soviet Union. The intense negative
reaction at home and abroad provoked by the U.S. sanctions ar-
gues that they struck close to the nerve. Multilateral deals are
highly intricate, potentially involving multifarious second- and
third-order relationships in several nations. Extraterritorial con-
trols can therefore have many unanticipated and undesirable con-
sequences as their impact spreads in a ripple-like effect to
worked out between H.R. 3231 and S. 979. See Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(c), at
132. The five criteria are discussed infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
250. For example, the controls imposed on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms as part of the
Soviet pipeline sanctions. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 89 and accompanying text regarding end-user statements.
252. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1295.
253. OTA, supra note 60, at 6.
254. Id. at 7.
255. Id.
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numerous and varied interested parties.2 56
2. Proposed restriction to domestic items not adopted
in EAAA 1985
During Committee consideration of the 1979 Act, during the
96th Congress, an amendment was proposed in the Senate that would
have specifically prohibited the imposition of foreign policy controls
on the foreign subsidiaries or licensees of U.S. companies, but the pro-
posal was dropped in the face of strong opposition by the Carter Ad-
ministration. 257 The House bill in the 98th Congress sought to do
exactly that, restricting the President's authority to impose controls to
the export of goods or technology produced in the United States.
258
The Senate bill, S. 979, did not contain a similar provision, and,
in the end, it was the Senate position that was agreed to by the joint
conference. 259 Despite the absence of language restricting the use of
foreign policy controls to domestically produced goods and technol-
ogy, congressional intent under the 1985 Act was to "protect from
disruption by new export controls both the foreign and domestic con-
tracts entered into by U.S. nationals, as well as their foreign subsidiar-
ies and affiliates. ' '260
3. Consultation with other countries
A provision of the House bill, partially adopted by the 1985 Act,
added a new paragraph (d) to section 6 to urge the President to con-
sult with other countries before imposing controls. The version
agreed to by the conference committee, and enacted, requires consul-
tation with other countries at the earliest appropriate opportunity. 26'
256. OTA, supra note 60, at 6.
257. Freedenberg, supra note 1, at 2193.
258. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 48 (amending section 6(a)(1)). The 1979
Act allowed presidential control over any "goods, technology, or other information subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States," not solely such items produced in the U.S. Id.
259. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12153 (heading entitled "Extraterritoriality").
260. Id. The draft statement of managers took note of the fact that their legislation per-
haps reaches only to protect contractual commitments from the extraterritorial powers of the
executive branch. "Extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls affecting non-contrac-
tual transactions and relationships remains a serious matter of contention and strain upon U.S.
relations with other countries, particularly with European governments, and possible ways of
further limiting such effects merit continued study and consideration." Id.
261. Id. at H12154 (heading entitled "Subsection (d) - Consultations With Other Coun-
tries"). Cf H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 50; Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5,
§ 108(d), at 132.
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4. Import controls as an extraterritorial assertion of U.S. power
The Senate bill provided for import controls, as a further means
of promoting U.S. foreign policy, by adding this language to section 6:
"Whenever the authority conferred by this section is exercised with
respect to a country, the President is also authorized to impose con-
trols on imports from that country to the United States." 262 Such a
measure would have provided authority to restrict imports from
countries whose activities are objectionable to the United States on
foreign policy grounds, as an alternative to gaining foreign policy lev-
erage by controlling U.S.-origin items.263 It would only have been
applied against target countries, not friendly nations. 264 The position
of the House bill, which did not contain a comparable provision, was
the one agreed to by the committee of conference.
265
The Senate bill likewise provided for import sanctions in further-
ance of national security interests,266 a measure that was incorporated
into EAAA 1985, as an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.267
The use of import sanctions in addition, or as an alternative, to
the use of other export controls raises an important dilemma. Should
they be favored as preferable to mechanisms that require U.S. indus-
tries to bear the cost of foreign policy or national security objectives,
or should they be avoided as yet another inappropriate extension of
U.S. authority into the affairs of foreign entities? Since the measure
that was adopted applies only to national security controls, this issue
will be discussed more fully in connection with the National Security
portion of this article.268
262. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 51.
263. Id. at 13. "Not only will the authority to control imports from countries that are the
targets of foreign policy controls widen the President's options, it could also lessen the burden
on American exporters, who have heretofore been asked to pay the entire price of foreign
policy actions in this area." Id.
264. Id.
265. Draft Stint, supra note 249, at H12153 (heading entitled "Import Controls").
266. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 73 (adding new paragraph 4 to section 11(c)).
267. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 121, at 155 (amending Chapter 4 of title II of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1864 (1986)) by adding a new section 233).
268. Discussed infra notes 536-57 and accompanying text.
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E. Presidential Restraint Through Required Threshold Criteria
1. Failure of the 1979 Act's mechanism of
"executive self-restraint"
Under the 1979 Act the President is directed to consider six spe-
cific criteria and to consult with Congress and industry before insti-
tuting foreign policy controls. 269 These provisions were designed to
limit the use of foreign policy controls by encouraging consultation,
public involvement, and consideration of alternatives. The provisions
are nonbinding, however, a regrettable feature from industry's stand-
point because they tend to be honored perfunctorily, if at all.270
Often, the envisioned economic impact of the controls on a targeted
nation has been overestimated while the costs to the United States
were underestimated. 271 These costs can include, for example, "budg-
etary costs, loss of principal and follow-up contracts (revenues, prof-
its, jobs, taxes), and the loss of market share. While many costs are
269. These criteria are set out at section 6(b) of the 1979 Act:
(b) CRITERIA. -When imposing, expanding, or extending export controls under
this section, the President shall consider-
(1) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign pol-
icy purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability from other coun-
tries of the goods or technology proposed for such controls;
(2) the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objec-
tives of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism,
and with overall United States policy toward the country which is the proposed
target of controls;
(3) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such
export controls by the United States;
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance of
the United States on the international reputation of the United States as a sup-
plier of goods and technology, and on individual United States companies and
their employees and communities, including the effects of the controls on ex-
isting contracts;
(5) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effec-
tively; and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.
Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(b), at 513-14.
270. MOYER-MABRY STUDY, supra note 25, at E2347.
271. Id. at E2348.
OTA found that trade leverage usually works under very limited conditions, and that
past precedents have demonstrated its weakness when used against the Soviet Union.
The aftermath of U.S. attempts to embargo grain and energy equipment exports to
the U.S.S.R. dramatically demonstrate the limitations on U.S. power to successfully
conduct a trade leverage policy. Although both embargoes were directed at vulnera-
ble areas of the Soviet economy, their results were inconclusive at best. U.S. sanc-
tions and embargoes may well have hurt the U.S.S.R., but it is unlikely that they
have hurt enough to make a real economic difference.
OTA, supra note 60, at 8.
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hidden, total long-term costs may be very large.
'272
Another factor, which is not even listed among the criteria the
President is supposed to consider, is the thought of how the controls
might be ended, once imposed. Especially in the case of controls that
failed to have the desired effect, lifting trade sanctions can be an awk-
ward move. In addition, since lifting the controls can be seen as a
diplomatic "signal," a decision whether or not to end foreign policy
controls can itself become a major issue.
273
2. Proposals considered by the 98th Congress
In his 1982 article discussing the issues that would be raised dur-
ing the reauthorization debates in Congress, 274 Dr. Freedenberg listed
some of the alternatives that had been suggested for generally cur-
tailing the President's freedom to utilize foreign policy export controls
as a tool of international diplomacy.275 One approach would have
been to prohibit their use except when there has been a declaration of
war or national emergency. This is the prerequisite to invocation of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
276
While observing that this constraint did not prevent President Carter
from imposing economic sanctions on Iran pursuant to the hostage
crisis, Dr. Freedenberg pointed out that IEEPA does require biannual
reviews of sanctions, and the sanctions can only continue as long as
the emergency does.
277
The proponents of this approach argue that the president
would still have the power to deal with true emergencies on the
order of Iran, or similar events, but it is felt that the added step of
the declaration of national emergency would lessen the probability
of "light-switch" diplomacy using U.S. trade as the initial weapon
of diplomatic leverage called upon by the Administration in con-
frontational situations. 27
8
Another approach noted by Dr. Freedenberg was the suggestion
by some that the 1979 Act provide for a one- or two-house congres-
sional veto of foreign policy controls. Dr. Freedenberg stated, how-
ever, that a significant problem with that mechanism arises from the
272. MOYER-MABRY STUDY, supra note 25, at E2348.
273. Id.
274. Freedenberg, supra note 1, at 2190.
275. Id. at 2192-93.
276. Id. at 2193.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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fact that a primary purpose for using the controls is to send a diplo-
matic message to adversary countries. If Congress were to veto the
President's measures, it "would have the exact opposite effect of the
intent of original export control, signalling American weakness and
indecision instead of strength of purpose.
'279
The real root of Congress's dissatisfaction with the mechanism
provided by the 1979 Act was not so much that prior consideration of
certain criteria was ineffective, but that presidential compliance with
this step was voluntary. This sentiment is reflected in the fact that
neither the House nor the Senate bill drastically altered the criteria to
be considered. Rather, congressional control over the matter was
sought in H.R. 3231 by a stricter requirement that the President con-
sult with and report to Congress prior to imposing such controls.
2 8 0
Similarly, S. 979 strengthened the use of the 1979 Act's six criteria by
requiring the President to go beyond mere consideration of them and
actually make a pre-determination that the criteria had been
satisfied. 281
One other means of curtailing presidential use of foreign policy
controls considered by Congress was S. 979's provision that foreign
policy controls expire unless renewed every six months, instead of
every year as in the 1979 Act. 28 2 The House bill had no comparable
provision, and the joint conferees elected to keep the law the way it
was. The conferees did note, however, "that the President has the
authority to add or life [sic] controls at any time, and [the conferees]
expect the President to modify controls, when appropriate, prior to
the annual renewal date. ' 283
279. Id.
280. Discussed infra at text accompanying notes 305-18.
281. Weinrod and Pilon state that such a requirement would be "inadvisable," since it
would leave the President with "no discretion concerning, or ability to weigh, competing fac-
tors." Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1293-96. This conservative view did not find ade-
quate support in the Senate. In fact, the Senate bill contained two strict requirements on
which presidential authority to impose, extend, or expand trade sanctions was contingent: (1)
prior submission of a written report to Congress; and (2) testimony by the Secretary of Com-
merce to Congress if, after six months, the President wished to continue the controls.
In the House, Representative Roth argued that economic and trade sanctions are among
the few options for crafting foreign policy available to the President, but his ability to use them
would be unduly restricted by H.R. 3231. 129 CONG. REC. E3284 (daily ed. June 30, 1983).
However, in the House, also, congressional determination to curb executive freedom in this
area won out in the end.
282. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 51 (amending section 6(a)(2)).
283. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12153 (heading entitled "Expiration of Controls").
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3. Strict criteria required under new law
As just mentioned in the preceding section, the Senate's ap-
proach to tightening the reins on presidential discretion to utilize for-
eign policy controls was to force him to first make a determination
that certain criteria had in fact been satisfied. As adopted in the
EAAA 1985, the wording of the introductory clause of section 6(h)
has been strategically reworded from the 1979 Act. From this:
When imposing, expanding, or extending export controls
under this section, the President shall consider-
284
To this:
[Tihe President may impose, extend, or expand export controls
under this section only if the President determines that- 285
The specific criteria that must be satisfied have been altered in
some respects from the list given in the 1979 Act 286 by the addition of
certain affirmative language. Specifically, in revising section 6(b)
Congress sought to assure that:
(1) if an alternative means of achieving his foreign policy objective
exists, the President will not impose foreign policy controls;
(2) foreign reaction to the controls will not render them ineffective or
counterproductive to their purpose; and
(3) the benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives exceeds any adverse
effects engendered by the controls.
Finally, the criterion of the 1979 Act that the President consider the
"foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls" 287 has been
expunged.
288
284. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(b), at 513.
285. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(b), at 132.
286. The Senate's bill added the requirement that "such controls... not have an extra-
territorial effect on countries friendly to the United States adverse to overall United States
foreign policy interests." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 52. But the version adopted in
Pub. L. No. 99-64 did not use such direct language. See infra note 288. The text of the 1979
Act's Section 6(b) appears at supra note 269.
287. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(b)(6), at 514.
288. This is evident from a comparison of the present wording of section 6(b), below, with
the wording of the 1979 Act, supra note 269. Italics have been used here to highlight those
concepts that have been added to section 6(b).
(b) CRITERIA. -(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection [requiring the Presi-
dent to consider the foreign policy consequences of modifying export controls that
were already in effect as of EAAA 1985's enactment], the President may impose,
extend, or expand export controls under this section only if the President determines
that-
(A) such controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose,
in light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of the
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4. Presidential power to impose trade sanctions expressly
restricted when foreign availability exists
The 1979 Act had included foreign availability as one of the cri-
teria the President should consider before implementing foreign pol-
icy controls, 2 89 but, as discussed in the Trade Promotion portion of
this article,290 Congress perceived a need to expressly restrict the use
of trade sanctions when foreign availability would defeat their
effectiveness.
The House bill added a seventh criterion to section 6(b), explic-
itly requiring the President to consider whether the controlled item,
or one similar to it, was available in sufficient quantity outside the
U.S. or whether negotiations had been successfully concluded to en-
sure the cooperation of other governments in controlling the good or
technology.29' The House bill did not, however, prohibit foreign pol-
icy controls if there was foreign availability, and it also exempted pro-
posed controls deemed necessary "to further efforts by the United
States to counter international terrorism or to promote observance of
internationally recognized human rights. ' 29
2
The language of the Senate's bill seemed to state that foreign pol-
icy controls could not even be imposed unless the President had first
goods or technology proposed for such controls, and that foreign policy purpose
cannot be achieved through negotiations or other alternative means;
(B) the proposed controls are compatible with the foreign policy objectives
of the United States and with overall United States policy toward the country to
which exports are to be subject to the proposed controls;
(C) the reaction of other countries to the imposition, extension, or expan-
sion of such export controls by the United States is not likely to render the con-
trols ineffective in achieving the intended foreign policy purpose or to be
counterproductive to United States foreign policy interests;
(D) the effect of the proposed controls on the export performance of the
United States, the competitive position of the United States in the international
economy, the international reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods
and technology, or on the economic well-being of individual United States com-
panies and their employees and communities does not exceed the benefit to
United States foreign policy objectives; and
(E) the United States has the ability to enforce the proposed controls
effectively.
Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(b), at 132 (emphasis added).
289. "When imposing, expanding, or extending export controls under this section, the
President shall consider-
(1) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in
light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of the goods or tech-
nology proposed for such controls ....
Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(b)(1), at 513.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 118-35.
291. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 50.
292. Id.
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determined that foreign availability was not likely to hinder their ef-
fectiveness. 293 But the Senate Banking Committee in fact intended a
more moderate approach. Senator Heinz stated that under S. 979
"foreign availability would not be a criterion in licensing products for
export to countries that are the subject of foreign policy controls for
the first six months, but that after that, in the absence of multilateral
cooperation it will become a factor.
' ' 294
This approach was taken in order to provide time for negotia-
tions toward multilateral controls and to "provide the President with
sufficient flexibility even in subsequent six-month periods of controls
to take foreign availability into account among other factors. ' 295 Sen-
ator Proxmire296 noted the recognition by the Banking Committee
that "there may be cases in which the actions of the country against
which controls have been instituted are of such an abhorrent nature
that U.S. foreign policy controls would be appropriate despite the de-
cision of our allies not to cooperate. ' 297 The key to the Senate ap-
proach was that foreign policy controls could be imposed under S.
979, notwithstanding foreign availability, if the purposes of the con-
trols could nevertheless be achieved.
298
The amended Act tightens the wording of paragraph (b)(1)(A)
by stipulating not only that the President must not impose controls
likely to fail due to foreign availability, but that he must have reached
a determination that the "foreign policy purpose cannot be achieved
through negotiations or other alternative means. ' 299 Under section
6(h) of the amended Act, in seeking to extend any export controls, if
the President has not, within six months from the date of enactment
(or for controls already in effect as of the enactment of the EAAA
1985, within six months of July 12, 1985), succeeded in securing the
cooperation of appropriate foreign governments, the Secretary of
293. "The President may impose, expand, or extend export controls under this section
only if he determines that-
(1) such controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light of other
factors, including the availability from other countries of the goods or technology pro-
posed for such controls ....
S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 52.
294. 130 CONG. REC. S1696-97 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). Sen. Heinz (R-Pa.) is a member
of the Banking Committee.
295. Id.
296. (D-Wis.), a member of the Banking Committee.
297. 130 CONG. REC. S1693 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
298. Id.
299. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(b), at 132.
460 [Vol. 8:399
Export Administration Amendments Act
Commerce is required to approve licenses for exports of goods or
technology available "in sufficient quantity and comparable quality
from sources outside the United States" such that the denial of
licenses would be ineffective in achieving the purposes of the
controls.3oo
Two things should thus be taken into consideration in evaluating
the significance of the new foreign availability requirements in section
6. First, the special attention accorded to foreign availability in sec-
tion 6(h) applies only in the context of extending foreign policy con-
trols. Second, the Senate Banking Committee expressly intended that
foreign availability not be a criterion until the President has had six
months to evaluate that factor and to negotiate with foreign countries
to remove foreign availability. Apparently, despite the plain language
of the statute, which requires a determination before the controls can
be imposed, Congress still intends for the President to have the free-
dom to impose such controls-and allow them to remain in effect for
at least six months-notwithstanding initial foreign availability.
However, this may be the best that exporters can hope for, since
otherwise the President would lack the ability to act quickly. Fre-
quently, the ability to respond quickly is a necessary component if the
sanctions are to achieve any impact at all.
Congress has, nevertheless, imposed the absolute requirement
that the President report to and consult with Congress before he may
impose, expand, or extend any foreign policy controls.30 1 In order to
satisfy that requirement, moreover, the President must describe to
Congress
the availability from other countries of goods or technology com-
parable to the goods or technology subject to the proposed export
controls, and describing the nature and results of the efforts made
pursuant to subsection (h) to secure the cooperation of foreign gov-
ernments in controlling the foreign availability of such comparable
goods or technology.
30 2
5. Exemptions for donations
Both the House and Senate bills introduced an explicit exemp-
tion from foreign policy controls for items intended to meet basic
300. Id. § 108(g), at 134.
301. Id. § 108(e), at 133.
302. Id. Prior consultation with Congress is discussed more fully infra notes 312-18 and
accompanying text.
1986]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
human needs. The conferees accepted the narrower Senate version in
amending section 6(f) (now renumbered to 6(g)). S. 979 exempted
from controls donations of such items. It thereby distinguished ex-
ports of "freely donated items of a people-to-people nature" from ex-
ports of a commercial nature.303 The new law would thus permit, for
example, exports to Nicaragua of donated food and clothing for suf-
fering people there.
3°4
F Required, Prior Consultation with Congress
1. Failure of the 1979 Act's mechanism
The 1979 Act had a provision that the President, "in every possi-
ble instance" was to consult with the Congress prior to imposing ex-
port controls under section 5.305 When such controls were imposed,
expanded, or extended, the President was supposed to "immediately
notify the Congress of such action" and simultaneously submit a re-
port. 30 6 That report was to contain (1) the President's conclusions
with respect to each of the six criteria contained in section 6(b) 30 7 and
(2) the nature and results of his attempts to employ alternative means
to achieve the same result or tell why he had not attempted to use any
alternative means.30
8
In practice, however, the President tended to disregard these re-
quirements of the 1979 Act.30 9 For example, the Joint Conference
Committee noted that (ironically enough) two days after the commit-
tee had taken action to revise that particular section of the Act, the
Commerce Department published expanded foreign policy controls in
the Federal Register. Although Congress had not yet been consulted
on the matter, the notice of controls included the statement, "Mem-
bers of Congress have been consulted.
'310
303. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H 12154 (heading entitled "Subsection (f)-Exclusion
for Donations").
304. By Executive Order 12513, issued May 1, 1985, the President declared a national
emergency with respect to Nicaragua, invoking the authority of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act. Under that order, all exports to Nicaragua from the United States are
prohibited, except those for the organized democratic resistance. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 540).
305. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(e), at 514.
306. Id.
307. See supra note 269.
308. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 6(e)(l), (2), at 514.
309. Draft Stint, supra note 249, at H 12154 (heading entitled "Subsection (e)-Consulta-
tions With the Congress").
310. Id.
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In another case-the 1982 embargo on oil and gas refining and
transmission equipment imposed against the U.S.S.R.-a report was
required to be submitted to Congress by June 22, 1982. The controls
were lifted on November 13, 1982. The required report was not sub-
mitted until November 29, 1982.311
2. Stricter requirements under EAAA 1985
Out of sheer frustration with Executive disregard for legislative
intent under the Act, Congress resolved to impose a strict prerequisite
to the President's authority to use foreign policy controls:
31 2
The conferees emphasize that with the enactment of this provision,
the President lacks authority to impose, expand, or extend policy
controls until the requirements of this subsection [6(f)] have been
satisfied. 3
13
Congress claims this authority over Executive prerogative under
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the ex-
clusive right to regulate international commercial transactions.
3' 4
Legislative intent, as stated explicitly in the House Conference Report
on S. 883 (the bill that became Pub. L. No. 99-64), is that "the Presi-
dent consult with Congress in the conduct of. . .[his] delegated au-
thority. ' 315 The amended section now requires that:
(1) the President (a) consult with Congress and (b) submit a
written report to Congress and to the General Accounting




314. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 57.
315. Id.
316. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 108(e), at 133. Section 6(f)(2) now provides:
(A) specifying the purpose of the controls;
(B) specifying the determinations of the President (or, in the case of those ex-
port controls described in subsection (b)(2) [controls already in effect as of July 12,
1985], the considerations of the President) with respect to each of the criteria set
forth in subsection (b)(l) [see supra note 288], the bases for such determinations (or
considerations), and any possible adverse foreign policy consequences of the controls;
(C) describing the nature, the subjects, and the results of, or the plans for, the
consultation with industry pursuant to subsection (c) and with other countries pursu-
ant to subsection (d);
(D) specifying the nature and results of any alternative means attempted under
subsection (e), or the reasons for imposing, expanding, or extending the controls
without attempting any such alternative means; and
(E) describing the availability from other countries of goods or technology com-
parable to the goods or technology subject to the proposed export controls, and
describing the nature and results of the efforts made pursuant to subsection (h) to
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(2) the Secretary of Commerce testify before Congress annually
on controls.
317
The President can satisfy the congressional consultation requirement
by consulting with the chairman and ranking members of the commit-
tees having jurisdiction in the Senate and House.
318
VI. NATIONAL SECURITY
The fundamental reason why the United States desires to exer-
cise caution-and why it wishes its allies would use greater caution-
in allowing its high-tech products to be marketed abroad stems from
the belief that the Soviet Union can achieve considerable improve-
ments in its military strength by acquiring Western technology.
There is no question that the U.S.S.R. has benefited militarily
from Western technologies and equipment. In cases where the
U.S. Government has expressly permitted the sale of such items to
the Soviet Union, it has engaged in actions which injure its own
national security. Recent intelligence analysis has confirmed the
fact that the U.S.S.R. is engaged in a massive high-level effort to
acquire militarily relevant Western technology, and that it has ob-
tained these technologies by both legal and illegal means.319
The concern for national security is the other side of the export
expansion issue. For some, it is a question of balance. Somehow a
way must be found to "close the doors on our technology while pre-
serving both national security and economic interests; and. . . to do
that without squelching, not only our economy, but the free flow of
information that-ironically in this case--produces the same technol-
ogy. ''320 For others, such as Stephen D. Bryen, a deputy assistant
secretary of defense who heads the DOD's technology transfer office,
"there is no balance. National Security comes first. ' 321
Those such as Mr. Bryen, who take the national security perspec-
secure the cooperation of foreign governments in controlling the foreign availability
of such comparable goods or technology.
Such report shall also indicate how such controls will further significantly the foreign
policy of the United States or will further its declared international obligations.
Id.
317. Id. § 7(0(5), at 133-34.
318. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 58. The Conference Report also stated that this
consultation "should extend to the Chairman and Ranking members of the relevant subcom-
mittee of these committees." Id.
319. OTA, supra note 60, at 10.
320. Spies at Work, ELECTRONIC Bus., Sept. 15, 1984, at 94.
321. Id.
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tive with regard to U.S. export controls, make some basic presump-
tions in their approach to national security controls. They believe,
first, that the Soviet Union is making significant military gains by ac-
quiring and applying Western technology.3 22 Second, they feel that
tighter U.S. export requirements can substantially slow this acquisi-
tion process. 323 Third, they consider the benefits to national security
gained by such controls to outweigh the economic cost of the exports
foregone.324 Finally, they believe that the United States can, by sus-
tained diplomatic pressure, bring its allies closer to the U.S. position
on these matters. 325
Those holding a national security perspective on the subject of
export controls are not without their horror stories to influence public
opinion in favor of tighter licensing requirements and greater vigi-
lance in general. But few would deny that there is, indeed, a legiti-
mate cause for concern. A 1984 article appearing in Electronic
Business began by describing an incident two years earlier, in which
Pentagon officials had examined a buoy that washed up on a beach in
Washington state.326 Inside, they found electronic components identi-
cal to RCA Corporation components, produced in the U.S. only three
years prior. 327 The buoy had been planted offshore by the Soviet
Union to monitor passing U.S. submarines. 328 "The incident merely
confirmed what most businessmen, government officials and scientists
have known for years-that the Soviets would rather spend their re-
sources acquiring technology from the West than developing their
own."
3 2 9
A primary target for the overt and covert KGB intelligence of-
ficers is computer technology, especially the increasingly fast and
powerful microcomputers. Working in a united effort to steal, or
somehow legally or illegally obtain, the high technology that separates
the two superpowers and their allies, the KGB empire of half a mil-
lion employees easily outnumbers all the intelligence agencies in the
United States. 330








330. Ulsch, I Spied, ELECTRONIC Bus., Sept. 15, 1984, at 94.
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Anatol Fedoseyen, one of the Soviet designers of the powerful
magnetrons used in radar transmitters, spoke at a seminar series on
Soviet Science and Technology, jointly sponsored by Harvard Univer-
sity, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Ford Founda-
tion. He reported that researchers in the Soviet Union are uniquely
well informed on technology developments worldwide. 331 "Research-
ers in the West have very limited access to information about compa-
nies with which they are in competition, whereas their Soviet
counterparts have access to internal information from competing ma-
jor corporations around the world," Fedoseyen noted.332 Russian re-
searchers of enterprises working for the military have plentiful access
to periodicals and equipment samples, as well as classified material,
consisting of blueprints, reports and other types of information ob-
tained from the West in an "informal manner.
' 333
Eric Firdman, a Soviet 6migr6 interviewed by Electronic Busi-
ness, was formerly chief designer for microelectronics at the Lenin-
grad Design Bureau. He told Electronics Business that in 1963, in
Leningrad, he was given photocopies of blueprints for a new U.S.
computer. 334 "We got information on what became the IBM 360.
Before the IBM 360 was introduced in the United States, we got pho-
tocopies of the architecture," Firdman said.335 And in fact, the IBM
System/360 line was not announced until April 1964.336
A. Channels of Loss as a Guide to Methods of Control
The point made earlier that "there is no question that the
U.S.S.R. has benefited militarily from Western technologies and
equipment" 337 came from the study undertaken in 1979, and later up-
dated at the request of Senators Riegel and Garn, by the Office of
Technology Assessment. 338 The upcoming sections of this article
draw further from that same OTA material. The conclusions and ob-
servations of the Office of Technology Assessment are relevant to the
discussion because, on close analysis, it seems apparent that the OTA








337. See supra text accompanying note 319.
338. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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study influenced the direction taken by the 1985 amendments. This
seems especially true of the proposals and enactments made in re-
sponse to national security concerns.
The OTA study asserted that, while it may or may not be pru-
dent to extend controls to a larger array of technologies and products
and to reduce commercial relations with the Soviet Union, it is crucial
to maintain a clear distinction between Russian military gains made
through theft or deception and gains made "legitimately" under U.S.
law:
3 3 9
Observers of the Soviet economy still disagree over the efficiency of
this technology acquisition program, but the significance of its
multifaceted nature for U.S. policymakers is that different transfer
mechanisms lend themselves to different legislative and administra-
tive remedies. Unfortunately, in the rhetoric surrounding export
control, the distinction between legal and illegal technology trans-
fers is often blurred. The resulting confusion intensifies the impres-
sion that the West is a "sieve," and that the U.S.S.R. is benefiting
from a veritable hemorrhage of U.S. technology. 34°
1. Five channels for technology flow identified
The OTA study identified five channels for technology flow from
the United States to the U.S.S.R.:
I. Legal transfers made possible by the open nature of Western
society, e.g., transfers occurring through perusal of open sci-
entific literature, academic exchanges, trade fairs, etc.
II. Legal transfers through purchase of technologies under gen-
eral license.
III. Legal transfers through purchase of technologies under vali-
dated license.
IV. Illegal transfers through purchase, e.g., by agents, through
third countries or foreign embassies, dummy corporations,
etc.
V. Illegal transfer through industrial espionage or the theft of
materials classified by the U.S. Government. 34'
339. OTA, supra note 60, at 10.
340. Id. As stated in Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1293:
The Soviet Union consistently has sought to obtain militarily relevant Western tech-
nology by every means possible. Its success has contributed to shifting the military
balance away from the West. As a result of mistaken licensing, weak enforcement,
and illegal Soviet bloc activities, the West has suffered a virtual hemorrhage of tech-
nology in the past decade.
341. OTA, supra note 60, at 10.
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2. Some security improvement proposals
In response to the leakage of U.S. technology through the five
channels just listed, Congress did consider numerous alternatives for
thwarting Soviet efforts via each of these routes.
Losses through the first channel-the open nature of Western so-
ciety-prompted suggestions that tighter controls be placed on scien-
tific and scholarly exchange.
3 42
Losses through the second and third channels-legal purchases
through general and validated licenses-brought urgings that license
requirements should be stiffened. In amending the 1979 Act, how-
ever, Congress chose largely to relax controls for lower-risk exports.
Since this action should make it possible for enforcement agencies to
focus attention on higher-risk exports, it was not thought necessary to
stiffen licensing requirements.
343
Finally, losses that occur through illegal transfers brought vari-
ous proposals for enhancing enforcement capabilities and discourag-
ing violations, most notably by (1) strengthening CoCom, 344 (2)
shifting responsibility for Export Administration Act enforcement to
another agency, 345 (3) increasing the Defense Department's input and
involvement in controlling exports 3 46 and (4) imposing stricter penal-
ties for violations of the Export Administration Act and other laws
designed to protect U.S. technology from illegal acquisition.
347
B. Scientific Exchange
One of the simplest ways of acquiring U.S. technology is to come
to this country and check out relevant material from a public library.
The following story, told by assistant director of intelligence Richard
J. O'Malley of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, illustrates the
technique:
348
342. See infra text accompanying notes 348-69.
343. Changes to the licensing process have already been discussed. See supra text accom-
panying notes 182-204. In general, however, the decision was made to greatly relax licensing
requirements for exports to countries maintaining multilateral export controls cooperatively
with the United States. The plan is to lighten controls to areas where there is the least risk of
loss, so as to enable a greater concentration of enforcement efforts for exports to areas where
there is the greatest risk of loss. Similarly, high-tech items will receive correspondingly more
administrative attention than lower-tech items.
344. See infra text accompanying notes 370-77.
345. See infra text accompanying notes 378-447.
346. See infra text accompanying notes 448-92.
347. See infra text accompanying notes 493-509.
348. Story retold in Spies at Work, supra note 320, at 94-95.
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Two Soviet diplomats wearing blue jeans and sport shirts and
posing as travelers from Washington, walked into a public library
in Nevada and asked to see the Environmental Impact Statement
for the nearby nuclear-test site. They walked across the street, xer-
oxed every page and a few hours later drove away with everything
they wanted to know.
349
Other readily accessible sources of information are computer manuals
sold in bookstores, 350 trade journals, scholastic journals, foreign stu-
dent exchange programs, 35' and scientific conferences and seminars.
1. Proposed restrictions on scientific exchange
Some have argued that since scholarly conferences and ex-
changes, especially, are such tempting targets for the Soviets, certain
restrictions should be promulgated, including limiting access to the
United States for certain foreign nationals, reviewing key, govern-
ment-financed research prior to publication, restricting communica-
tion of technical data vis-a-vis foreign nationals, and classifying
certain information. 3
52
The use of the Export Administration Act to control the flow of
scientific information at open scientific meetings dates to February
1980, in the aftermath of the Societ invasion of Afghanistan. At that
349. Id.
350. Soviet 6migr6 Emanuel Bobrov gave this example:
'I wish to present two very peculiar documents, one of which you can buy in any
American bookstore that sells technical literature and the other a volume on software
published for limited circulation in Russia, for users of the ES series computers,
called RIAD. I will call your attention to the astonishing similarity between the two
documents. If you open any page of the English text of the Fortran manual to the
corresponding Russian text of that same manual, you will find the Russian version to
be an exact translation of the English version. . . . The Russians did not even
change the identificator names. . . . The software has about 600 volumes, and all
600 volumes of the description of the ES software are exact copies of those for the
IBM software. This is how Soviet computer technology is being developed.'
Alster, supra note 336, at 115.
351. Spies at Work, supra note 320, at 95. "Over 500 Soviet scientists, many of them
posing as students, have been granted visas since 1979, according to the State Department."
Id. Rep. Courter (R-N.J.) informed the Congress that:
Americans at Moscow State University currently study issues such as musical genres
in Russian music; the history of the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great,
1762-96; and the planning and design of the Soviet environment. Soviet students in
the United States, however, engage in topics of study such as research in the theory
and application of scientific experiments and testing power engineering objects; re-
search in the field of automatic control as applied to spaceships; and development of
recurrent methods for navigation in space and optimal filtration of hindrances.
129 CONG. REC. E4599 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
352. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1294.
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time the Carter Administration opened to debate the question of
whether and how the communication of unclassified but militarily
sensitive scientific information should be controlled.
353
The Commerce Department and the State Department
warned the organizers of two open scientific meetings that some
papers scheduled for presentation contained sensitive information
whose release to foreigners would infringe export control law. So-
viet scientists were subsequently disinvited to one meeting and pro-
hibited by the State Department from attending the other.354
In other instances, during the Reagan Administration, the De-
fense Department has raised objections prompting attempts to restrict
access to unclassified projects on university campuses by Chinese and
Soviet-bloc scientists, visas have been denied or restricted, and papers
have been ordered withdrawn prior to scheduled presentation at sci-
entific meetings.355 Such measures have frequently been based on the
authority of the Export Administration Act. 356 The problem with us-
ing the Export Administration Act to restrict communication of sen-
sitive, unclassified information, however, is that the Act is "an
unwieldy instrument, carrying potential heavy criminal penalties,
whose use can have an extremely chilling effect on scientific
communication., 357
2. Counter recommendations of the Bucy Report
One of the points made by the Bucy Report35 was that "control-
ling strategic technology" does not mean that the results of scientific
research should be controlled.359 Members of the scientific commu-
nity warned that the proposed repressive measures could have a nega-
tive, even devastating, effect on the scientific process.360 They
maintained that without the free flow of ideas-typically through
trade and scholastic journal publications and scientific conferences-
researchers and scientists cannot build on each others' work. Fur-
thermore, by shutting out foreign scientists from high-security
353. Norman, Administration Grapples with Export Controls, Sci. MAG., June 3, 1983,
reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. E3962 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1983) (placed in the Congressional
Record by Rep. George Brown, Jr. (D-Cal.)).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at E3963.
357. Id.
358. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
359. Bucy, supra note 138, at 130.
360. Schmitt, supra note 137, at 122.
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projects, a tremendous input of talent is excluded from U.S. research
and development efforts. Ironically, "[i]t is the openness of the system
that makes it possible for our adversaries to tap into it. But imposing
controls strong enough to stop this leakage totally would also cripple
our ability to generate new technology."' 36 1
3. EAAA 1985 shields scientific exchange from control through
export administration
During the pendency of the 1979 Act's reauthorization in Con-
gress, several groups lobbied their legislators in an attempt to have
scientific research exempted from the Act.362 Their pleas for help fell
on sympathetic ears, for both the House and Senate passed bills safe-
guarding basic scientific research from control under the Export Ad-
ministration Act.
363
Thereafter, section 3 of the 1979 Act was amended by the addi-
tion of this paragraph as part of the Act's Declaration of Policy:
It is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous scien-
tific enterprise. To do so involves sustaining the ability of scientists
and other scholars freely to communicate research findings, in
accordance with applicable provisions of law, by means of publica-
tion, teaching, conferences, and other forms of scholarly
exchange. 364
It should be borne in mind, however, that this refusal of Con-
gress to allow the Export Administration Act to be used as a control
mechanism over scientific exchange does only that. The Act is not by
any means a "bill of rights" to protect the free flow of scientific infor-
361. Id. at 118.
362. Norman, supra note 353, at E3963.
363. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 15-16, and S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102,
at 3.
364. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 103(5) (adding new paragraph (12)), at 121. In
urging the House to pass H.R. 1786, the bill that with very few changes later became Pub. L.
No. 99-64, Rep. Bonker stated:
The Committee recognizes that there are legitimate concerns about the flow of sensi-
tive U.S. technology through scientific communication and exchanges which may be
damaging to U.S. national security and that there may be an important role for U.S.
Government oversight.
However, the committee conferees believe that existing government authority to
declare material classified, to control work performed under contracts, and to limit
the entry to and movement within the United States of foreign nationals is adequate
to meet virtually all our reasonable security needs. Any application of the provisions
of the Export Administration Act to traditional scientific communication that devi-
ates from the views stated here bears a heavy burden of justification to the Congress.
131 CONG. REc. H2006 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985).
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mation from other lines of attack. There are still numerous means
available to the Administration for accomplishing many of the same
feared results.
For example, since a great deal of the research likely to be
deemed militarily sensitive is funded by the federal government,
largely the Defense Department, constraints of scientific exchange
often come about by contractual agreements between the researcher
and the funding agency. 365 At times, researchers have not been in-
formed of obligations to restrict access to information, and controls
are not imposed until after the work is under way. 366 Under proce-
dures announced in September 1982, new DOD research contracts
were required to contain a clause obligating researchers to submit
their papers to the Defense Department when submitting them for
publication. 3
67
Noteworthy, also, is the State Department's authority to deny or
restrict visas to foreign scientists on exchange visits (for example, re-
stricting access to parts of a university campus) and the Energy De-
partment's right to control the release of unclassified nuclear
information. 368 There are also other laws aimed at preventing the loss
of U.S. technology to potential adversaries, although they are not as
broad as the Export Administration Act. These include the Arms
Export Control Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Trading
With the Enemy Act of 1917, and the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act of 1976.369
C. Strengthening CoCom
President Reagan gave a clear indication to Congress that he
wished to receive the authority under the 1979 Act to negotiate with
other governments to achieve an improved multilateral control sys-
tem.370 Congress has sought to comply with his request.
As the 98th Congress considered the matter, it was plain that the
multilateral effort represented by the CoCom organization was inade-
quate to effectively administer national security controls. Characteris-
tic was the fact that the full-time staff of CoCom "consisted of only




369. Schmitt, supra note 137, at 118.
370. 130 CONG. REC. S1693 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); H.
REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 18.
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ten to fifteen persons in a makeshift office."' 371 Ministerial-level
CoCom meetings had not, until recently, been held for twenty-five
years. 37 2 It was claimed that "[tihese inadequacies harm the security
of all by strengthening our potential adversaries and requiring in-
creased defense costs among the CoCom countries.
373
Another complaint, raised by U.S. exporters, was the lost sales to
competitors in CoCom countries because, whereas the U.S. govern-
ment denies certain licenses in strict compliance with CoCom regula-
tions, companies in the other CoCom countries manage to either
violate the provisions or circumvent the system.
374
Both the House and Senate bills called for the addition of new
objectives to section 5(i), the paragraph authorizing U.S. participation
in CoCom. The Senate differed from the House, however, in that it
sought to have the status of this informal agreement raised to the level
of a treaty.375 This proposal was rejected by the Joint Conference
Committee. In general, however, the provisions of the two bills were
combined.376
Under the EAAA 1985, there has been a deletion of the 1979
Act's objective to reach an agreement with CoCom members to re-
duce the scope of export controls imposed to a level acceptable to all
CoCom participants. In addition, the President is directed to enter
into negotiations with the other CoCom-participating governments to
reach agreements to: (1) enhance full compliance, through the "es-
tablishment of appropriate mechanisms"; (2) improve the Interna-
tional Control List, minimize exceptions, strengthen enforcement,
provide funding, and upgrade professional staff, translation services,
data base maintenance, communications, and facilities; (3) coordinate
systems of export control documents; (4) establish uniform criminal
and civil penalties; (5) increase on-site inspections; and (6) strengthen
371. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1295.
372. Id.
373. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 11.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 48 (adding new paragraph (4)).
Raising this informal agreement to the status of a treaty will signal to our allies the
importance our Government attaches to the need for export controls on equipment
which [if diverted to Soviet bloc countries would] threaten our mutual security.
Besides this symbolic move, the bill also directs the executive branch to work in
Cocom to update the list of technologies that need to be controlled and to harmonize
licensing and enforcement mechanisms among Cocom members.
130 CONG. REC. S1693 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
376. Draft Stint, supra note 249, at H12151 (heading entitled "Subsection (e)--Objectives
for CoCom Negotiations").
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the Committee to increase its effectiveness for the mutual national se-
curity benefit of all participants.
377
D. Optimal Agency for Export Control Enforcement
1. Proposed Office of Strategic Trade
The Senate was largely dissatisfied with the way the 1979 Act
confers on the Commerce Department the duty of enforcing export
restraints when that Department is dedicated to the role of promoting
U.S. exports. Senator Proxmire echoed the thoughts of many in that
body when he told the Senate, "[flor years I have felt the Department
of Commerce should not simultaneously administer both our export
promotion and control programs because there is an inherent conflict
between these two functions.
'378
One alternative suggested to resolve this perceived problem was
to create a new independent agency, an "Office of Strategic Trade,"
with sole responsiblity for administering export controls. One advan-
tage to the idea, from a national security perspective, is that it "would
assure a high-level advocate within the Executive Branch to present a
security perspective on export issues and to provide independent in-
formation and analysis to Congress. ' 379 Another advantage, as envi-
sioned by the Senate Banking Committee, is that an Office of Strategic
Trade would coordinate in one, central agency all the export adminis-
tration and enforcement functions of the government.380 Senator
Proxmire explained, "[p]resently such functions are scattered
throughout a number of different departments and agencies and we
wanted to pull them together."
'38 1
Although it found considerable merit in this proposal, the Bank-
ing Committee decided that the creation of an Office of Strategic
Trade should be postponed until the President submitted to Congress
a feasibility plan on how such an office could be effectively estab-
lished. 38 2 The Senate bill therefore contained only the provision that
the President submit a plan, within a few months, for creating an Of-
377. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(f), at 126.
378. 130 CONG. REC. S1294 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S2141
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nunn); and 131 CONG. REC. S8923 (daily ed. June
27, 1985) (statement of Sen. Garn).
379. Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1294.
380. 130 CONG. REC. S1294 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
381. Id.
382. Id.
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fice of Strategic Trade.383 For the meantime, S. 979 provided for a
shift in enforcement authority from Commerce to Customs.
2. Proposed shift of all enforcement authority to Customs Service
a. Senate preference to make Customs Service responsible for
enforcement under the Act
While conceding that the Commerce Department had recently
made great strides toward better enforcement of export regulations,
384
security-minded persons felt that the Customs Service would be a bet-
ter agency for that task:
Commerce is not a traditional law enforcement agency. It does not
arm its agents with traditional police powers. It has dubious law
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign countries where American
agents must operate within the sanction of, and in close harmony
with, the host nations.
Conversely, the U.S. Customs Service is an official Federal law
enforcement entity with trained agents and unequivocal law en-
forcement authority. Customs has bureaus throughout the United
States and in many foreign nations. Its agents operate abroad ac-
cording to treaties, international agreements and bilateral com-
pacts. Customs is the logical place for the export function to
reside.38
5
The drawbacks seen with maintaining enforcement authority in
the Commerce Department-aside from the "conflict of interest"
problem already mentioned-were:
(1) that Commerce was not a traditional law enforcement
agency and, consequently, was neither oriented toward a po-
lice function nor clothed with legal authority to make arrests,
serve search warrants, conduct warrantless searches at U.S.
borders, take sworn statements, or carry firearms;
386
383. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 82.
384. "Commerce has made extraordinary progress in the past two years in remedying past
weaknesses .. " Weinrod & Pilon, supra note 7, at S1294. "The Committee commends the
Commerce Department for the efforts that have been made during the past two years to im-
prove enforcement." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 21. "In the last year, the Commerce
Department has taken steps to improve its enforcement capability." 130 CONG. REC. S2141
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
385. 130 CONG. REC. S2141 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Nunn). If the
Banking Committee had not included the transfer in its EAA amendments, Senator Nunn said
he would have promoted the idea through legislation that he and Senator Chiles (D-Fla.) had
introduced, S. 407. Id.
386. Id. at S2139 (statement of Sen. Mattingly (R-Ga.)).
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(2) that Commerce lacked the resources in trained manpower
and facilities possessed by Customs,38 7 and to do an adequate
job of enforcement Commerce would need to duplicate Cus-
toms' operations; 388 and
(3) that Commerce lacked experience as a law enforcement
agency as well as the foreign counterparts with whom it
could coordinate efforts, unlike the Customs Service.
38 9
Accordingly, the Senate bill transferred enforcement responsibil-
ity, but not licensing responsibility, to the Customs Service, "an
agency better equipped in terms of resources and its overall mandate
to enforce the act . . -390 The bill added a provision to the Act
permitting Customs officers to conduct border searches of suspected
exports of goods or technology, making it clear that its searches of
exports could be conducted on the same basis as its present searches
of imports. 39 1 The bill also contained specific authority for warrant-
less arrests in connection with the enforcement of any law governing
exports, giving Customs specific Federal arrest authority.
392
b. mixed results with "Operation Exodus" by Customs Service
Soon after being elected, President Reagan demonstrated that he
387. "The Commerce Department has a limited staff of approximately 35 criminal investi-
gators located in four cities and five export inspectors, stationed only in New York." Id. at
S2140. In contrast, "[clustoms currently has a designated [Operation] Exodus staff of approxi-
mately 292 specialists and investigators. . . supplemented by the approximately 750 customs
agents and inspectors . . . at the major ports of entry. Id. at S2139.
388. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 21.
389. 130 CONG. REC. S2139 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mattingly). In the
opinion of Senator Proxmire:
The Customs Service is in an excellent position to conduct export control investiga-
tions abroad because it has counterpart agencies in so many countries with which it
has day-to-day working relations.
I may say, Mr. President, this Senator was very impressed by the testimony of
the Department of Defense and by the testimony of the U.S. Customs Service.
130 CONG. REC. S1694 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984). The Senate Banking Committee drew atten-
tion to the long history of the U.S. Customs Service by noting that its "enforcement of export
controls dates from 1793, when President Washington, in order to prevent American involve-
ment in the French Revolutionary Wars, issued the first proclamation of U.S. neutrality and
directed its enforcement by officers of the Customs Service." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102,
at 21.
390. 130 CONG. REC. S 1695 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
391. 130 CONG. REC. S2139 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mattingly). S.
REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 74 (amending section 12(a)).
392. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 21. The Committee noted that without federal
arrest authority, Customs would be required to make its arrests in compliance with the stan-
dards set forth in the various state laws. Id. at 22.
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considered the matter of keeping U.S. technology out of the hands of
unfriendly countries to be one of his highest priorities. In October of
his first year in office, Mr. Reagan instituted Operation Exodus, a pro-
gram administered by the Commerce Department but implemented
by the Customs Service.3 93 The President subsequently channeled
millions of dollars into Customs to police international ports in search
of cargo illegally bound for Soviet-bloc countries. 394
Operation Exodus was another of those programs that (like the
Soviet pipeline sanctions), depending on who is speaking, was either a
success story or a near disaster. In explaining why Export Adminis-
tration Act enforcement ought to be shifted to Customs, Senator Mat-
tingly39 5 cited the "effective export enforcement program" that
Customs had developed in Operation Exodus.396 The report on S. 979
by the Senate Banking Committee said that the Customs Service had
"enhanced the effectiveness of export controls" through the Exodus
program. 397 Other sources pointed to the high number of port
seizures as a measure of Customs' success with the program. 398 Ac-
cording to one of these sources, in the initial two years of enforcing
the program, "Customs officials detained and seized 2,300 foreign-
bound shipments and won indictments for export control law viola-
tions in 221 cases. ' 399 But as illustrated by a story told in the Minne-
apolis Tribune, placed in the Congressional Record by Senator
Durenburger,40° such a ratio of seizures to convictions is not necessar-
ily an indication of progress.
According to the Minneapolis Tribune article, Central Engineer-
ing Co. was one of several Minneapolis-area companies that exper-
ienced the "frustations created by Operation Exodus."' ° At the time
the article was written, Central Engineering Co. was primarily in the
business of making custom-ordered equipment for the ground testing
393. Chucker, Who's in Charge Here?, Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 5, 1982, reprinted in
130 CONG. REC. S1726 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
394. Stopping the Flow, ELECTRONIC Bus., Sept. 15, 1984, at 128. "At the same time,
Reagan has beefed up the enforcement arm of the Commerce Department . . . and he has
sternly told the two agencies to put aside petty differences and work together." Id. This may
partially explain the reasons behind the Commerce Department's "improved track record" in
recent years. Id.
395. R-Ga.
396. 130 CONG. REC. S2139 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
397. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 20-21.
398. See, e.g., Stopping the Flow, supra note 394, at 129; Schmitt, supra note 137, at 119.
399. Schmitt, supra note 137, at 119.
400. R-Minn.
401. Chucker, supra note 393, at S1726.
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of jet engines. A company of about eighty-five employees, it then de-
rived approximately two-thirds of its sales revenues from exports,
having as its customers various airlines around the world. According
to its vice president for operations, William Jones, Central Engineer-
ing's "products are not convertible to military uses. ' '4° 2 He gave as an
example the fact that equipment for testing the jet engines of a jumbo
jet passenger plane cannot be used in testing fighter plane engines.
Finally, another company spokesman stated that the same testing




In early April 1982, at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International
Airport, Customs officers detained a shipment of Central Engineer-
ing's testing equipment, which had been manufactured for Iraqi Na-
tional Airline. The officers said the equipment was "mislabeled" and
moved the shipment to a "seized" status. It was months before the
shipment was released. Jones told the Tribune, "[i]t's a guessing game
with Customs," and remarked that Customs seems to take the tack
that "the safest thing they can do, especially if they don't understand
the technology and its use, is to detain the shipment." 4 4
Mr. Jones also discussed another reason Customs may seize
cargo. Under export regulations, a shipment has to match its license
exactly. If it does not, the license is invalid. But in the approximately
forty-five days that it takes to get a license, design changes may have
been made to the product. A company may ship under what it be-
lieves is a proper export license, only to have Customs disagree with
the license.4°5
Central Engineering's shipment was finally released for export on
August 25, 1982, after nearly five months of waiting. Because the
product was available from other countries in both Europe and the
Far East, the company president pointed out that an inability to ship
products when promised meant Central Engineering would lose its
market to foreign competitors. 406
c. House preference to maintain enforcement authority in
Commerce Department
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fairs Committee was not terribly impressed with the results of Opera-
tion Exodus: "[T]he Customs Service enforcement program, known
as Operation Exodus, has not been very cost-effective. It has resulted
in few prosecutions of serious violations under the Export Adminis-
tration Act, while at the same time needlessly delaying many legiti-
mate export shipments on the basis of indiscriminate detentions."
4°7
The House bill maintained enforcement authority in the Depart-
ment of Commerce. In answer to objections that Commerce lacked
appropriate law enforcement authority, the House bill authorized
Commerce enforcement officials to execute search warrants, make ar-
rests, search and seize illegal commodities and carry firearms. H.R.
3231 limited Customs' authority to detain and seize items to instances
in which its officers had received specific information about possible
violations.4o8
Under the House bill, enforcement activities of the Customs Ser-
vice under the Export Administration Act included only "preseizure
targeted inspections, detentions, preliminary investigations, and
seizures," under the belief that this "affirms the role that the Customs
Service, with its personnel at every port, is best able to perform."
4 9
Furthermore, the Customs Service was required, upon seizure, to for-
ward all cases to Commerce for appropriate action.410 Finally, as a
reflection of the Foreign Affairs Committee's "view that budgetary
balance [was] needed between the two agencies," '411 Customs' budget
for export control enforcement was limited to $14 million per year,
while Commerce was allotted $15 million per year toward its enforce-
ment activities. 41 2 The House's budgetary position was enacted.
41 3
3. EAAA 1985 gives more authority to both
Commerce and Customs
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs had considered the
possibility of shifting responsibility to a single department, or, alterna-
tively, of creating an Office of Strategic Trade, but it rejected both of
407. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 5.
408. Id. at 14.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 5.
412. Id. at 14. The executive branch's funding request for Commerce's EAA enforcement
activities was $4,970,000 (for Fiscal Year 1984). Id. at 5.
413. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 150 (adding paragraph (6)).
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these approaches. 41 4 Its conclusion was that "the only means of as-
suring that both economic and national security or foreign policy con-
siderations are fully weighed in export control decisions is to involve
fully and equally the Departments charged with furthering those
goals.,, 4
15
The Joint Conference Committee adopted the House position in
that the final bill did not require the President to submit a feasibility
plan on an Office of Strategic Trade.41 6 Likewise, on the issue of the
division of authority between Commerce and Customs, the result
reached was close to what the House wanted, except that, in general,
rather than taking authority away from one agency to give it to the
other, the final bill simply gives more authority to both agencies. 41 7 A
description of the actual division of enforcement authority between
the two agencies follows.
a. jurisdiction of the Commerce Department and creation of Under
Secretary of Commerce position
The 1985 amendments make clear that the Commerce Depart-
ment is to have the exclusive right to impose civil penalties and ad-
ministrative penalties under the enforcement section of the Act.
41 8
Under the compromise worked out by the Joint Conference
Committee, it is the intent of Congress that Commerce focus its re-
sponsibility on domestic violations of the Act and on pre-license and
post-shipment checks to (1) "identify possible violations before con-
trolled items leave the country," (2) "prevent issuance of export
licenses based on invalid information," and (3) "discover and deter
domestic circumvention of the export licensing system. '419 The Com-
merce Department is to conduct its investigations primarily at points
other than borders and "ports of entry and exit." '420
414. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 9.
415. Id.
416. Draft Strut, supra note 249, at H 12157 (heading entitled "Office of Strategic Trade").
417. Id. at H12157-58 (heading entitled "123-Enforcement").
418. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149 (adding new paragraph (a)(5)): "All
cases involving violations of this Act shall be referred to the Secretary for purposes of deter-
mining civil penalties and administrative sanctions under section 1 l(c) of this Act, or to the
Attorney General for criminal action in accordance with this Act." Id. "Any investigations
undertaken, expanded, or continued on the basis of prelicense or post-shipment inquiries
should be considered part of the prelicensing and post-shipment verification authority granted
to Commerce in this Act." 130 CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of
Rep. Bonker).
419. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 63.
420. Id.
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Commerce is specifically authorized to "search, detain (after
search), and seize goods or technology at those places within the
United States other than" 42 at places of ingress and egress to and
from "the United States where officers of the Customs Service are
authorized by law to conduct such searches .. "422 Enforcement of
export laws at ports of entry and exit is intended by Congress to be
"the sole province of the Customs Service unless that Service agrees to
a Commerce role for specific operations. '423 In addition, similar to
H.R. 323 l's provision, 424 under EAAA 1985 any Office of Export En-
forcement (Commerce Department) officer or employee may be desig-
nated to have authority to (a) execute a warrant, (b) make a
warrantless arrest (with probable cause), and (c) carry firearms (in
carrying out (a) and (b)).
4 2 5
One other change made by the EAAA 1985 with regard to the
enforcement activities of Commerce is the creation of a new, Presi-
dential-appointment position within Commerce, the Under Secretary
of Commerce for Export Administration. 426 The new Secretary "shall
carry out all functions of the Secretary [of Commerce] under this Act
which were delegated to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Trade Administration" before the EAAA 1985's enact-
ment.427 Originally a Senate provision, this requirement to create the
Under Secretary position, "while [not curing] completely the inherent
conflict between Commerce's export promotion and control activities,
. . . ensures that the latter activities will have a higher priority and
visibility. ' 428 This new provision will not become effective until Octo-
421. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149 (at new paragraph (a)(3)(A)).
422. Id. § 113(a), at 148 (at new paragraph (a)(2)(A)).
423. 131 CONG. REC. S8925 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). "The
search, detention . . . , or seizure of goods or technology at [ports of entry and exit] . . . may
be conducted by. . . the Department of Commerce. . . with the concurrence of the Commis-
sioner of Customs .. " Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149 (emphasis added).
Regarding this requirement, Congressman Bonker stated the intention of the Foreign Affairs
Committee "that Customs and Commerce [develop] procedures which will allow for swift and
routine concurrence on the part of the Commissioner." 131 CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed.
Apr. 16, 1985). Also, as Rep. Coleman (D-Tex.) pointed out, Commerce would be permitted
to maintain computer terminals for their own use at ports of entry and exit. Id. at H2014.
424. H.R. 3231 allowed any Commerce officer or employee to have these enforcement
authorities. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 66 (emphasis added).
425. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149.
426. Id. § 116(a), at 152.
427. Id. The President is also required to appoint two Assistant Secretaries of Commerce,
to assist the Under Secretary. Id.
428. 131 CONG. REC. S8925 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
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ber, 1986.429
b. jurisdiction of the Customs Service
In a role designed to be complementary to that of the Commerce
Department, the Joint Conference Committee has made the Customs
Service the lead agency for enforcement of the Export Administration
Act at U.S. ports of entry and exit and for overseas investigations of
Act violations. 430 The term "ports of entry and exit" is intended to be
construed narrowly, thus limiting the areas in which the Department
of Commerce can engage in search and seizure activities only if it has
the concurrence of Customs. 431
The 1985 amendments authorize Customs to conduct border
searches when investigating suspected exports of goods and technolo-
gies in violation of the Act.432 The Service's authority is also ex-
tended to stopping and searching vehicles, vessels, aircraft, persons,
packages, and containers suspected of containing goods exported or
about to be exported in violation of the Act.433 These authorizations
are intended as a clarification of Congress' intent that the Service's
authority to search exports be conducted on the same basis as their
searches of imports. 434 Finally, the amended law specifically confers
federal arrest authority on the Customs Service in connection with its
right to make warrantless arrests under the Act.435 Having federal
arrest authority will enable Customs to make arrests under a uniform,
federal standard, rather than having to conform to the standards of
the laws of fifty states.436
429. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 116(d), at 153.
430. Id. § 113(a), at 148, and 131 CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement
of Rep. Bonker).
431. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 63-64. The term "ports of entry and exit from
the United States," as explained by Congressman Bonker, is limited to
the actual areas at which international carriers arrive and depart, such as airports,
boat docks, or bus terminals, and public and private premises immediately adjacent
to such areas which provide direct services to ports, such as port authority facilities,
warehouses, and freight forwarding terminals. It also includes the international vehi-
cles and carriers entering such port areas.
131 CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985).
432. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12157 (heading entitled "Section-123 Enforcement
Subsection (a)--Enforcement Authority").
433. Id.
434. Id. at H12158.
435. Id.
436. Id. Congress deemed this necessary in light of the holding of a Second Circuit case.
Although Customs officers currently make warrantless arrests for export violations,
as well as for violations of other laws delegated to Customs for enforcement, U.S. v.
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c. cooperation in information sharing
Since it was felt that effective enforcement depends on close co-
operation between Commerce and Customs, the conferees added the
following provision to section 12(b):
[t]he Secretary [of Commerce] and the Commissioner of Customs,
upon request, shall exchange any licensing and enforcement infor-
mation with each other which is necesary to facilitate enforcement
efforts and effective license decisions. The Secretary, the Attorney
General, and the Commissioner of Customs shall consult on a con-
tinuing basis with one another and with the heads of other depart-
ments and agencies which obtain information subject to this
paragraph, in order to facilitate the exchange of such
information.
4 37
The amendment is not intended to provide either Commerce or
Customs unlimited access to the other's licensing enforcement data.
Rather, it is hoped that when one agency uncovers evidence or infor-
mation pertinent to an ongoing investigation by the other, that agency
will readily provide the information to the other. The sharing of Cus-
toms' information with Commerce will help ensure that Commerce
makes informed licensing decisions at the outset. It is also Congress'
intent that whenever the two agencies determine they are indepen-
dently investigating an export control violation in the same case, the
agencies will work jointly to determine which one will take primary
responsibility for completing the investigation stage.438
As Senator Proxmire put it, "[h]opefully, this clearer delineation
of enforcement responsibilities will prevent our enforcement officials
from tripping over and even thwarting one another. In areas where
they do share enforcement responsibilities, this bill makes clear they
must cooperate and share information. ' '4
39
4. How the Attorney General became involved under EAAA 1985
As discussed earlier in the section describing the legislative his-
tory of the EAAA 1985, not long after the two houses had finally
Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir. 1977) held that such arrests were to be determined
by the standards set forth in the various state laws since Congress had not given
Customs officers specific Federal arrest authority in this area. One effect of this
amendment is to create uniformity in the law of export arrests.
Id.
437. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § I13(b), at 150.
438. 131 CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statements of Rep. Bonker).
439. 131 CONG. REC. S8925 (daily ed. June 24, 1985).
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come together on the issue of dividing enforcement powers between
Commerce and Customs, the House Judiciary Committee succeeded
in persuading the House to add a provision giving the Justice Depart-
ment authority over Commerce and Customs enforcement
activities. 440
Senators Garn441 and Heinz 44 2 objected to the provision, 44 3 but
when the conferees met on June 25, Judiciary Committee Chairman
Peter Rodino444 insisted that the Attorney General should have the
power to review the other agencies' activities to block illegal ex-
ports.445 In particular, Congressman Rodino wanted the Justice De-
partment to regulate Commerce and Customs activity in carrying
firearms, issuing warrants and making arrests, but Senate negotiators
protested that such review would merely complicate enforcement.
44 6
In the compromise reached on June 25, the bill was changed to permit
the Attorney General to issue guidelines for Commerce, but not
Customs. 44 7
E. Continued Role of the Department of Defense
Since the thrust of the national security goal of the Export Ad-
ministration Act is to control exports of militarily significant technol-
ogy and products to the Soviet bloc, and the Department of Defense is
viewed as the one most capable of identifying which exports are likely
to threaten that goal, some reformers of the 1979 Act sought a more
significant role for the DOD in export control procedures. Two pro-
posals were made for amending the 1979 Act that would arguably
440. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. In his statements to Congress on April
16, 1985, Congressman Bonker explained that the intent of the provision was "to ensure that,
through guidance to be provided by the Attorney General, police powers are exercised in a
uniform manner by all agencies that have the legislative authority to use such powers." 131
CONG. REC. H2008 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985).
441. R-Utah.
442. R-Pa.
443. Green, House Votes to Renew Law on Export Controls, 43 CONG. Q. 739 (1985).
444. D-N.J.
445. Green, Congress Clears Bill to Renew Main Law Regulating Exports, 43 CONG. Q.
1302 (1985).
446. Id.
447. Id. See Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149 (adding paragraph (4)).
The statutory requirement of Attorney General guidelines is not extended to the Cus-
toms Service, since the law enforcement authority of the Customs Service is not new.
However, the managers intend that there be consultation between the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Secretary of the Treasury on the exercise of law enforcement authority
. . . by the Customs Service.
H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 49-50.
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have increased Defense's influence over exports. Significantly, neither
of these proposals was incorporated into the 1985 amendments.
These proposals were to:
(1) Reverse the license review procedure for all licenses that Com-
merce is bound to send to Defense for review, so that these would
go immediately to the DOD, rather than being reviewed first for
thirty days at Commerce.
(2) Confer on Defense the statutory right to review licenses for ex-
ports to Free World countries where there is a high risk of diver-
sion to controlled countries.
The first proposal, one of several suggestions that was made in
the General Accounting Office 1982 publication Export Control Regu-
lation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security,448 was
not incorporated into either house's bill. The proposal will neverthe-
less be discussed here because its rejection illustrates the importance
Congress places on the "balance of departmental power" in control-
ling exports.
The second proposal became law, not through an amendment to
the Export Administration Act, but by presidential directive. 44 9 It
will be recalled that the Senate's insistence on giving the Defense De-
partment statutory authority to review license applications to certain
Free World countries was one of the last roadblocks to reaching a
consensus on the 1979 Act's amendment and reauthorization. 45 0
Thus, although in the end Defense did acquire additional author-
ity over exports, this authority was not conferred by the EAAA 1985.
The proposal will be discussed here for what it shows about Congress'
role in maintaining the desired balance among the agencies charged
with overseeing exports.
Two other proposals were made for revising the 1979 Act with
respect to the DOD. Both were aimed at increasing the effectiveness
of Defense's role in controlling exports. Both were enacted in EAAA
1985. These proposals were to:
(1) Step up the process of integrating the Militarily Critical
448. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION COULD BE
REDUCED WITHOUT AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY (May 26, 1982) (available from U.S.
General Accounting Office, Document Handling and Information Services Facility, Gaither-
sburg, Md., GAO/ID-82-14) [hereinafter cited as GAO]. The study was prepared at the re-
quest of Senators Jake Garn and Harry Byrd (D-W.Va.) "to examine how well the export
control system is carrying out the Export Administration Act's national security goal." Id. at i.
449. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Technologies List into the Control List and review the MCTL at least
annually to remove goods and technologies no longer militarily criti-
cal. To the extent that Defense complies with the measure's intent,
the DOD will be releasing more products and technologies for export
and enhancing the ability of Commerce and Customs to focus their
attentions on those items that are truly militarily critical.
(2) Create a National Security Control Office within the DOD so
as to better coordinate within that department the tasks assigned
under the Export Administration Act. Implementation will have the
effect of increasing Defense's influence to the extent that better organ-
ization and coordination within the DOD will heighten its effective-
ness. The creation of the new National Security Control Office is not,
however, a grant of additional authority-or more money-to the De-
fense Department.451
The following discussions expand on these four proposals.
1. Proposed: reversing order of review in licensing procedure
As described earlier, the Defense Department has a statutory
right to review all exports to countries controlled for national security
purposes, after informing Commerce of those applications it wishes to
see. 452 As with other applications requiring interagency review, how-
ever, the application is not immediately forwarded to Defense. 453
Rather, Commerce holds the application for up to thirty days while it
develops its own required recommendation on the proposed export. 454
The 1982 study prepared for Congress by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) argued that this procedure "delays decisionmaking
by up to 30 days with no perceptible benefit and results in additional
staff at Commerce. '455 The study pointed out that Commerce was
"severely limited in identifying military risk" and must therefore fo-
cus its review on "providing an industry perspective. ' 456 The GAO
451. The paragraph authorizing creation of the National Security Control Office, Pub. L.
No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(j), at 128, which does not mention authorization of funding for
its purpose, came from S. 979. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12152 (heading entitled "Na-
tional Security Control Office"). The Senate Report specifically states that "the directive to
create a National Security Control Agency is an organizational measure and does not include
authority for new resources ... " S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 12. The Senate Report
did add a note to the Secretary of Defense, however, that it would not hurt to ask. Id.
452. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
453. GAO, supra note 448, at 15.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 8:399486
Export Administration Amendments Act
felt that if Commerce were to forward those applications to Defense
before it reviewed them, "Commerce could eliminate up to 65 percent
of the detailed reviews it now makes. ' 457 In fact, the GAO saw no
reason why Commerce need ever review such applications (except to
check on end-user reliability and foreign availability) unless Defense,
after its review, favored denial or only conditional approval. 458 The
GAO said this would save up to thirty days in review time and would
eliminate the need for nineteen staff persons at Commerce.459 Best of
all, the plan would not require an increase in the resources or time
required by Defense, since the DOD had to conduct such a review in
any event.
460
Not surprisingly, when asked to comment on the recommenda-
tions made in this GAO study, the Department of Commerce ex-
pressed some resentment at the implication that Commerce's
contribution to the license review process was little more than a "rub-
ber stamp" of approval.461 In a reply letter by Lionel Olmer, Under
Secretary for International Trade, Commerce asserted that amending
the 1979 Act to give Defense the responsibility of first review on dual-
use license applications would be inappropriate. 46
2
Such an action would undermine Congressional intent to maintain
a locus of control over technology transfer within the federal gov-
ernment. It could damage the balance we now have between stra-
tegic, economic, and policy perspectives while merely shifting the
burden from one agency to another. The recommendation is
driven implicitly by a desire to expedite license processing, how-
ever, it is unwarranted on those grounds since we are processing
licenses on time. The January 1981 backlog of some 2000 cases is
down to virtually zero today. 463
The March 1982 letter from Under Secretary Olmer also noted
Commerce's recent act of hiring additional technical staff and increas-
ing the training of those already on the staff. Thus it was taking af-
firmative steps to remedy the "weakness" complained of by the
457. Id.
458. Id. at 21-22. "Conditional approval" by the DOD involves either "derating" or
"safeguards." As explained in the GAO study, "[d]erating is a strategy that lowers one or
more of the proposed export's performance characteristics; safeguards normally apply to com-
puters and are designed to discourage diversion and unauthorized uses." Id. at 16.
459. Id. at 17.
460. Id. at 23.
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General Accounting Office in Commerce's ability to assess the strate-
gic implications of a proposed export.
464
The fact that neither H.R. 3231 nor S. 979 incorporated the pro-
cedural reversal suggested by the GAO is strong evidence that Con-
gress did, in fact, reject the measure as potentially disruptive of the
balance now maintained among "strategic, economic and policy per-
spectives." Also, in view of the numerous measures taken by the
EAAA 1985 to remove unnecessary hindrances to increased techno-
logical exports, it is understandable why Congress might not have
wished to diminish Commerce's influence in reviewing export licenses
in favor of increased DOD influence.
One idea that did appeal to Congress was that of cutting review
time when interagency review is necessary. Under the "fast-track"
licensing procedure adopted for exports to CoCom and similar multi-
lateral agreements to control exports, any necessary interagency re-
view must take place simultaneously with Commerce's review. 465 It is
interesting to note, however, that exports to CoCom countries and
others with whom the U.S. maintains similar multilateral controls are
also the exports least likely to require referral of license applications
to Defense.
2. Proposed: conferral of DOD authority to review exports to
non-controlled countries
This controversy and its resolution by President Reagan have al-
ready been described. 466 As noted, the Senate wanted to amend sec-
tion 10(g) to incorporate this provision, while the House did not. The
House meant to encourage Commerce to consult informally with De-
fense in cases involving exports to free world countries where there
was a significant risk of re-export to a controlled destination. 467 It
refused, however, to require formal review, on the belief that this
"would greatly complicate and slow free-world trade, the vast bulk of
which involves little or no national security risk." 468 The Senate, on
the other hand, wanted a formal review mechanism. But even its revi-
sion would have at least required the DOD to obtain the concurrence
of Commerce on which free-world applications Defense should re-
464. Id.
465. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 11 (b), at 142.
466. See supra notes 42, 47-49, 102-03 and accompanying text.
467. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 9.
468. Id.
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view.469 When the House and Senate were unable to reach a consen-
sus on this issue, the President cut the Gordian knot.
470
The case is an illustration of what can happen when Congress
takes too long to make up its mind on important issues such as this
one. The Office of Technology Assessment report reflected on the dif-
ficulty, in general, of the congressional task that then lay ahead:
Renewal of the Export Administration Act may well lead to legis-
lation that addresses some or all of these perspectives. It is possible
that Congress will make difficult choices and select among consis-
tent measures. If it does not, it risks leaving export administration
in much the same state as at present. Implementation of the 1979
EAA has been complicated by the fact that inconsistencies of this
sort were built into it. If this situation continues, controversies will
once again be transferred for [sic] the legislative to the executive
arena and resolved by Presidential decisions or administrative
action.471
For the most part, the newly amended 1979 Act reflects Con-
gress' remarkable task of reaching a compromise on the many diver-
gent goals and strategies competing for incorporation. But the so-
called 10(g) issue was "one that got away," one that slipped from the
legislative into the executive arena. In the statement of managers on
the final bill, however, the conferees made this promise: "This matter
may be raised again should the need arise, and both House and Senate
committees of jurisdiction intend to exercise close oversight with re-
spect to implementation of the President's initiative."
472
3. Enacted: pushing the DOD to fulfill its obligation to compile
the Militarily Critical Technologies List
One of the goals behind the 1979 Act's requirement that the De-
fense Department develop a list of militarily critical technologies was
the envisioned use of the list to remove controls from nonstrategic
469. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 17.
470. Senator Heinz, in his June 27, 1985 remarks on the Senate floor, made it clear that
Congress did not quibble with the President's right to take such action.
Since the President adequately addressed the matter, there was no need for the Con-
gress to do so as well. The statement of managers, however, does make clear that the
President had the legal authority to take the action he took last January, unpopular
though it may have been in some quarters.
131 Cong. Rec. S8922 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
471. OTA, supra note 60, at 14 (emphasis added).
472. H. REP. No. 180, supra note 143, at 62.
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items and thus enhance trade.473 The Government Accounting Office,
in its 1982 study, observed that little progress had been made in fulfil-
ling these expectations. 474 Thus far, Defense has developed and re-
vised an initial list, which it is presently using to make negative
licensing decisions, but Commerce has not adopted this MCTL for its
own use.475 The problem with it is that the list lacks the specificity
needed to make it a practical guide for licensing decisions.
476
The 1985 amendments require Commerce and Defense to work
together to integrate the Militarily Critical Technologies List and the
Control List "with all deliberate speed" and to report back to Con-
gress by 1986 on their progress.4 77 In addition, for the first time, De-
fense is required to "establish a procedure for reviewing the goods and
technology on the [MCTL] at least annually for the purpose of re-
moving from the list. . . any goods or technology that are no longer
militarily critical. '478
One factor, not mentioned in the reauthorization discussions in
Congress47 9 and which was brought out in a 1981 Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal student Comment 480 may be worth reiteration
here. It will be recalled from the earlier discussion on the respective
export-licensing jurisdictions of the Commerce and State Depart-
ments, that their lists are mutually exclusive, even though both the
Munitions List and the Control List contain military items.481 The
distinction is that if a product or technology also has a commercial
application, it would belong on the Control List rather than the
Munitions List. 482 The Harvard Comment noted a tendency in the
Defense Department, especially in the case of dual-purpose technolo-
gies that Defense regarded as "volatile," 483 to ask the State Depart-
ment to include the item on the Munitions List, rather than asking
473. GAO, supra note 448, at 5-6.
474. Id. at 6.
475. Id. at 32. A recent conversation with Michael T. Schilling, of TRW Inc., confirms
that this is still the case. See supra note 176.
476. GAO, supra note 448, at 32.
477. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 106(a)(2), at 128.
478. Id. at 129.
479. Although particularly looking for such a discussion, this author was unable to find
any mention of the problem in the Congressional Record or other legislative materials
consulted.
480. Recent Developments, supra note 79, at 416.
481. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
482. Id.
483. "Examples of especially volatile technologies include some types of space technology
and very high speed integrated circuitry." Recent Developments, supra note 79, at 416 n.30.
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Commerce to put it on the Control List.484
According to the Harvard commentary, the advantage seen by
Defense for relegation to the Munitions List is that "there is less pres-
sure to grant a license if such a technology is viewed as a military
weapon, reviewable by the State Department rather than the Com-
merce Department. ' 485 The Harvard author noted that such a deci-
sion by the DOD to use the Munitions List rather than the Control
List would circumvent the procedures envisioned by Congress and
further restrict overseas sales of technologies. 486
4. Enacted: creation of a National Security Control Office
The provision for creating a National Security Control Office48
7
originated in the Senate, where it was felt by the Banking Committee
that "delays in the processing of license applications for national se-
curity purposes have in some degree been due to inadequate coordina-
tion and devotion of resources within the Department of Defense. '488
The Banking Committee believed that by institutionalizing the
DOD's export control functions, Defense could better organize its re-
sponsibilities under the Act.4
89
In agreeing to include the measure, the Joint Conference Com-
mittee made it clear that it was not their intent that the new office
exercise any functions not already authorized and delegated to the
Defense Department. 490 The purpose of the new office is simply to
centralize the personnel within Defense who review licenses and to
expedite their recommendations to Commerce. 491 As noted in the in-
troduction to this section, however, that in itself may be sufficient to
shift the "balance of power" in the DOD's favor. Senator Garn, in
fact, seemed to see in this provision a sort of "mandate" to Defense to
fulfill the role he had hoped to embody in an Office of Strategic Trade:
[The National Security Control Office will] be under the responsi-
bility of the Under Secretary for Policy, who draws upon informa-
tion from the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering in
484. Id. at 416.
485. Id. at 416 n.30.
486. Id. at 416.
487. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(j), at 128.
488. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 12.
489. Id.
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establishing Defense export control policies. This arrangement is
vital if Defense's role is to be anything more than to provide tech-
nical input. As long as export controls are assigned to the Com-
merce Department for overall administration[,] a broad and direct
policy role for the Defense Department will be necessary to
counter balance that natural pro-trade bias inherent at the Com-
merce Department.
492
F. Stricter Penalties for Violations of Export Laws
1. Criminal violations
Under the 1985 amendments, "conspiring to violate" the Act (or
an order or regulation issued pursuant to it) has been codified as a
separate crime under section 11 (a), subject to the same penalties as an
actual violation.493 The Joint Conference Committee affirmed its be-
lief, however, that "criminal intent" is needed to violate section
11 (a).494 In other words, the crime must be done "voluntarily and
purposely" and not merely because of accident, mistake or other inno-
cent purpose.
4 95
Under the 1979 Act, an 1 l(b) violation496 required that the viola-
tor know either (1) that the exports would be used for the benefit of a
controlled country (contrary to the license) or (2) in cases where the
item had been approved for export to a controlled country, that the
country would use it for military or intelligence-gathering purposes
(contrary to the conditions under the license). 497
Under the new law, it is now also an 11 (b) violation if the ex-
porter simply knows that the destination or intended destination is
either a controlled country or one subject to a foreign policy embargo
(in contravention of the license). 498 Additionally, Congress has made
it an 11 (b) violation even to possess the goods or technology when the
492. 131 CONG. REC. S8923 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
493. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 112(a), at 146. Unless subject to the provisions of
section 1 (b), which carries an even heftier fine and/or prison sentence, the penalty for violat-
ing subparagraph (a) is either five times the value of the exports involved or $50,000, which-
ever is greater, or a five-year prison sentence, or both. Id.
494. Draft Stint, supra note 249, at H 12156 (heading entitled "Section 113-Violations").
495. Id.
496. A section 1 l(b) violation carries a penalty of $250,000, or ten years imprisonment, or
both, in the case of an individual or a fine of five times the value of the exports involved, or
$1,000,000, whichever is greater, in the case of non-individual entities. 50 U.S.C. § 2401(a)
(1986).
497. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § Il(b), at 529.
498. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 112(b)(3), at 146-47.
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person or entity (1) intends to violate national security or foreign pol-
icy controls or (2) knows that the items would be so exported.
499
Finally, an act done with the intent of evading the provisions of
the Export Administration Act (or regulation, order or license issued
under it) will be subject to 11 (a) penalties, unless it is an evasion of a
national security or foreign policy control. Then it is subject to the
higher 11 (b) penalties. 500
2. Civil sanctions and penalties
The Secretary of Commerce has the authority under section
11 (c) to impose civil penalties, either in addition to or in lieu of any
other liability or penalties imposed, for violations of the Act or a regu-
lation, order or license issued under the Act.50
1
The Senate Banking Committee wanted to give Commerce the
authority to revoke or suspend the export privileges of any person
convicted of violating any other federal law arising out of an export
prohibited under the Export Administration Act,50 2 but the Joint
Conference Committee decided not to adopt it.503 A provision that
was adopted was the related Senate measure that persons convicted of
violating the Arms Export Control Act or certain espionage statutes
may be ineligible to apply for or use an export license under the Ex-
port Administration Act for a period of up to ten years.5°4
A new penalty that Commerce may now impose under the Act,
in addition to other penalties in its arsenal, is to require violators of
national security controls to forfeit to the government goods or tangi-
ble items that were the subject of the violation as well as any tangible
property used in or derived from the violation.50 5
In the interest of encouraging cooperation with the government
in disclosing a violation, the President is authorized to set standards
for establishing levels of civil penalties, based upon "the seriousness of
the violation, the culpability of the violator, and the violator's record
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. 50 U.S.C. § 2410 (1986). The Attorney General must bring any criminal charges that
arise. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 113(a), at 149 (adding paragraph (5)).
502. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 73 (paragraph (c)(3)).
503. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12156 (heading entitled "Subsection (e)-Forfeiture;
Prior Convictions").
504. Id. See also Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 112(e), at 148 (adding new paragraph
(h)).
505. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 112(e), at 147-48 (adding new paragraph (g)).
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of cooperation with the government in disclosing the violation. '50 6
Finally, a provision desired by the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee prohibits exceptions to orders denying export privileges unless
the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Banking Committee are first
consulted.50 7 This would allow Congress an opportunity to review the
justification for any such exception.50 8 The House Report accompa-
nying the introduction of this measure stated, as well, that the draft-
ers expected "such consultation to occur well in advance of approval
of any exception."50 9
3. Judicial review
The 1979 Act provides for a number of civil penalties to punish
the violators of the Export Administration Act and regulations, or-
ders, and licenses issued under it, all at the disposal of the Secretary of
Commerce. They include (1) suspension or revocation of a validated
license, (2) a general denial, as well as a temporary denial, of export
privileges, (3) exclusion from practice before the Department of Com-
merce, and (4) civil money penalties. Under the 1985 amendments,
Commerce may also impose certain forfeiture penalties. 10
Before the 1985 amendments, however, those alleged to have
committed violations of the Act had almost no right to independent
judicial review, 511 because section 13 of the Act exempted functions
carried out under the Export Administration Act from the provisions
of the Administrative Procedures Act, a statute designed to provide
due process and procedural rights in administrative proceedings.
51 2
The policy reason behind this exemption, as explained by Senator
Proxmire, was
the intimate relation to foreign policy and national security of the
functions invoked under this act. These foreign policy and na-
506. Id. at 147 (adding paragraph (4)).
507. Id. (adding paragraph (3)).
508. H. REP. No. 257 pt. I, supra note 134, at 14.
509. Id.
510. 130 CONG. REC. S1702 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dixon (D-Ill.)).
511. Id.
512. Id. at S1700 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Section 13(a) provides: "except as pro-
vided in section 1 l(c)(2)[regarding violations of the anti-boycott provisions of section 8], the
functions exercised under this Act are excluded from the operation of sections 551, 553
through 559, and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code." Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra
note 21, § 13(a), at 531. The Administrative Procedures Act is a statute designed to provide
due process and procedural rights in administrative proceedings. 130 CONG. REC. S1703 (daily
ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
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tional security functions may at times require secrecy, speed, unity
of design, and special expertise. We certainly did not, and do not
now want, the courts second guessing the President with regard to
how he carries out such functions under this act.513
Senator Dixon 51 4 and others on the Senate Subcommittee on In-
ternational Finance and Monetary Policy were concerned, nonethe-
less, because civil penalties were being imposed without giving alleged
violators a chance to defend or explain their position. 515
Alleged criminal violations of the act are handled like alleged crim-
inal violations of any other Federal statute; a full trial, judicial re-
view, and all the usual safeguards apply. However, the treatment
of alleged civil violators of the act is far different than applies in
most other areas of Federal law. Under the Export Administration
Act, the Commerce Department essentially gets to act as prosecu-
tor, judge, and jury, with essentially no right of independent judi-
cial review.
516
a. administrative procedure under the 1979 Act
Under the 1979 Act, proceedings to impose sanctions were held
before a hearing commissioner, a position not having the same inde-
pendence as an administrative law judge. 51 7 Even fewer safeguards
accompanied the granting of temporary denial orders, which were be-
ing imposed on an ex parte basis and which could last indefinitely. 5
Commerce regulations required a hearing but did not specify when
the hearing had to be held. 519 Thus, a temporary denial order could
be imposed without any proceeding guaranteeing the right of the af-
fected party to be present and no timely right to contest the matter
afterward. 5
20
Under section 1 l(f) of the 1979 Act,52' if a party failed to pay a
penalty imposed under 11 (c), the government could enforce it by go-
ing to the district court. 522 In such an action, the court was required
513. 130 CONG. REC. S1700 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
514. D-111.
515. Id.
516. Id. at S1702 (statement of Sen. Dixon).




521. This section was eliminated by the 1985 Act. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 114,
at 150.
522. Pub. L. No. 96-72, supra note 21, § 11(0, at 530.
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under the Act to determine de novo all issues necessary to the estab-
lishment of liability.5 23 But, as Senator Dixon explained,
the Commerce Department has never, as I understand it, at-
tempted to go to court in the past to collect a fine in any event.
What the Department did instead, in some cases at least, was to
impose temporary denial orders, which of course are not subject to
judicial review, and then only remove the temporary denial order
when the party paid the fine determined to be appropriate by the
Department.
524
b. EAAA 1985 allows a narrow form of judicial review
in section 11 cases
To remedy these problems without exposing national security
and foreign policy decisions to judicial scrutiny, the EAAA 1985 pro-
vides a narrow exception to the Export Administration Act's exemp-
tion from judicial review. The Act now provides:
In any case in which a civil penalty or other civil sanction (other
than a temporary denial order or a penalty or a sanction for a vio-
lation of section 8 [regarding boycotts, for which the Act provides
special procedures]) is sought under section 11 of this Act, the
charged party is entitled to receive a formal complaint specifying
the charges and, at his or her request, to contest the charges in a
hearing before an administrative law judge. Subject to the provi-
sions of this subsection, any such hearing shall be conducted in
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of title 5, United States
Code.
5 25
For those persons and businesses on whom the Commerce De-
partment has imposed civil sanctions under the Export Administra-
tion Act, therefore, the law now accords:
(1) a hearing before an administrative law judge rather than a hearing
commissioner;
(2) the rights, for example, to submit briefs, call witnesses, cross-ex-
amine witnesses and submit supporting materials; and
(3) after the administrative law judge has made his or her findings of
fact and conclusions of law in written form, the right to appeal
this decision to the Secretary of Commerce, who within thirty
days must review the decision and either affirm, modify or vacate
523. Id.
524. 130 CONG. REC. S1703 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
525. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 114, at 150.
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it.526
The Senate sought to make the Secretary of Commerce's decision
appealable to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 527
but the Joint Conference Committee would not agree to this feature of
the Senate bill. 528 Under the 1985 amendments, therefore, this deci-
sion by the Secretary of Commerce is final and is not subject to judi-
cial review.
529
c. temporary denial orders
The treatment of temporary license denials under the 1985
amendments to the Act is slightly different from that of other civil
sanctions. A temporary denial order can still be imposed ex parte, but
is limited to a 60-day duration and may only be imposed to prevent an
"imminent violation of this Act." The order can only be renewed for
60-day periods and then solely (1) to prevent such imminent violation
and (2) after notice and an opportunity for a hearing is provided. 530
d. license denials
The 1985 amendments to section 11 provide for appeal of a very
limited type of license denial. One may now appeal the narrow ques-
tion of whether or not the item proposed to be exported is actually on
the Control List. This is not a right to appeal the question of whether
the item is properly on the Control List-only an opportunity to set-
tle questions of product characterization under the descriptions given
on the list.531
Thus, if Commerce denies a license under section 10(f) of the
Act, the applicant has a right of appeal to an administrative law
judge, "who shall have the authority to conduct proceedings to deter-
mine only whether the item sought to be exported is in fact on the
control list. ' ' 532 The written determination by the administrative law
judge is appealable to the Secretary of Commerce, whose written deci-
sion is final. 533 Subject to some safeguards, the Secretary's decision is
526. 130 CONG. REC. S1703 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
527. Id. at S1702.
528. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12156 (heading entitled "Section 114-Exemption
from Judicial Review").
529. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 114, at 151.
530. Id.
531. 130 CONG. REC. S1703 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
532. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 114, at 151.
533. Id. at 151-52.
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to be published in the Federal Register.5 34 As noted by Senator
Dixon, this "provision is designed to help bring greater precision to
the control list, and to provide additional guidance to the business
community as to what is being controlled. '535
4. Import sanctions against foreign violators
As originally proposed, S. 979 included a provision that would
have allowed the President to impose import sanctions in two national
security-related situations:
(1) against anyone violating a national security control imposed
under section 5 of the Act; and
(2) against anyone violating any regulation issued pursuant to a mul-
tilateral agreement to control exports for national security pur-
poses (to which the United States is a party).
5 36
Presidential authority to impose import sanctions in the first situ-
ation-violation of a U.S. law-was adopted by the Senate without
protest and subsequently adopted by the full Congress in the 1985
amendments. 537 Presidential authority to impose import sanctions in
the second situation-violation of what are essentially a foreign coun-
try's laws-underwent a major modification before it passed the Sen-
ate and became part of the 1985 amendments. The Senate's debate
over the matter, which took place shortly before S. 979 was passed, 538
highlights the competing factors that made it difficult to agree on this
country's best approach to increasing the strength and effectiveness of
multilateral cooperation to control high technology exports.
a. Banking Committee's proposed sanctions
against CoCom violators
It will be recalled from the discussion on CoCom that one of the
things that really irks U.S. businesspersons is to lose a market to for-
eign competition because our government turns down a license appli-
cation, in adherence to CoCom regulations, while the competitor's
government, a CoCom member, does nothing when its companies ex-
534. Id. at 152.
535. 130 CONG. REC. S1703 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
536. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 73.
537. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 121, at 155 (amending Chapter 4 of title II of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1864 (1986), by adding new section 233).
538. See 130 CONG. REC., S1716 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (beginning with heading entitled
"Amendment No. 2742") to S1721.
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port in violation of the same regulations.5 39 The Banking Committee
thus sought to obtain for the President the authority to impose sanc-
tions against such foreign companies as punishment for not adhering
to the CoCom agreement. They believed that the ever-present threat
of this remedial action would work to motivate greater compliance
with CoCom requirements.
b. Finance Committee's concerns about possible
negative consequences
The Senate Finance Committee, on the other hand, reasoned that
the use of such a device would backfire, actually undermining CoCom
cooperation. Senator Danforth, 54° therefore, introduced an amend-
ment to S. 979, deleting the authority to impose import sanctions
against foreign violators of multilateral security agreements. 541 As ex-
pressed by Senator Danforth, the main flaw with this provision was its
disregard for "foreign, particularly European, sensitivities to Ameri-
can infringements on their sovereignty. ' ' 542 Since CoCom is only a
voluntary organization, said Danforth, the best hope of enforcing con-
trols on high-technology exports to the Soviet bloc is through tactics
aimed at motivating increased cooperation from the governments
involved.543
Another problem that would likely arise from the use of this pro-
vision, the senator said, was retaliation against U.S. exports in bitter
resentment over yet another manifestation of the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law. 544 Senator Danforth inferred that the United
States has no right to act as a judge of whether foreign laws have been
adhered to and to mete out justice to presumed violators. 545 The sen-
ator also pointed out that this provision would be directed against our
closest allies, who are likewise our major trading partners.546 The
proposed measure would thus jeopardize our own trading interests. 547
Finally, as evidence of the Administration's concurrence with his peti-
tion (that of the Finance Committee), Senator Danforth placed in the
539. See supra text accompanying note 374.
540. R-Mo.
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Congressional Record a supporting letter from Lionel Olmer, Under
Secretary for International Trade.
548
c. compromise reached in EAAA 1985
The Banking Committee returned the volley with an amendment
of its own, a compromise retreating from the Banking Committee's
original position but retaining the possibility of presidential authority
to impose sanctions against violators of CoCom regulations.549 This
compromise measure eventually became part of the 1985
amendments. 550
While the Banking Committee did come out the victor in that
contest, Committee Chairman Jake Garn took the opportunity to
make it clear that he would have preferred the force of the original
measure as a necessary tool to pressure our allies into compliance:
I do not think that in my entire public career, I have ever seen so
many European parliamentarians come to try to convince me of
the error of my ways than I have in the past year .... This Sena-
tor understands their problems with extraterritoriality and also
with export controls but I have very little sympathy. . . .For a
mess of pottage, for a few jobs, [the Europeans] are willing to sell
most anything they can sell to anybody without regard to
security. 551
Senator Garn noted the fact that the United States spends a great
deal for the military defense of the Europeans and Japanese, and he
remonstrated our allies' seeming disregard for the national security of
us all by "selling the Soviets our technology jewels." Senator Garn felt
that the measure as originally proposed was needed to "send a
message" to our allies that they had better cooperate and "quit selling
our enemies strategic and technological goods that increase [the
United States'] defense budget. ' 55 2
The compromise agreed to that day, later enacted in the EAAA
1985, 551 gives the President power to impose import controls against
548. Id.
549. Id. at S1720.
550. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 121, at 155.
551. 130 CONG. REC. S1720 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
552. Id.
553. Pub. L. No. 99-64 authorizes import sanctions by providing for an amendment to
Chapter 4 of title II of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5,
§ 121, at 155.
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foreign violators of multilateral security agreements, but only if the
following three conditions are met:
(1) an unremedied violation to such an agreement has been identified
and the President has been unsuccessful in quietly negotiating with
the government concerned to achieve compliance;
(2) the President has announced to the government concerned and to
the other parties to the multilateral agreement his intention to im-
pose import sanctions in sixty days against the offending company;
and
(3) after 60 days, a majority of the parties to the multilateral agree-
ment have indicated their support for the sanctions or have ab-
stained from stating a position.
55 4
Senator Heinz, of the Banking Committee, explained that this
compromise measure would "multilateralize" the enforcement effort
and bring the issue "directly to the attention of all the CoCom
members." 55
5
In particular, it makes the government of the offending country
confront the problem of ineffective enforcement or noncompliance
with Cocom rules and discuss the issue with other Cocom mem-
bers. I believe that that process will result in correcting the prob-
lem and thereby enhance the enforcement of these export controls.
Finally, Mr. President, I think it avoids some of the trade pol-
icy concerns that Senator DANFORTH has raised, because what we
have created is a process that should result in the import sanction
never ultimately having to be imposed. 556
Senator Danforth "reluctantly and temporarily" gave in to the
compromise proposed by the Banking Committee, but he said he
hoped it would be removed by the Joint Conference Committee. He
stated his understanding that the Administration also opposed even
this revised form of the provision. 557 Now that this limited authority
to impose such sanctions has become law, it will be interesting to see
whether this new arrow in the diplomatic quiver is as loath to be used
as Senator Danforth believed.
554. 130 CONG. REC. S1719 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
555. Id. at S1720.
556. Id.
557. Id. at S1721.
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G. Embassies Specifically Made Subject to Export
Administration Controls
Reports of illegal exports via diplomatic pouches and shipments
from embassies and affiliates in the United States raised concerns in
the executive branch and both houses of Congress. 558 The Banking
Committee noted the discovery by Customs officers that embassies
and missions were being used as conduits for illegal exports.559 In
addition, the Committee stated that certain foreign government-
owned companies have used their legitimate operations to gain access
to controlled goods and technologies, establish business relationships,
and then serve as a front for illegal operations, meanwhile becoming
directly involved with illegal exports.56° The Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, concluding that tougher enforcement of laws prohibiting espio-
nage, conspiracy, and theft-rather than stricter standards for
licensing-was the solution to technology leaks by illicit means, went
on to list foreign embassies to the United States as one of the targets
for increased control. 5
61
Thus, although the Act had not previously precluded the imposi-
tion of such controls,562 the executive branch requested, and Congress
conferred, express authority in this area.563 The 1985 amendments
add to section 5(a)(1) the power to regulate sales to foreign embassies
and affiliates 564 of controlled countries.565
558. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 6; H. REP. No. 257 pt. l,supra note 134, at 5, 17.
559. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 6.
560. Id.
For several years a high official of the Polish Government-owned firm Polamco,
which is incorporated in Delaware and Illinois, obtained information on several U.S.
defense systems through an employee of a prominent American defense contractor.
Although the Polish official and the American were subsequently convicted and
jailed for their involvement, Polamco was allowed to continue its operations.
Id.
561. H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 4-5.
562. Id. at 17.
563. Id.; Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(a)(l), at 123.
564. The Report of the Senate Banking Committee defined "affiliate" as including "diplo-
matic officers, employees of foreign governments, and offices of foreign governments such as
consulates, offices of military attaches, and permanent and temporary trade or diplomatic mis-
sions." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 102, at 6.
565. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 105(a)(1), at 123. The Joint Conference Commit-
tee adopted the House version of this provision. Draft Stmt, supra note 249, at H12151 (sec-
tion entitled "Subsection (a)-Transfers to Embassies"). The House Report recorded the
Foreign Affairs Committee's intent that
the new controls authorized in this legislation be implemented by the Commerce
Department and other agenices to which it may delegate enforcement responsibilities
in the closest possible consultation and coordination with the Secretary of State, par-
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VII. CONCLUSION
As Dr. Freedenberg pointed out in his December 1982 discussion
of the soon-to-expire 1979 Act, the 1970's were a time in which "the
U.S. lead in many aspects of high technology dwindled or disap-
peared. '566 He went on to say:
For the first time in the postwar era, U.S. high technology firms
saw their foreign markets taken away by aggressive new competi-
tors and even their domestic share challenged. This meant that
export controls and other constraints, which served as a nuisance
in earlier times of unquestioned U.S. high technology dominance,
could possibly make the difference between holding on to an im-
portant market or losing it, or the difference between penetrating a
lucrative new market or forfeiting it to a foreign competitor.
5 67
The increasingly high U.S. trade deficit was a concern of many
legislators, who saw in the expired 1979 Act an opportunity to turn
the situation around.5 68 They hoped that by modifying the Act to
remove arguably superfluous controls, the level of U.S. exports could
be increased.
569
As discussed at length in this article, the administration of ex-
ports under the 1979 Act was creating several roadblocks for U.S.
exports and hampering their competitiveness in the world market.
Particularly problematic were the following:
(1) the ill-advised use of foreign policy controls by Presidents Carter
ticularly with regard to the authorities and responsibilities of the Department of
State under sections 202, 203, and 204 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act
of 1956, as amended by the Foreign Mission Act (Public Law 97-241).
H. REP. No. 257 pt. 1, supra note 134, at 5.
566. Freedenberg, supra note 1, at 2190.
567. Id.
568. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. H2010 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1985) (statement of Rep.
AuCoin (D-Or.)); 130 CONG. REC. S2142 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg (D-N.J.)); 130 CONG. REC. S1860 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Tsongas (D-Mass.)).
569. As Congressman Bonker told an audience in his remarks before a July 18, 1985 con-
ference on the EAAA 1985:
There is a whole litany of industries that is being impacted by exports. So, it is
understandable that the pressure is on Congress to act. ...
The fact is that if we do not do something to bring down the trade deficit, we
have no choice but to move down the path of protectionism. . ..
High technology happens to be the one place where America is still competitive,
yet last year we posted an $8 billion deficit on high technology. This year [1985] it
will be $12 billion. As long as we have these restraints on our ability to export, we
are not going to be competitive and that deficit will grow.
Address by Rep. Bonker, supra note 8, at 3.
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and Reagan, resulting in U.S. companies gaining a reputation for
unreliability;
(2) the imposition of unilateral controls despite foreign availability,
which forced U.S. companies to relinquish profitable foreign mar-
kets to European and Asian competitors, who rushed in to fill the
vacancy; and
(3) the more onerous pre-licensing documentation and review re-
quired by the Office of Export Administration, as compared with
the requirements of our competitors' governments, resulting in (a)
longer waits to buyers of U.S. merchandise, and (b) the annoying
requirement that foreign customers warrant not to re-export their
U.S. purchases without prior authorization from the OEA.
Despite these negative factors, however, many in Congress and
the Administration believed that the leakage of Western technology
into the hands of the Soviets posed such a threat to national security,
that the foremost task during the Export Administration Act
reauthorization process was to ensure that existing licensing require-
ments were not eliminated570 and that heightened safeguards were
provided. 571
The bill that was finally approved by the 99th Congress passed
because both sides saw in it significant improvements over the licens-
ing and enforcement mechanisms of the 1979 Act. The following two
subsections highlight these gains.
A. Recapitulation of Gains for United States Exporters
Gains for United States Exporters in EAAA 1985
" Elimination of requirement for some validated licenses namely
those required solely because goods contain embedded
microprocessors and those for "low-tech" goods, such as per-
sonal computers, to CoCom destinations.
" Expedited licensing time, particularly through fifteen- and thirty-
working-day licensing of "high-tech" goods to CoCom
destinations.
" Increased attention to foreign availability, both before imposing
controls and as a reason to lift controls.
* Tighter restrictions on presidential use of foreign policy controls.
570. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. E3283 (daily ed. June 30, 1983) (statement of Rep. Roth);
129 CONG. REC. E4289 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (statement of Rep. Roth).
571. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S1636 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of Sen. Helms);
130 CONG. REC. S1710 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
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* Increased emphasis on multiple-transaction licenses.
* Continuation of the Department of Commerce as the lead
agency for licensing and enforcement over commercial exports.
The elimination of the validated license requirement in the case
of goods containing embedded microprocessors and for "low tech"
goods to CoCom destinations is particularly important. It means
more companies can get involved in selling their products abroad-
without the bother and delay of obtaining a validated license. The
reduced turnaround time on licensing "high-tech" goods to CoCom
destinations, if implemented as outlined by the 1985 Act,5 72 will en-
able exporters to put newly developed technology on the world mar-
ket more quickly and help exporters respond faster to the demands of
their foreign customers. The new law also increases the number of
products available for export by broadening the definition of "foreign
availability." Further, the new law shifts the burden of proof on this
issue from the exporter to the Office of Export Administration, which
must now prove that foreign availability does not exist. 573
Explicit mandatory prerequisites to presidential imposition of
572. In an interview with Washington International Business Report, the Commerce De-
partment's Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration William T. Archey, acknowleged
that complying with the "fast track" licensing requirements for high-tech exports to CoCom
destinations could be difficult for the Office of Export Administration:
The second issue is the one that will be the most difficult-the new requirement that,
effective 120 days after enactment, if a product does require a license to CoCom, it
should be licensed within 15 working days, unless the Commerce Department says to
the exporter that it needs an additional 15 working days. For most of the products
that is not going to be a problem. For some licenses to CoCom we still do pre-license
checks. Doing that within 6 weeks (30 working days) will not be easy.
A related problem is that we are required under the statute to provide a notifica-
tion of receipt of the application. In that notification we are to include a license
number so that if the exporter has not been informed otherwise by us by the 15th
working day, they can ship without the hard copy of the license. That is going to
create some problems because there will be some times when we will need to hold up
shipment but the word did not get out. Something may go that shouldn't or we will
worry about the opposite problem, something that should go won't. I think this is
going to require enormous coordination with Customs and I think, in the initial
stages, it is going to have some problems. We are doing everything we can to avoid
them.
The Washington International Business Report Talks with . . . William T. Archey, WASH.
INT'L Bus. REP., Aug. 10, 1985, at 2 (available from International Business-Government
Counsellors, Inc., 1625 Eye St., N.W., Wash., D.C. 20006) [hereinafter cited as WIBR].
573. As William Archey further expressed to the Washington International Business
Report:
Another big change is in foreign availability. We think we now have a very active
program which is going to be very, very important and beneficial, and we are fully
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foreign policy controls have been written into the Export Administra-
tion Act to protect exporters' contractual commitments from revoca-
tion by foreign policy-based trade sanctions. Legislators hope this
measure will work to rebuild U.S. suppliers' reputation for reliability.
Unfortunately, these changes to the 1979 Act may be insufficient to
eliminate the problem, for the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) 574 provides an alternative source of presidential
power to revoke foreign contracts. Congressman Bonker has sug-
gested that the addition of a "contract sanctity provision" to IEEPA
may also be in order.57 5
In a move to place greater personal accountability in export ad-
ministration on the private sector, while at the same time seeking to
facilitate large-volume exporting operations, Congress has codified in
the 1985 Act several of the multiple-export licenses developed by the
Office of Export Administration. This is particularly true of the dis-
tribution license and the newly authorized license for transfers of
technical data, called the comprehensive operations license. The dis-
tribution license is intended to be granted "primarily on the basis of
the reliability of the applicant and foreign consignees with respect to
the prevention of diversion of goods to controlled countries. ' 576 Simi-
larly, the envisioned comprehensive operations license is intended for
transactions "from a domestic concern to and among its foreign sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, joint venturers, and licensees that have long-term,
contractually defined relations with the exporter. ' 577 In practical
staffed. I'm coming more and more to conclude that this is the dark horse program
in export controls.
This is in part because of the fact that when we get a request to immediately
impose unilateral controls on something, we now have a mechanism that says before
we do that we must ask what is the foreign availability? I have a mechanism which
can fairly quickly do a down and dirty search, if you will, throughout the world. We
have a couple of instances right now where the foreign availability aspect of the cases
is absolutely going to be dispositive as to whether or not we have controls.
Id.
574. 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1985). See supra notes 33, 243 and accompanying text.
575. Address by Rep. Bonker, supra note 8, at 3.
[Wihen the State Department appeared before the committee I asked, 'If the EAA
had been alive and well, and if we had no contract sanctity provision, which would
you have chosen, IEEPA or the EAA to impose that embargo [against Nicaragua]?'
The official response was IEEPA. All of the work that we have put into contract
sanctity to protect American businessmen with long-term commitments in the world
community goes out the window because the President at any time, through a mere
whim, can invoke IEEPA. Does that mean now that we have to go back now and put
a contract sanctity provision in IEEPA?
Id.
576. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 104(a), at 122 (amending section 4(a)(2)(A)).
577. Id. (amending section 4(a)(2)(B)).
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terms, this means that both the distribution license and the compre-
hensive operations license will be used only by companies having an
enormous volume of export transactions and highly systematic inter-
nal controls over those operations.
578
Finally, significant for the fact that a major shift in agency lead-
ership was not implemented, the locus of primary licensing and en-
forcement authority is maintained in the Commerce Department. The
Commerce Department is now charged, however, with the obligation
to cooperate with the Customs Service in its enforcement responsibili-
ties. Moreover, there now seems to be an expectation, on the part of
Congress, that the Commerce Department achieve more of a balance
in licensing between promoting exports and safeguarding national se-
curity. Otherwise, there are those in Congress who intend to go
ahead with the proposal to create an Office of Strategic Trade.5 79
It should be noted that the EAAA 1985 establishes a new under
secretary and two assistant secretaries of Commerce for export ad-
ministration. 5 0 This provision will take effect on October 1, 1986.581
The impact of this bureaucratic change on U.S. exports, which Con-
gress did not discuss extensively during reauthorization debates, 582
remains to be seen.
578. James Branagan, corporate counsel for TRW Inc., Automotive Worldwide Sector,
advises that for those companies exporting about $25 million or less in sales per year, it would
be more practical and feasible to export under a so-called "bulk license" than to try to obtain a
distribution license. A "bulk license" can cover up to a year's supply of shipments and re-
export approvals, necessitating only the legwork of obtaining annual renewal of OEA ap-
proval. However, for companies contemplating going from using a bulk license to a distribu-
tion license, it should be noted that each bulk license---even though it covers multiple
exports-counts as only one validated license, and a distribution license is only available if it
replaces twenty-five validated licenses. Exporters should also be aware that obtaining a distri-
bution license requires extensive, well-documented and complete records, able to withstand the
comprehensive Commerce Department audits. Thus, for a sales volume under $25 million per
year, exporters would not likely find a distribution license cost effective over a bulk license.
Telephone interview with James J. Branagan, Senior Counsel, TRW Inc., Automotive World-
wide Sector, Solon, Ohio (Nov. 20, 1985).
579. As Senator Garn commented on the day the EAAA 1985 was passed:
I would have preferred to establish a new Federal agency to administer our export
controls, which would have been a far more efficient means of bringing balance to
export administration. The provisions of the legislation, however, may serve to bring
balance into export controls that has been lacking up to now. If that does not prove
to be the case in the future, I think the case for establishment of a separate Federal
agency will have been unquestionably made.
131 CONG. REC. S8923 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
580. Pub. L. No. 99-64, supra note 5, § 116(a), at 152 (creating section 15).
581. Id. § 116(d), at 153.
582. NAM Green Memo, supra note 233, at 12.
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B. Recapitulation of Gains for United States National Security
Gains for United States National Security in EAAA 1985
" Increased ability to focus enforcement resources on higher-risk
export transactions.
" Increased enforcement authority in both Commerce and the
Customs Service, with greater coordination of effort between the
two agencies.
* Enhanced efficiency within the Department of Defense for ex-
port-related responsibilities by coordination through the newly
created National Security Control Office within DOD.
* Heightened effectiveness of multilateral control agreements by a
move to strengthen the CoCom entity.
* Stricter civil and criminal penalties authorized for violators of
export control laws.
" Greater restrictions placed on sales of technology for foreign em-
bassies and affiliates of controlled countries located in the United
States.
Since even the severe tightening of licensing controls would prob-
ably not prevent the Soviet Union from benefitting militarily from
U.S. technology, 83 it is understandable that legislators chose to tem-
per the 1979 Act's reliance on broad licensing requirements, 584 in
favor of encouraging increased exports to counterbalance the trade
deficit. Instead, the EAAA 1985 responds to the Soviet threat by em-
phasizing improved use of enforcement mechanisms.
It is interesting that, as a consequence, one of the greatest gains
to the cause of insulating U.S. technological advancements from So-
viet acquisition is actually the flip side of the move to eliminate the
validated license requirement for large numbers of lower-risk exports.
Now that numerous transactions do not require a validated license at
all, enforcement resources can be focused on monitoring exports of
583. OTA, supra note 60, at 12.
584. Regarding the limitations on the effectiveness of licensing controls, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment study observed:
In sum, there are severe constraints on the power of U.S. export licensing to deny the
Soviet Union access to the Western technologies it most wants. These constraints
include the extent to which the Soviets use illegal means to acquire Western technol-
ogy; lack of allied agreement on a more strenuous multilateral export control policy;
the difficulties inherent in identifying in advance which technologies will have impor-
tant military payoffs; and the increasing worldwide diffusion of technology.
Id. at 11-12.
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higher-level technology to higher-risk destinations. Congressman
Roth, speaking in support of the bill as it was about to pass both
houses of Congress, commented on this gain for national security
interests:
The bill shifts our manpower resources at the export licensing stage
to more carefully review U.S. overseas sales of high technologies.
With a limited staff, the Commerce Department now reviews about
125,000 licenses. The new law eliminates about 40 percent of the
workload. This provision will enable Commerce's licensing officers
to scrutinize more effectively high technology trade flows and des-
tinations and improve our ability to detect surreptitious
transactions. 585
Another gain is that the compromise plan to split enforcement
responsibilities between Commerce and Customs has the potential of
bringing the best capabilities of both agencies to the task of identify-
ing and safeguarding those areas of greatest risk. Since the two agen-
cies must in some instances work together, it seems a plus factor that
the present Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, William T.
Archey, was formerly Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Customs
Service. 586
Both the creation of the National Security Control Office, within
the Department of Defense, and the measures passed to strengthen
CoCom as a multilateral control mechanism are moves to better util-
ize and streamline existing, security-minded organizations for more
effective control over high-technology trade. Lastly, the provisions
for stricter penalties for export law violations and the explicit recogni-
tion of authority to regulate domestic sales to foreign embassies and
affiliates of controlled countries are designed to give more muscle (and
teeth) to the area of deterrence.
C. Closing Remarks to the Exporting Community
This detailed study of the legislative reasoning behind the EAAA
1985, is designed to give U.S. exporters a clear understanding of con-
585. 131 CONG. REC. H5060 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
586. WIBR, supra note 572, at 1. The Washington International Business Report noted
that prior to coming to his Commerce Department post in 1983, Mr. Archey
served as Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service between 1979 and 1982.
During the period from December 1980 until September 1981, he served as Acting
Commissioner. During his tenure at Customs, he also headed the U.S. Delegation to
the Customs Cooperation Council and served as Vice Chairman of the Council's
Policy Commission in 1980 and 1981.
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gressional intent. It was Congress' strong desire that the volume of
U.S. exports be increased as a result of this bill. In dealing with the
administrative agencies that must implement these changes, exporters
may do well to go armed with the knowledge of exactly how U.S.
business is supposed to reap the benefits of these revisions.
In his speech before a July 18, 1985 conference on the new export
law, Congressman Bonker expressed essentially the same concern,
although in stronger terms:
I don't know how you add up all of these reforms. We are all
happy that the bill passed. I think maybe there is more in it than
we expected. It could have been worse. But I feel that our work
has just begun on the EAA, and I think we would be fooling our-
selves if we thought for a moment that what we put into this new
law is going to be fully implemented, or implemented the way Con-
gress intended. 5
87
United States exporters have a role to play in making sure that
the changes called for in the new law are implemented, particularly by
keeping members of Congress advised on executive branch activity in
this area.58 8 The reforms on behalf of exporters look good on paper.
Now, the exporting community must work to hold the Administra-
tion accountable for these reforms. It is exporters who must ulti-
mately insure that these reforms are not just talk.
587. Address by Rep. Bonker, supra note 8, at 4.
588. Id.
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